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20 MARINE REVIEW. [November 16, - COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME OF NAVAL INCREASE. BY A. M. BAILEY.* The general feeling of the American people can be confidently as- sumed to be in favor of granting to the navy all that it can consistently ask. There are good reasons for believing this to be the case. For the first time since the war of 1812 the navy has been the predominant factor in our hostile operations. In the war with Mexico and in the civil war the navy was secondary to the army, and the present is the first occasion which the people have had in which to observe the worth of our naval forces, supplied with an effective fleet, equipped with the best guns and armor, and institute a comparison between its deeds now and in former times. The result has been satisfactory even to those who expected the most. There is not an occasion to be cited where the officers, men, vessels, and guns of our new navy did not do all that could be expected of them whenever opportunity offered. All those who paid attention to the operations of the navy during the Spanish war and the shifts to which the secretary of the navy was put to find vessels for the work to be done, are fully convinced that we need not only a much larger fleet than we now possess, but that such navy should be divided into two separate and distinct classes, which we may call, for distinguishing purposes, the offensive and defensive fleets. The lack of a sufficient number of vessels for harbor defence in the first in- stance, and the failure to receive what little had been provided, owing to the necessity of using monitors and coast defence vessels on blockading and offensive duty, demonstrated our deficiency in defensive fleets, and the lack of efficient vessels for offensive purposes, even with the assistance of the coast defence fleet, when we could not spare one ship to threaten the ports of our foe across the Atlantic, conclusively show our crying need of more vessels suited to offensive operations. The necessity for a _ larger navy is not alone the outgrowth of our experience during the late war. Before that time it was generally conceded that we were not yet in such a strategical position as regards number of vessels of the various classes as would justify us in ceasing to add to our fleets. The great American habit of procrastination and failure to be ready till "the day after the fair' has kept us back, but aside from those who seem to be lost to all sense of patriotism in their wild hysterical shriekings about anti- imperialism, the worst procrastinator is now convinced that we must take time by the forelock and, as quickly as possible, get in a position to take care of our coasts, commerce and the additional great interests we have assumed as a result of the war. The lessons of the war, the need of pro- viding suitable protection for our foreign territories, combine to impress seriously upon us not only the wisdom, but the absolute necessity of im- proving our naval strength in ships, guns and men as rapidly as possible. The insufficiency of our present navy being admitted, what do we need to complete our present equipment? Here we find our best experts afraid to face the situation, fearing that the immensity of their demands will appall the people and result in nothing being done. It is of no use to expect anything unless the people fully realize the necessities of the case, and the sooner the situation is fairly faced and provision made for the systematic and regular addition of the vessels needed the better it will be for the navy, the people and the prospects of lasting peace. Just at this time, when the nation is most vividly impressed with the excellencies of what we have and the greatness of our needs, would seem to be the most opportune time to lay out a comprehensive scheme of naval increase, to be realized as fast as our means will allow. NAVIES OF THE PRINCIPAL MARINE POWERS. Before specifying our wants it will be as well to compare our exist- ing fleet with that of the five or six principal nations of Europe and note how we stand in comparison with those of our neighbors with whom we are more or Jess apt to come in conflict. : : Great United Ger- VESSELS. Britain France Russia States many Italy Batileshipseninstec Asspa.cet 6 eee 44. 18 11 12 6 10 Battleships. secemd Glassy, ., «cise so se 21 18 ool 10 2 Battleships staundelass sen... ee 9 He 5 iz oe 3 Coast deience ysiips: 44... aes a. 21 19 17 23 19 3 AATIMOTFEGRCRINS EES 1.4 te eeg ie ce viele o.04v0e 15 4 5 2 2 5 Protectedmeniisers are 7 ser. cee 19 Oe 74: 17 2 a Criuisersy2d) andead classh...,.0 00.5005 104 20 16 3 3 14 Gunbodtee seagoing = 2G. 64a cs ne eos 48 36 29 16 17 17 Gunboatstniver i. nics oe oe 54 31 41 15 8 Torpedo boat destroyers .............. 96 18 Pail 16 11 18 Morpedo boats, frst class............-. "8 lh? 85 27 109 110 Torpedo boats, 2d & 8d class.......... i es) 130 8 33 84 Auxiliary vessels, despatch boats. colliers, etc., are omitted, but their enumeration would show the United States to be still further behind than the above list would indicate. Here we stand fourth in the naval powers by a very small margin, with Germany and Italy running us a very close race, and, with the German programme of increase taken into account as against our own, the knowledge that in three or four years Germany will be ahead of us. In enumerating below what is considered our necessities for the protection we require and the proper vessels to be assigned to the defensive and offensive fleets, it should be borne in mind that this is not a scheme for a year or two, but is laid out as a comprehensive plan to take a minimum of fifteen years for its accomplishment, and allowing for the dilatoriness of congress, a probability