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also of M ontreal, and the Gildersleeve family of Kingston,2 2 Although the Allans themselves never bought controlling interest, their close connections with the other principal owners and general satisfaction with the per formance of the company made Hugh Allan's grip on the presidency of the Canadian Inland Steam Navigation Com pany secure, M ANAG E ME NT In the frenzied activity of the spring of 1861, secretarytreasurer Alexander Milloy, Captain Thomas Harbottle and others took on major roles as stock promoters and in vestors. This entrepreneurial initiative would not long be tolerated by the firm's board of directors. Over the next few years sharp distinctions began to be drawn between the roles of ownership and management in the Canadian Inland Steam Navigation Company. Most reflected the for malization of the channels of decision-making within the firm as the chief employees gradually ceased to participate in the boardroom meetings and conversely, as owners ceased to manage the daily affairs of the firm. This process was first evident in the role of the Hon. John Hamilton. Since his first investment in steamboats Hamilton had nearly always combined the role of manager and owner, Now he was reduced to acting as General Manager for the old Mail Line.23 W ith most of the key decision-making done by the directors and the paper work by Milloy as secretary-treasurer, the routine activities of general manager must have made the job seem much like a semi-retirement. W hen major expansions were undertaken in the late sixties the decision was made to employ a superintendent whose duties encompassed some of those previously handled by the general manager. W ith uncharacteristic sensitivity (undoubtedly prom pted by the fact that Hamilton was a Senator and thus politically valuable), the company eased further responsibilities from the shoulders of their aging manager. In Captain Howard, they had a younger, more active employee whose duties included the direction of salvage operations (previously left to the insurance companies), supervision of vessels being con structed for the firm (a task hitherto delegated to the man to be the first commanding officer), and some hiring.2 4 The company's division of responsibility for engaging officers and crew is one of the best examples of the emerg ing bureaucracy. According to statements made in 1873, a fairly rigid selection policy was in force. The directors appointed the captains, the secretary-treasurer picked the pursers, and the superintendent hired the engineers, stewards, pilots and mates. The captains and mates then engaged the rest of the crew, guided only by a scale of maximum wages, 25 The company practice of promoting captains from the `more gentlemanly' ranks of the pursers eventually pro duced a class of captains who, while nominally having 'full control' of a vessel, actually possessed minimal skills in its handling.26 How seriously the promotion of these men af fected morale amongst the other classes of officers is dif ficult to determine without more consistent figures for employee turnover. The data for engineers suggests great mobility in the lower ranks but considerable stability among the first and second class engineers.27 However, chief engineers had never been promoted higher in the passenger trades so the preference given to pursers did not seriously affect their career objectives. For the mates this may have had graver consequences. Any further am bitions they might have entertained could usually only be satisfied by transferring to a freight steamer. While under ordinary circumstances the specialized functions of the officers required minimal supervision, the danger was always that in an emergency the authority of a `purser' captain would prove inadequate, Such in fact, appears to have been the case in the burning of the Bavarian (formerly the Kingston) in 1873 when the crew abandoned the passengers on board and left Captain Carmichael cling ing to some flotsam in the chill November waters.28 This tragedy did little to reinforce the public image of the company's dominant spirit, Sir Hugh Allan, then en trapped in the Pacific Scandal that toppled Sir John A. Macdonald's government. But it would take considerably more than a little criticism to crack the solidarity of the Canadian Navigation Company's Board of Directors. A seven-man body, there was virtually no alteration in its membership after the exclusion of the employees. The Up per Canadian investors retained two of the directorial posi tions, Edward Browne of Hamilton, and first Overton and on his death, Charles Gildersleeve. The majority of the board members represented the Montreal investors. Hugh Allan's partner in almost all his business affairs, brother Andrew, was always assured a seat. Two of the remain ing places were taken by Allan's co-directors in his cen tral financial investment, the Merchant's Bank, W. F, Kay and Robert Anderson (the latter also a director of the Allan Line).29 The fifth Montreal director was M. H. Gault, associated with Allan in the Montreal Mining Company but otherwise a participant in a completely different cir cle of businessmen, centred in Sun Insurance and the Ex change Bank.3 0 Together these men were responsible for the general policy affecting the company's Royal Mail and Saguenay lines, While early in the history of the company, Alexander Milloy would lead negotiations with outside firms, this function would later be assumed by the company presi dent. In 1863 and again six years later the company applied 7