Maritime History of the Great Lakes

Marine Review (Cleveland, OH), 15 Dec 1898, p. 16

The following text may have been generated by Optical Character Recognition, with varying degrees of accuracy. Reader beware!

16 MARINE REVIEW. CLASS OF VESSELS TO BUILD. CAPT. A. T. MAHAN DISCUSSES THE QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEMANDS TO BE MADE UPON THE UNITED STATES NAVY BY NEW CONDITIONS. Capt. A. T. Mahan is devoting quite a little attention to that founda- tional factor, the ships. themselves, in the series of articles on "The War on the Sea and Its Lessons," which he is contributing to McClure's Maga- zine. Referring, in the December number of the magazine, to the propor- tionate excess of war vessels necessary to successfully blockade other war vessels, in connection with the circumstance that Admiral Sampson's armored ships numbered seven to Cervera's four, he says: "The circumstance possesses a further most practical present interest, from its bearing upon the question between numbers and individual size in the organization of the naval line of battle; for the ever importunate demand for increase in dimensions, in the single ship, is already upon the United States navy, and to it no logical, no simply rational, limit has yet been set. This question may be stated as follows: A country can, or will, pay only so much for its war fleet. That amount of money means so much aggregate tonnage. How shall that tonnage be allotted? And especially how shall the total tonnage invested in armored ships be divided? Will you have a few very big ships or more numerous medium ships? Where will you strike your mean between numbers and individual size? You can- not have both unless your purse is unlimited. The Santiago incident, alike in the battle, in the preceding blockade and in the concurrent necessity of sending battleships to Dewey, illustrates various phases of the argument in favor of numbers, as against extremes of individual size. Heavier ships were not needed; fewer ships might have allowed some enemy to escape; the Massachusetts and the New York both being necessarily though tem- porarily absent, would, had the ships been bigger and fewer, have taken much more proportionately from the entire squadron. Above all, had that aggregate, 65,934 of tonnage in seven ships, been divided among five only of 13,000 each, I know not how the two' ships that were designated to go with Watson to the Philippines could possibly have sailed. "The question is momentous and claims intelligent and immediate decision, for tonnage once locked up in a built ship cannot be got out and redistributed to meet the call of the moment. Neither may men evade a definite conclusion by saying that they will have both unlimited power-- namely, size--and unlimited number; for this they cannot have. A decision must be reached and upon it purpose must be concentrated unwayeringly; the disadvantages as well as the advantages of the choice must be acceptea with singleness of mind. Individual size is needed for specific reasons, numbers also are necessary. Between the two opposing demands there is doubtless a mean of individual size which will insure the maximum offen- sive power of the fleet; for that and not the maximum power of the single ship is the true object of battleship construction. Battleships in all ages are meant to act together in fleets, not singly as mere cruisers. "A full discussion of all the considerations on one side or the other of this question would demand'more space than the scope of these papers permits. As with most conclusions of a concrete character dealing with contradictory elements the result reached will inevitably be rather an approximation than an absolute demonstrable certainty; a broad general statement, not a narrow formula. All rules of war, which is not an exact science, but an art, have this characteristic. They do not tell one exactly how to do right, but they give warning when a step is being contemplated which the experience of ages asserts to be wrong. To an instructed mina they cry silently: 'Despite all plausible arguments this one element involved in that which you are thinking to do shows that in it you will go wrong.' In the judgment of the writer two conditions must be primarily considered in determining a class of battleship to which, for the sake 01 ' homogeneousness, most of the fleet should conform. Of these two one must be given in general terms, the other can be stated with more pre- cision. The chief requisite to be kept in view in the battleship is the offensive power of the fleet of which it is a member. The aggregate gunpower of the fleet remaining the same, the increase of its numbers, by limiting the size of the individual ships, tends up to a certain point, to increase its offensive power, for war depends largely upon combination, and facility of combination increases with numbers. Numbers therefore mean increase of offensive power, other things remaining equal. I do not quote in defense of this position Nelson's saying that 'numbers only can annihilate,' because in his day experience had determined a certain mean size of working battleship, and he probably meant merely that preponder- ant numbers of that type were necessary, but weight may justly be laid upon the fact that our forerunners had under the test of experience accepted a certain working mean and had rejected those above and below that mean save for exceptional uses. "The second requisite to be fulfilled in the battleship is known techni- cally as coal endurance--ability to steam a certain distance without recoal- ing, allowing in the calculation a reasonable margin of safety, as in all designs. This standard distance should be the greatest that separates two coaling places as they exist in the scheme of fortified coaling ports which every naval nation should frame for itself. In our own case under evident future conditions, such distance would be that from Honolulu to Guam, in the Ladrones--3,500 miles. The excellent results obtained from our vessels already in commission, embodying as they do the tentative experi- ences of other countries, as well as the reflective powers of our own designers, make it antecedently probable that 10,000 and 12,000 tons rep- resent the extremes of normal displacement advantageous for the United States battleship. When this limit is exceeded observation of foreign navies goes to show that the numbers of the fleet will be diminished and its aggregate gunpower not increased--that is, ships of 15,000 tons actually have little more gunpower than those of 10,000. Both results are devi- ations from the ideal of the battle fleet already given. In the United States navy the tendency to huge ships needs to be particularly watched, for we have a tradition in their favor, inherited from the successes of our heavy frigates in the early years of this century. It must be recalled therefore that those ships were meant to act singly, but that long experience has shown that for fleet operations a mean of size gives greater aggregate efficiency, both in force and in precision of maneuver. In the battleship great speed is distinctly secondary to offensive power and to coal endur- ance, i December 15, RECORDS OF TRANSATLANTIC STEAMERS. Compilation has just been made of the records of the principal trans- atlantic steamers for the year ending in June last. The number oi hours given does not indicate merely the time occupied by the voyage, but the elapsed time between the collection of mails at the New York postothce and their delivery at postoffice at Paris or London. NUMBER AVERAGE TIME QUICKEST LINE AND STEAMER. OF OCCUPIED PER TRIP, TRIPS. TRIP, HOURS. HOURS. NORTH GERMAN LLOYD (NEW YORK TO LONDON, VIA SOUTHAMPTON): ; Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse..............- 8 158.8 Holes (lephiita cots tars eda. eRe recat: a fetes Sata 11 192.1 183.3 Ela Glace ies oye oe nt lae sae eee acon: 7 192.1 185.2 PTR Teny Cet pens cee eset ee at pra ate bats Bloce eae 12 192.9 184.0 Sa alleueees cs at ee eee Bebo ee or ee 6 195.1 189.9 Spreelicn rae naa aa ee eet 1 198.3 198.3 eisemsrnetdnich: =n aes EELS Cae? 1 sen 231.7 CUNARD (NEW YORK TO LONDON, VIA QUEENSTOWN): MEICAT aie eee res saeco cisco: 12 161.8 157.3 Gatiipatita re eee etc ee pent e rete, 12 163.5 aioe CRU ae ee ee en re ees 12 181.7 172.4 WiBac ee hen eee 12 183.3 176.7 Sry ae eae ee ee et mea ee 6 213.1 210.9 Nana ee ee ee eee ee ae 6 216.3 201.5 AMBERICAN (NEW YURK TO LONDON, VIA SOUTHAMPTON): PEE ONDHIS SS cee Seis oe ees a ier en iT 12 171.6 166.3 Geren 1g lege cor ace eh eee oetaec otis Seas 12 174.5 168.3 FIN WeNVG@ fete ee oe ors ER cee See 5 189.6 182.0 Datel