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1900.] | : MARINE REVIEW. 23 the record of the American 8-in. guns in the war with Spain justifies the change. The 12-pounder guns, at present without protection except that afforded from a raking fire by the casemates at the corners of the upper deck, are too valuable to be so exposed to destruction. As at present placed, the chances are that there would be few, if any, left of them after the ship had been in action with an enemy, even if she herself were com- paratively little the worse for it. What, then, would she have to rely on to repulse a night attack by torpedo boats? In the proposed design they are (four of them) placed in species of wells between the 8-in. guns, so as to be afforded a share of the protection of the 6-in. armor and covered above by stout cupola-like shields inclining forwards. The remaining four of the 12-pounders would not be used in a daylight action with an- other battleship, but be kept under cover of the armor and mounted in their positions at night-fall. The smaller guns, which form the arma- ment of the fighting tops, would have to take their chance if their fire against a battleship or cruiser is considered necessary, and it cannot be denied that at Santiago the 6-pounders, at any rate, did excellent service. The fighting tops are to rest on a low tower-like foundation, the masts and spars above them being as light as consistent with stability. It would then take a comparatively heavy shot to bring down the fighting top, while, at the same time, the lofty and enormous masts which disfigure and even form a source of danger to many French ships would be avoided. The torpedo armament should be entirely below water, as the dangers attending the use of above-water tubes have been amply demonstrated. Two tubes should be well forward, so placed as to be able to discharge their Whiteheads well on either bow, one right aft, and one on either quarter. "After the virtual certainty of wooden decks being set on fire by an enemy's shells has 'been so clearly proved, their abandonment is only a matter of time. The sooner they can be got rid of the better, though a substitute, which is entirely satisfactory, is admittedly rather difficult to find. The specially prepared non-combustible wood, which is now being used to deck some of our new ships, has the defect of being rather heavy. In the proposed type, then, the iron decks are to be coated with a com- position of a non-inflammable nature pressed into thin slabs containing a light steel wire grating or network to give them additional strength and cohesion; the outside surface to be hard and smooth. This will have to be produced by pressure and rendered impervious to water. Such a com- position of the nature of cellulose or papier-maché should not be difficult for a chemist to discover. The use of such a material would mean a con- siderable saving in weight. A further slight reduction might be made by a moderate 'tumbling home' in the central portion of the ship, between the two barbettes. This would diminish the weight of the upper and main decks, and add to the stability of the ship. It is the great 'tumble- home' of the sides of the famous French cruiser Dupuy-de-Léme which alone enables her to bear the burden of her huge cuirass. But forward and aft of the citadel the sides will be the same as in the Formidable, as the 'tumble-home' would here not increase her weatherly qualities, and, moreover, would reduce the roominess and hence the accommodation for the officers and crew. 'Habitability' is a most important point to be at- tended to in the construction of our ships of war. The long voyages which have to be constantly undertaken by them in the ordinary course of the world-wide duties which fall to their lot, and the cruising and block- ading work which would employ them in war time, render the comfort and well-being of their officers and men an important factor in the navy's effectiveness. For this reason in all the larger classes of the types here suggested, the usual scuttles on the main deck are replaced by ports which will admit a larger amount of light and air. That ports are harder to secure in bad weather and more liable to leak is an objection which could surely be overcome by improved appliances. BELOW-WATER SUB-DIVISION, ENGINES, ETO. "Turning now to the below-water sub-division by water-tight bulk- heading, which is of so great importance, and which in more than one instance in the history of our fleet since its introduction has failed to do its work. In the proposed type, except in one or two places where rushes of men must be provided for or large and bulky articles have to be fre- quently passed through, the only means of communication between the, various compartments is by means of automatic water-tight doors. A door of this type has been patented by a Scotch inventor. It consists of an inner and outer cylinder, the latter built into the bulkhead and having two opposite doors, the former revolving within it and having but one door. One door in the outer cylinder or casing is thus always closed. To pass through, the inner cylinder is revolved by hand till its door coincides with the nearer one. On entering, it is again revolved till its door coincides with the further one in the outer cylinder, when egress is obtained. Doubtless other equally good or even better systems could be devised, the all-important point being that' whatever the type of door, it should always automatically close itself and be impossible to leave open. The frames of these doors in the proposed type are not riveted into their places in the bulkhead, but fastened by bolts and nuts, so that if at any exceptional time freer passage than ordinary is necessary, they can be taken out and replaced. Nothing has been hitherto said about the engines, as the experiences of the Chino-Japanese war and that between Spain and the United States do not teach us any particular lessons in this connection, beyond the obvious one that where good machinery gets into the hands of people like Spaniards and Chinese it cannot be depended on for any time at all, as it very soon gets ruined for want of proper care and attention. Thus the Spanish cruisers at Santiago, all new ships, were on paper quite capable of running away from the slower ships of the Americans, but the records of that engagement show that they were being overtaken by them all through as soon as the latter had a full head of steam. Of course, the foulness of their bottoms had a great deal to answer for, but we may be quite sure that the engines were not giving anything like the speed that their trials promised. "The engines, then, of the proposed type and other types of men-of- war here suggested will follow the general lines of those now in use in our later battleships, cruisers, and smaller craft, whose records in speed and steaming powers are so satisfactory when compared with those of other navies, and which the engineering talent of our nation will steadily improve. The water tube boiler has come to stay, in spite of the great opposition it has met with in various quarters, and so will be fitted in all cases. She will be provided with the double screws which are