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Page 66 • GREAT LAKES & SEAWAY NEWS WINDOC tied up just above guard gate on Welland Canal - September 18, 2001 ANALYSIS: The bridge operator did not respond to either the radio or the whistle blasts from the WINDOC, which were intended to alert him the vessel was not clear of the bridge. It is unlikely the bridge operator could have heard the radio call given the noise level in the bridge control room, but the operator should have heard the ships whistle. The operator stated he saw the ship clear through the north window and lowered the bridge. Analysis of the ships position before and at the time of impact shows the superstructure was clearly visible through the south window. In the absence of medical testing, which was not conducted following the collision it is not possible to determine what substances might have affected the bridge operators behavior. However, recorded communications in the period surrounding the accident show the operators confusion, slurred speech, impaired memory and lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the event are consistent with substance and/or alcohol intoxication. Therefore it is likely that the operator's performance was impaired at the time of the accident. Videotape recordings of the ship after the collision show that the firefighting response by the ships crew was effective in containing and reducing the fire on the ship. The captain, fearing an engine room fuel oil bay tank explosion and observing firefighters arriving on the bank of the canal withdrew shipboard fire teams to a safe position forward of the superstructure. Although shipboard hoses were directed to contain the fire, attempts to extinguish it were delayed several hours while shore based fire crews obtained suitable boats and boarded the vessel, the result was the fire was able to spread. Because the crew closed the watertight/fire doors the fire was limited to the engine room casing and aftermost area of the crew quarters. Once the shore based firefighters boarded the vessel they did not realize the fire was partially contained due to their training. They opened the watertight/fire doors believing it would ventilate smoke from the vessel. Once opened the fire spread rapidly through the rest of the superstructure. CONCLUSIONS: The approaching WINDOC was visible from the control room at the time the bridge operator started lowering the bridge. It is likely that the operator's performance was impaired at the time of the accident. The responding fire department's lack of training and experience for fighting shipboard fires, lack of equipment to access the vessel, and the non-accessibility of the control plans hindered effective firefighting response. Available firefighting resources in the Welland Canal area were not effectively utilized to contain and extinguish the fire in time to prevent the vessel's accommodation from being destroyed. The sprinkler system installed on the WINDOC was rendered ineffective when the combustible structures supporting it burned causing the pipework to collapse. Photo by Jim Morris