Seer tees ee te ee Gh My a Rg lg eg dy 11 191.6 Miia: Berliner ee erie cok. ee Sos os 1 239.2 239.2 HAMBURG-AMERICaAN (NEW YORK TO LONDON, VIA ; SOUTHAMPTON): Golumbiae ce ee i ee oe 5 174.3 173.7 UES tSiiat Cle tree pemey.he ests eer a ne 9 177.8 171.7 INORMantias se ee ae te cee as ne 6 180.4 171.4 ANG ERIRED, WHCHOIBEL Goccsccus usp pbeoo5aonsode 5 187.8 174.8 WHITE STAR (NEW YORK TO LONDON, VIA QUEENS- TOWN): MReULOMICr Wes ee iacce fe ae he ee 13 176.3 168.8 MAW EStIC a. hic ean ce ae Sen 12 176.5 171.4 (Genimanicsncct ose eee ee 13 203.1 197.1 BitantiC ser fat eae ne ar 12 216.3 204.0 DANG talc TOh octet ean era as 2 238.9 235.9 GENERAL TRANSATLANTiC (NEW YORK TO PARIS, VIA HAVRE): : [eae ounalies se ee ee scat ee oeees 8 202.2 187.3 WasB Reta meen: trek aia. orators) sae cies 11 205.8 197.6 arch OlLeO omer qe 8. hse re ee 3 208.4 201.2 a @lramipaetie me... ca eae ao ee en 8 210.7 197.5 [Oa GrascO cles ie een ae eens cigar he 11 211.1 198.3 opeNavainese aoc oe 4. 216.1 210.8 Scie Norstar ies ek eee Petes ccae ih 225.8 204.4 CHICAGO GRAIN FLEE'I--LAKE CARRIERS' ANNUAL. The movement begun in Cleveland, a few days ago, to have inserted in all grain charters made in Chicago during the winter, a clause providing that the ships are not to move until April 25, is not an affair of the Lake Carriers' Association, although it was endorsed by all members of the executive committee of the association who attended the Cleveland meet- ing. The association has refrained at all times from taking action in mat- ters pertaining in any way to freights, but questions of this kind are taken up by the members meeting as vessel owners after adjournment of the asso- ciation meetings, as was done in this case. There will probably be some objection to the proposed action at Chicago, but it is more than probable that the majority of vessel owners are favorable to suchamovementand that the underwriters will do all they can in the matter. Of the total increase of 1,435,143 gross tons in ore shipments this year, full 1,200,000 tons was gained in the first month of the season. There was practically no gain after the middle of May. It is a fact also that when the grain fleet reached Lake Erie ports last spring, they found the opening so early that there was practically no return business, and some of them were tied up in port for a period of nearly two weeks. These are the conditions that prompt the movement to delay departure of the fleet from Chicago next spring. It was decided by the executive committee of the association to leave the mater of fixing a date for the annual meeting of the general organiza- tion in Detroit to Secretary Keep and Treasurer McKay, but as the com- mittee practically decided on March 22, it is more than probable that the annual meeting will be delayed this year until that date. It is thought a better attendance will be secured at a late meeting, and more time will be given to consider during the winter the subjects that are to be discussed. The meeting will very probably be held at the Russell House. ¢ Changes in the new monitors will not be as radical as at first con- templated. After a week's discussion between the naval board 'on construc- tion and the four firms to whom the contracts for the new single-turret monitors were given a conclusion has been reached which seems to be dictated chiefly by an unwillingness to refer the matter to congress for further appropriation. 'The proposed second turret is given up. One turret with 12-inch rifles as planned ioriginally will be provided, but the hulls will be lengthened 27 feet, raising the displacement from 2,800 to 3,100 tons. This will give room for 200 tons more coal, increasing the bunker capacity to 400 tons. The speed will be reduced to WY knots, which will not please the service. This modified plan has not been sub- mitted to the secretary as yet. Such changes indicate an abandonment of the coast defense idea as the exclusive field of these monitors. With their peerless trio of fast express trains daily, low rates, unex- celled dining car service and magnificent vestibuled sleeping cars through to New York City and Boston, the Nickel Plate road offers the traveller to those points every comfort and convenience demanded by the exacting American public, 278, Dec. 31

Powered by / Alimenté par VITA Toolkit
Privacy Policy