The following text may have been generated by Optical Character Recognition, with varying degrees of accuracy. Reader beware!

1809.) 7 MARINE REVIEW. | | oT The best method of providing for these will be considered in connec- tion with the provision for the requirements of the offensive fleets. THE OFFENSIVE NAVY. When we come to consider our requirements for an offensive fleet we find entirely different conditions confronting us. This fleet is to the de- fensive what the regular army is to the militia. It must be strong in attacking power, able to carry a large supply of coal, stores and pro- - visions, and each squadron must be of sufficient strength to hold its own against any enemy it is likely to encounter. A navy, deficient in vessels, guns, men or material, is worse than no navy at all, as it will be a source of weakness instead of strength when it is most needed. For this reason I have laid down as our actual, necessary requirements for a fairly ade- quate offensive navy the following: a ro 4 z 7) g fel ole Sie)" SS ea ones DIvIsIons. 2 52 39 eB 2 aoe eae 83 pS eae) aes 9 <5 aS Ds 6S HMA MonineAtiantic: 1et.. 20.0. mt wae 4 8 8 2 4 12 South tlanticatteet «5 ani ae Sane 2 6 6 9 4 6 European or general fleet.......... 2 6 4 4 be 12 Northern Pacific fleet ............. 4 6 6 6 4 10 Somsherusbaciticaleet, os qaceaae 2 4 2 1 4 4 AGIRISG TSEC RR nn eaonoe Gas chee dan 3 6 10 8 5 10 20 Reserve or flying fleet............. 4 10 10 20 | 24 50 44 20 26 84 The above list calls for the least number of vessels of each class that the necessities of our position require. It is easy to find where a vessel of one class should be added here, one of another there; that protection is not provided for this place or that, nor for convoys; but I think it im- possible for the most severe critic to find a spot where one can dispense with a single vessel without actual danger to our interests as they now exist. We have available at present, of the various vessels enumerated above: TB yHETESITIp Sersemeeete secs cia oR ence oe ite re ea cree ee ae oa ons PMIPMOREGGEUIISCLG en emir ee ee 2 Protected cruisers; .......... Pee Rar ep | ae ey a ena 15 Winprotectedscruisers x. seperue sh ee on aos cca eee 10 Grunt @altiSocnucseng ot mcccs Teetictree oy ty ene ramen ct pee RUT, sth crea 16 Moped osbOat CeStioOvieRnsuncr te iy tains on acne oe ee 16 It has been stated that the principal qualities needed in our offensive fleet are: Great fighting capacity; large radius of action; superiority in fighting quality to enemy; speed superior to enemies' vessels; number sufficient to cover and protect our interests. To achieve this our main reliance must be on our battleships and armored cruisers, with a comple- ment of destroyers. Protected cruisers, second and third class cruisers, and gunboats are needed for convoy, scout and special duty, and for the ordinary work of times of peace, and no navy would be in condition to cope with an enemy without a proper supply of these classes, but the strength of the fleets will lie in the efficiency of the battleships and armored cruisers. The present opinion of naval con- structors, and our own experience in the late war, convince us that battle- ships should be of 12,500 to 15,000 tons, of at least 18 knots speed, of great coal capacity, and furnished with the best armor and guns obtainable. Armored cruisers should be about 12,000 tons, 22 knots speed, large coal capacity, with best gun power and armor attainable with their other re- quirements. Protected cruisers, 6,000 to 8,000 tons, 18 to 20 knots speed, fair gun power, and large coal capacity. Unprotected cruisers 2,000 to 5,000 tons, 16 to 20 knots speed, good coal capacity, and such armament as their size warrants. Gunboats, 1,000 to 1,800 tons, 15 knots speed, light draught (not over 12 feet), and best coal capacity and armament possible. Destroyers, 500 to 800 tons, 35 knots speed, good sea boats, and as large a coal capacity as can be managed. Of the battleships needed we have, strictly speaking, none on hand, and all will have to be built. If some of those now under construction are used for the offensive fleet, their place would have to be supplied in the defensive, so it is the same thing to count them there and as lacking here. The two armored cruisers we have are fine vessels of their size, but are not large enough in view of the kind other nations are building. The three ordered at the last session of con- gress will be of the right kind, however, to compete with any now built or building for any of the other powers. Our fifteen protected cruisers are good boats and will answer in this class, although smaller in tonnage than we require. Our unprotected cruisers and gunboats are suitable for their classes, and the sixteen destroyers now building are just what we shall want for the offensive fleet in size and speed. WHAT WE HAVE IN BOTH SEOTIONS OF THE NAVY. We find then that for both sections of the navy the vessels on hand and needed are as follows, viz: Bid ks = 3 3 - of a 2 copa SE BE du Be we Be B ge 8 3 S833 25658555 5 as 2 Number needed ......c00cce000- 46-34 24 50 44 32 20 26 110 74 umber on hand .....+-.. 2s... 98 13 00 2 15 2 10 16 16 35 Number to be built..........0+-- "93 91 24 48 29 26 10 10 94 39 This makes a total of 191 vessels yet to be built, and 133 destroyers and torpedo boats. The unthinking will laugh at the idea that the United States can need any such force for the protection of its coasts, foreign dependencies and trade relations with other countries; politicians will stand aghast at the money required to voted for such a purpose, which they would not mind Probably did they not fear it would not be approved by their con- stituents. Let all the dissidents sit down and think the question over calmly and rationally. Try to pick flaws in the above estimate of our needs and arrange a schedule of our wants to cover your own idea of the needs of the country. Take our extent of coast line, are the requirements of the defensive fleet overestimated? If so, where? Which one of the ports enumerated would you leave without the protection specified or lessen the number of vessels assigned. For most of the ports one mon- itor and two torpedo boats are provided. Is this too much naval protec- tion to reinforce the land defences and act as a first line of battle to draw out the strength of any attacking force