now almost universal in our navy, as the triple screw, a recent innovation which finds many admirers among foreign nations, and has been adopted in many of their newest men-of-war, does not seem to have proved its superiority to a sufficient extent to warrant any change, especially when the great additional weight of another set of engines is considered." Then follows a brief description of the electrical equipment. Continu- ing Major Field says: INFERIOR ARMAMENT IN OCRUISERS--PROPOSED NEW TYPE. "The British cruisers are essentially sea-keeping ships, standing well up out of the water, and having good speed, a liberal coal supply, and generous berthing accommodation for the crew; but it must be confessed that in the main the vessels appear to be undergunned, the armament in many of the vessels being light in proportion to the displacement' - 'The foregoing is an American criticism of this portion of our navy, and the facts therein stated can hardly be controverted. But while it may be admitted that the cruisers in question are by no means so heavily armed as are many foreign cruisers of equal or even less tonnage, yet it must be remembered that this numerically inferior armament is delib- erately provided after the relative values of coal supply, ammunition and speed have been carefully considered and weighed. A commerce pro- tecting cruiser, spending weeks and months in mid-ocean looking after our great trade routes, must be always ready for action, not only one action, but, it is hoped, many, before it is necessary for her to return to a dock yard. Without coal, therefore, she could not remain on her sta~' tion, or go at full speed in pursuit of the prowling cruisers of an enemy. Without plenty of ammunition she would be useless after one or two engagements. (More guns necessarily mean more weight, which must be taken either from coal, ammunition or protection, so that the supply of powder and projectiles may be doubly curtailed. The cruiser then that we specially require for the express purpose of protecting commerce must have all the good qualities referred to in the American criticism just quoted, and, as she must carry a comparatively moderate armament for her size, this must be amply protected and also the ship herself, as far as possible, after her speed, coal supply and ammunition have been pro-~ vided for. That this can be done cannot be doubted, when the lightly- armed and armored monsters Terrible and 'Powerful are compared with the new Drake class, which carry four more 6-in. guns, are far better pro- tected and steam 23 knots to the formers' 21 knots. The following is a description of the proposed commerce protector: "The displacement of this ship is to be from 12,000 to 15,000 tons. In outward appearance she is to be assimilated as closely as possible to a big mail boat, not only in order to give her a better chance of approaching an enemy's cruisers without arousing suspicion, but also to create among them a feeling of caution when coming up to a mail 'boat which may, to some extent, favor the latter's escape. There is nothing a 'commerce destroyer' or 'pirate' wants less than a fight, and in the nature of things, the longer their commanders and crews go on with their special role, the more anxious they themselves become to escape capture or destruction. This point, then, is an important one, and should be carried out so that the ship will stand a minute scrutiny through the glass even at a moderate distance. No military tops are then possible, and the funnels should preferably be two only in number, though three might in some cases be permissible, as a few mail steamers carry that number. The armored shields of the 8-in. bow and stern chasers must be concealed by, or made to resemble, the ordinary deck houses of a mail boat. If to do this it is necessary to build actual wooden fittings upon the shields these should be of uninflammable wood and made as light as possible, and either remov- able or to revolve with the guns. The guns themselves might be partially withdrawn downwards when not in use through an opening on the inner side of the barbette, over which they are placed so that their muzzles would be concealed by the deck house casing. The embrasures for bow fire of the two foremost guns on the main deck to be concealed by care- fully fitted and easily lowered light iron screening. All port lids should be as inconspicuous as possible and the lines of scuttles continued over them by dummies where requisite. The cuirass of the ship is to consist of 6-in. armor throughout. The belt will be 6 ft. in width, and there will be a 2-in. armor deck springing from its lower edge. The armor will be continued up to the upper deck in the central portion of the ship, entirely enclosing her battery, which is to consist of two 8-in. quick-fire guns and sixteen 6-in. quick-firers. As in the battleship, the crews of the 12-pounders, of which there are to be sixteen, are to 'be partially pro- tected by the armor plating and provision made for keeping some in reserve for night work, though in a cruiser of this kind there will, as a rule, be little chance of being attacked by torpedo boats. She will have her sphere of usefulness generally in mid-ocean far beyond the radius of torpedo craft. The same arrangement as to anchors, absence of wood- work, automatic water-tight doors, electric motors, etc., as is indicated for the battleship, are to be followed in the cruiser. "Tt will be doubtless observed that in this design the 8-in. quick-fire gun supplants the 9.2 weapon which occupies such a prominent place in the armament of our present cruisers. But it is considered that for cruisers, which are not intended to engage battleships (unless, under favorable conditions, antiquated, ill-armed and slow types), weight for weight the 8-in. gun offers many advantages over that of larger caliber. Two weigh comparatively little more than one 9.2-in. gun. Their pene- tration is but little less, and their rate of fire out of all proportion more rapid. If we could imagine two vessels (protected by the heaviest armor now carried 'by cruisers, and in every respect equal) armed, the one with a single 9.2-in. gun, the other with a single 8-in. quick-fire weapon, is it to be denied that the latter would stand first in the betting on a duel be- tween them? If we double the 8-in. guns in the one, victory would be almost a certainty for the ship carrying them. In the events of the two recent wars which we have considered, the weight of evidence goes to show that the damage done by the explosion of the largest classes of shell does not so very greatly preponderate over that attributable to those of medium size. Of course, other cruisers of various sizes and types would be required for other purposes. COUNCLUDING REMARKS, "In the foregoing attempt to describe generally the various classes of men-of-war, which, in the humble opinion of the writer, seem to be most adapted to our needs, there are doubtless several suggestions as to con- struction and equipment which a naval architect would perhaps recognize as impracticable. Should this be the case, the criticism must of course be accepted, but this will not vitiate the contention which is made in this