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16 | MARINE REVIEW. [October 26, THE NAVAL WARFARE OF THE FUTURE. BY LAWRENCE IRWELL. During the ironclad era we have had actions enough to supply mate- rial for a long and fairly satisfactory history of them, although the first- class vessel has often been absent from the engagements. The Yalu fight came as a revelation, and it knocked down the theories of many enthusiasts who insisted that the day of the ironclad was over. The Yalu affair rehabilitated the ironclad, and thrust the cruiser into the background. Beyond this it taught nothing. We know, without doubt, that the bigger the gun the less likely it is to hit the mark; but our knowledge of the subject only suggests that the best possible lies in a mean--a mean that is left to individual judgment. In 1896 the 12-inch gun embodied this mean; since then, however, the French have discarded it for a heavier weapon. We may expect other nations to follow suit. The ram, tested by results, has proved itself more likely to be fatal by accident than by design. From an absolute belief in it, opinion gradually changed till it was spoken of as an impossible weapon; and the French, previously so, partial to enormous spurs, so far discarded their old ideals as to build their battleship Brennus without any ram at all. Nevertheless, at the same time, our own government was busy constructing the Katah- din, a ram which is now in the navy. France has again begun to build ram-bowed ships, and the British second-class cruiser Arrogant and her sisters are short, double-ruddered ships, specially designed for use as rams. - The whole truth about the ram is evidently not yet known. The torpedo also forms debatable ground. With the torpedo-boat I shall deal later on; here I propose to speak of the torpedo-tube. The torpedo is a destructive weapon, but it cannot be used satisfactorily at a range much in excess of a quarter of a mile. At that distance the big gun can hardly miss, and its damage is quite as appalling as any that the less accurate torpedo could accomplish. Moreover, the slow speed of a torpedo--slow in comparison with a projectile--infinitely increases the danger of damaging a friend instead of the enemy aimed at. Further, every part of the ironclad not heavily armored being searched by quick- fire shell, the torpedoes are likely to be exploded in their tubes long before they can be utilized. So fully is this recognized that the under-water tube alone is being adopted for new designs, while the above-water tube is condemned entirely. Submerged tubes, however, are said to be difficult to use. In the American navy, as well as in the British, the deflection of the torpedo caused by the ship's movement has been reduced to a few degrees, but perfection has not been obtained. 'With other nations, the tube being of cruder design, the deflection is sufficiently great to make a hit at any considerable range almost a matter of pure chance. SOME THINGS THAT WILL HAPPEN UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS. At present the gun holds the field as the weapon par excellence. It is fairly certain to hit the target at ranges under 1,000 yards and it will hit occasionally up to 4,000. Much 'beyond this latter distance the target offered by a ship is a spec so tiny that all the odds seem against a hit. A mile and a half is, perhaps, the greatest range at which any serious firing could be even attempted. Near or far, however, it needs no gift of prophecy to forsee some of the things that will be sure to happen under present-day conditions. Increased range will merely prolong the early stages of an action. Sooner or later all unarmored portions of the battle- ships will be blown to pieces; wreckage will gradually block the guns; shot-holes in the ventilators will reduce the speed and will make the engine-room an Inferno of heat. Two hundred degrees Fahrenheit may be looked for there, and it will have to be endured. The water-line is little likely to be hit, but rents just above it will be plentiful enough where there is no armor; and if there should be any sea on, the tons of water thus shipped will seriously affect a ship's speed, if they do not actually capsize her. The electric lights will cease to work; there will be nothing but oil lamps to penetrate the darkness. Fires may be expected at incon- venient moments. Many naval officers believe that no commander will be able to stand the above condition very long, and that by mutual con- sent the ships will steam into close range, anxious to finish the battle without-further delay. What will happen in such a case, with the ships so close together that no gun can miss, so near that no armor can with- stand the fearful impact, the imagination cannot really grasp. The devasta- tion such an engagement must produce is too tremendous for a fanciful conception. It has one bright side--its endurance must be short. Some authorities think that upon one side or the other, panic will seize the crews, and that men will throw themselves overboard rather than endure pare It may be so. The question is simply how far discipline will old. To return to the long-range fight. Here, great as the apparent destruc- tion may be, the actual damage will be comparatively slight. No captain will attempt to keep his men at the light, unprotected guns; these will be deserted, and damage done to them will not affect a vital part of the ship. The men behind armor will be safe, although they may be bruised; but the guns will not be silenced. The charges of modern shells are chiefly high explosives. These will be burst outside by even quite thin armor. In the few cases in which they enter and explode, the damage will be local. Hence we may look to see most of the ships comparatively sound, even after a long range conflict of considerable duration. _ It takes a great deal to put an ironclad out of action. Even in the old three-decker days, when ships fought gun-muzzle to gun-muzzle; when if there were no shells there were splinters equally terrible; when the motive power was entirely exposed; when the gunners had no protection whatever--even then it was the exception, rather than the rule, for ships to be totally disabled. Nor were the losses in personnel very often suffi- cient to put a vessel out of action. At the battle of Cape St. Vincent, in 1797, which in its tactics closely resembled a modern ironclad fight. the British had only one battleship entirely disabled; and the defeated Span- iards lost but four. It is true that at the Yalu fight between China and Japan, which, in that the victors steered for a gap in the enemy's line, tactically bears some resemblance to St. Vincent, the Japanese had three ships disabled, while