and (the torpedo boats) serve as the destroying agency of the enemy? The monitor will retire as the foe advances and become eventually an integral part of the land defences with the advantage that it can be moved from point to point as may be found necessary or advisable. The points where more than one monitor are suggested, as Boston, New York, etc., are such as the most careless ob- server must see require more protection and of the kind offered by a floating battery. The wide sweep of Massachusetts bay, the large number of small towns situated upon it, can only receive adequate protection from a force of monitors, and more rather than less should be stationed there. The importance of New York justifies the assignment made there and so with the other places in the list. The problem of proper defence can be met in no other way than by a suitable number of monitors and torpedo boats capable of navigating in still waters and practically indestructible. The defence line of battleships may be omitted by the over bold. Their usefulness and importance must be admitted, nay emphatically asserted, if we are to undertake to guarantee our ports from bombardment; but if we do not undertake to prevent any attack, but aim only to resist one that is made, we can omit most of the battleships provided. So also we can dis- pense with the scouting cruisers. The omission will be costly in two ways: first, it is likely to result in the serious damage of some of our coast towns, involving a larger expense than would result from the construction of twice the number of defence ships here suggested; second, in the grave loss to the offensive fleet by the withdrawal of its vessels to act as a de- fence to seaports, for we can feel assured that the same alarmist feeling that depleted our navy during the last war would arise again and political influence would once more compel the administration to divert the vessels of the navy from their proper and regular duty. In the first case cited the loss would fall, unless congress came to the rescue, upon the city or town suffering the attack, and would be a most unjust division of the punishment resulting from the neglect of the whole country. If, therefore, the line of battleships and scout cruisers is not to be provided, it should be plainly laid down by law that the vessels of the offensive fleet are not to be used for defensive purposes under any consideration during hostili- ties with another power. While the last scare or fear of a bombardment by the fleet of Spain was silly in the extreme, it is safe to assume that anr next war will be with some power far stronger than Spain, one with more ships to spare for attacking our coasts, raising a much greater feeling of alarm and far greater demand for coast protection. The diversion of the offensive fleet cannot be permitted under such circumstances, even if it was during the last war, and congress must look this fact squarely in the face. Of course, the battleships that we have at present, though not properly--most of them--sea-going ships, will have to serve in the offen- sive fleet until such time as they can be relegated to their proper duty and place, and the excuse that they are coast line battleships will not serve to take them out of the offensive side of our naval forces. They must be used for offensive purposes for some years anyway until we can get a suffi- cient number of sea-going ships of the first class to do duty on the offen- sive force, and until we can get ten or twelve first-raters afloat we must pray to be delivered from the danger of war. NO PLACE TO CUT DOWN ESTIMATES. In the offensive fleet the most careful scrutiny cannot find a place in which to pare. The North Atlantic fleet will be charged with the duty of sweeping the Atlantic and protecting our commierce there and our West Indian possessions and Cuba. In its charge will be the great ocean high- ways from Europe to our shores and the protection of Porto Rico and Cuba as well as the Gulf of Mexico. Its strength as laid down will not be sufficient for its needs against the French or Russian fleets, or even the German, as it will be in five years, and it would be found necessary to re- inforce it from the European and reserve fleets in such a case. The South Atlantic fleet will have charge of our interests on the east coast of South America and the west coast of Africa, and the extent of territory it will have to cover could not be properly done in war time by twice the number of vessels. The European fleet would be the invading or aggressive one, and for special operations it would have to draw from the others instead of giving to them a part of its strength, and without a large reinforcement, would not be equal to an attack against the land defences of any conti- nental nation. As a nucleus, however, it could be used to make' feints, keep a force of vessels of other nations at home to protect their shores against it, and maintain our power on the high seas. The Northern Pacific fleet will have the care of our western coast, Alaska and Hawaii. t would have about as much work in proportion to its size as the North Aflantic fleet, and work fully as important. The Southern Pacific fleet would have commerce and interests in those seas to protect and might also be charged with the care of Samoa. The Asiatic fleet will have the greatest task of all. It is, therefore, made the strongest numerically and in fighting capacity. Westward the course of empire has taken its way until it has gone so far that it seems to be about to recommence at the far East the conquest of the world. China, the prey of all nations, teeming with a vast population, desired by all as a trading place for manufactured goods, is surrounded by a lot of wolves waiting to tear a strip of territory from its worn-out grasp. Japan is raising herself to a high place in the councils of the world, and we have assumed responsibilities in the Philippines that must be carried out at any cost. With all these interests to protect and our new possession of Guam, the size of this fleet should be increased largely. It is useless to expect this, however, for many, many years, and the Dewey of his day will be obliged to equal if not surpass the deeds of the hero of today by reason of his still more inadequate allotment of vessels to compete with the superior forces of our foes. The vessels as-