that at least twenty years will be required to realize it in full, if at all. It is better to lay out a good and as near as possible perfect system, than a poor one devised for temporary emergencies. PROPOSED DEFENSIVE NAVY. _ Defence being more important than offence, and no nation in fact being in a position to take the offensive until its defences are in order for its protection, let us lay out first our scheme of defence. The United States has an enormous extent of seacoast on both the *Reproduced from the New York Sun, in IME 19 Atlantic and Pacific oceans to protect. It would seem that the best way to do this will be to divide the various sections into zones, to which arrangement the situation of our principal cities naturally lends itself, and then provide for an outer and inner line of defence and scouts for each zone. The following is suggested as the best disposition of ships and arrangement of zones to meet our requirements: DEFENSIVE FLEET, ATLANTIO COAST. Moni- Battle- Cruis- Destroy- Torpedo Zones. Ports. tors ships ers. ers. Boats TEVALS [sf ia eee teste ert ee areas 1 2 Hee aR Eta OO tee eet ree castes: asic esaloiere ape 1 2 2 2 Portland........ pep en: eo ea teen tae es 1 2 PROTtS TOU Es cocoon oc'sv os odes one ce camels es a 7 Boston and vicinity................... a NG ivy [oO acmies eetereatentanseinn eee Qf : ' Z 2 Head Long Island Sound........... 2 | 2 Long Island Sound................... 2 2 4 3 New York Harbor........ .........00. 2 2, 4 4 8 Delaware Capes........:.seceseeceees 4 2 4 Chesapeake Bay............-secsrseeee 4 2 4 8 AMV ATO TON, ease seae or ecnrec eens taceenss i 3 2 Port Royal. .....01 seseee seeseeeereeeeee 2 1 2 @halestOns «ise. .cc-s csesshacsscoecs cess 1 2 Be cAS AVATHA Teese staat ces pcasasccceceeeees 1 2 2 2 PB TAITTS Wile eta cee skies dss Sav danekcebsace 1 2 6 Key West and vicinity............... 2 2 2 MN ALIGUE eet p ee te acstniesccise as afonaisercesne 1 2 ie = AACNSACO Lea dsssctenecet ailecn cots racesiass 1 it 2 2 INGO DE et sates cco de taccceasatise 1 2 - Moutias AMUSSISSIPpI -....0.0.00.000--- 2 2 2 SeaSalbinewassancscaac a ooscadsspaiestee. 1 4 4 2 Galvestomsiaisicst acct ieee eee 2 2 37 24 23 18 60 DEFENSIVE FLEET, PACIFIO COAST. OreaSan Diego ase teeianchcas teense these ee 1 2 1 1 2 HUPtSant BraniciScost..2s6s6 se cosee oseseee er 2 4 3 2 4 IT sColtmibta rivers... ssa. deciee. shee 2 2, 2 2 4 12, sPUPet SOU di nsect-.caple-<cc2--sseepos- 4 2 3 4 4 9 10 9 8 14 Total Atlantic CoOast.........cccecesseee-s 37 24 23 18 60 shotale Pacttices Coasteesessses esse aes 9 10 9 8 14 Total Defence fleet...... ..........cceeeee 46 34 32 26 74 A study of the provision made for each port and zone will show that the aim has been in all cases to provide a minimum of one monitor and two torpedo boats to each port and if not an ample, at least a fair supply of battleships, cruisers and destroyers to the different zones. The mon- itors and torpedo boats will act as advance guards to the land defences at each port, for it is now a well-appreciated fact, that an auxiliary defence at some distance seaward from the land defences is an important and necessary part of the proper protection of a port, to engage, and, if pos- sible, disable the enemy before he has a chance to attack the defences at the port, and later to reinforce the work of land batteries. The torpedo boats can do their special work and get closer to the object to be attacked under the wing of a monitor and stand a better chance of sinking the enemy than if obliged to proceed to the attack alone. To each zone has. been allotted one or more battleships, proportionate to the importance of the zone. These vessels are intended to cruise off shore, at or near the middle of the zone to which they may be assigned, and, upon being in- formed by the scout cruisers of the approach of an enemy, to reinforce the station monitors at the point destined for attack. The cruisers de- signed for scout service should have high speed and large coal capacity so that they can stay at sea for long periods, and, within their respective zones, detect the approach of a hostile fleet, and then warn, first, the battleships of the zone, secondly, the point threatened. Heavy armor or armament 1s not needed on these ships, which require rather large steam- ing radius and great speed than fighting capacity. The uses of the de- stroyers and torpedo boats need no explanation. The division into zones and allotment of vessels of each class to the different zones, it is believed, will commend itself to the impartial student as being fair to all and afford- ing to each place the importance its position to the country demands. Certainly the principle here laid down must be approved, for no one can gainsay that the destruction of the smallest port we have enumerated in this list would be more expensive than the cost of the entire number of vessels herein provided for; and when that factor receives proper consider- ation the size of the defence fleet required will not seem so great. At the present time to meet the demands of such a fleet we have on hand: Mon- itors, 23; Battleships, 13; Scouting cruisers, 2; Torpedo boats, 35. None of our destroyers is yet in commission, and those under con- struction we have attached to our offensive fleet, where they would seem to be more urgently needed. The battleships take in all under construc- tion at this time; the monitors, the relics of the civil war, and those now built and contracted for; the scouts are the Minneapolis and Columbia. We have, therefore, still to provide for our defensive fleet the following, Viz: Moni- Battle- Scouting De- Torpedo tors. ships. Cruisers. stroyers. Boats. Nice dedar i. sarmrn tn nt: hn oe 46 34 32 26 74 @neiivan deere sete. = ee 2 23 13 6 ae 35 Pe ndined ee. Cee. oc. cc oes 28 a1 26 26 39 re