the Chinese lost five. This, taking into considera- tion the smaller number of combatants, is about double the proportion of a fight of a hundred years ago; but the above-mentioned battle was, in sev- eral respects an exceptional affair. Its early tactics--which led. to the dis- ablement of two Japanese ships--are not likely to be repeated. (The Japan- ese crossed the enemy's front and exposed their own rear ships in an at- tempt to cut off two small Chinese vessels.) Nonaval power of the first class would include in its fighting-line unarmored ships such as many of these combatants were. Only three ships which can properly be described as ironclads took part in the fight. Two of these were considerably "knocked around," but they did not suffer any vital injury; nor were many men lost on them; yet they were exposed to the fire of guns of over sixty tons for five hours. REAL DANGER OF A MODERN SEA FIGHT. The real danger of a modern sea fight at long range lies in the ammu- nition question. After such a battle, ships, perhaps still quite unsubdued, will be left with empty magazines. The biggest ironclad cannot carry enough for more than a few hours' vigorous cannonadg, and it is now admitted that certain ships are overgunned. With a reduced armament, and consequently greater carrying capacity for ammunition, they would be more satisfactory ships. The problem of modern naval warfare, then, may be expressed in the following question: Will ships fight at long range, hurting each other but little, firing till all the ammunition is ex- pended, or will they get to close quarters and mutually annihilate each other, meeting gun with gun, torpedo with torpedo, ram with ram? It is difficult to see how, in either case victory is to be obtained. In a fleet action, the side which gets in most disorder appears to be usually the loser, but in a duel between battleships this element is absent. The exact amount of ammunition carried on a vessel in war time is a somewhat unknown quantity, but given two ships otherwise equal, we may assume that the larger carries most rounds per gun. Theoretically, A can fight at long range until the enemy, Z, has emptied his magazines, then steam in and win. But Z, knowing this, will endeavor to save am- munition--by no means an easy task. The speed of the two ships being about the same, neither--unless some chance shot makes it practicable-- will be able to close with the other against the other's wish; and the desire for close action on the one side is almost sure to correspond to the reverse on the other. How is such an action to end? A lucky shot may end it. What else can, time alone will tell. There are many theories about "beating down an enemy's fire." But fighting at a range at which quite 70 per cent of the projectiles miss alto- gether, how is this to be accomplished? The captains of the first two battleships that enter upon a duel under equal conditions will have a great problem to work out. If in a narrow sea, the fight may be not unlike a game of chess; but if there should be plenty of sea-room, then we have to face a game of checkers--not chess--upon an almost limitless board. On the strategy of the next great naval war, it is not desirable to do much speculating. Captain Mahan has endeavored to read the future by the light of the past. But has he read the past correctly? Has not the fascination of history led him to overlook certain points of practical im- portance? Has strategy been the great influence in past campaigns? With great respect, I think not. It is easy to piece things together now, but in history, strategy so often seems to have been at the best only on very broad lines. A' vague desire to get at the enemy, and beat him, without much thought of subsequent issues, seems rather to have been the dominant idea. The strategical advantages would seem to have been first noted and made use of after the victory; and the victory itself has so often been due to one side thinking that it had had enough before that idea occurred to the other. The truth is that the theories about carefully worked-out strategy have not been sufficiently proved to command com- plete confidence. __ The war with Spain has taught us extremely little, because the Span- ish navy was in deplorable condition--discipline could hardly be said to exist at all. In order to learn very much we must have a naval war be- tween two first-class powers, and every humane man hopes that this event may be long delayed. The naval battle of tomorrow will be a terrible thing, but there is some reason to suppose that it will be far less dreadful than many of us are in the habit of imagining. Especially is there reason to think that it will not be very sanguinary. Science has made close- quarter fighting very much like annihilation, but it has only partially solved the problem how to hit at long range. DYNAMITE GUN AND SUBMARINE BOAT. "The day after tomorrow" must be considered. By that time the dynamite gun and the submarine boat may have been perfected. The former, however, is likely to be limited in its range and exposed to the fire of guns that can attack it long before it can reach them in reply; and the latter, even supposing the apparently hopeless problem of how to see under water to be solved, is hampered by innumerable other difficulties. It must come to the surface to see the enemy, and it can do so only in comparatively smooth water. For its own safety, it must move at a low speed, and a swifter enemy cannot have much cause to dread it under any conditions that as yet appear possible. It is dangerous of course, to attempt to prophecy, but the submarine boats of the future appear to have quite a limited value. At the same time it is only fair to say that so much secrecy is observed about these vessels that we never know accurately what the latest novelty has accomplished. The submarine boat means, in warfare, the probable death of the crew sooner or later, and it does not seem to promise any results worthy of the sacrifice. The future of special torpedo attack seems to lie with the boat swiftly moving along the surface. The first point to keep in mind is that it is impossible to tell how far away the enemy is. The actual firing of the torpedo is a comparatively simple matter; the principal part of the business is done in harbor beforehand; and the boat is steered so that the tube bears on the target. As soon as this is in line with the sights of the director, a trigger is pressed and the torpedo leaps out. But it is necessary to know the distance, and, as a matter of fact, this can only be roughly estimated. The second and more important point is what are the chances of the torpedo being fired too soon. They are very considerable, for the upper-