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1900.] MARINE REVIEW. 23 STATUS OF THE NAVAL ENGINEER. From the Engineer of London. Lately we sketched a plan of reorganization of the engineer branch of the service. It will be remembered that the principal feature of that plan was practically a reduction of the status of the naval engineer. He would no longer rank with the executive at sea, or aim at social equality with the deck officer on shore. His attainments would be those of the best and most competent sea-going engineers in the mercantile marine; no less and no more. To compensate him for his risks and the--in many respects--disagreeable conditions of service, such as three years' commissions abroad, he would have high pay, and the pensions would be good. He should have more control than is now possible of his firemen. 'Vhat is to say, when he wanted them they could not be taken away to dis- charge other duties; and in various ways more thought would be taken for tha machinery of the ship. We have put this scheme forward tenta- tively for discussion. Up to the present it has scarcely been criticized at all. Possibly, perhaps, it has been regarded as so audacious that no words can do justice to its enormity. In putting it forward we stated that there was an alternative scheme about which we should have something to say. In fulfillment of that promise we now proceed to set forth the general features of this second scheme. To go into details would be at once premature and difficult. 3 In brief, it means the supercession of the sailor altogether--not in practice, but in theory. At present the dominant idea in the navy is that a man-of-war is a ship, and that her officers and crew are sailors. That idea governs the whole policy of the admiralty. Its effects are far-reach- ing. It modifies the relations of all the classes and ranks of the men who constitute our naval fighting strength. It is essentially a survival from the past. Under the new system a man-of-war would be a machine, and noth- ing else. A machine afloat, it is true, but none the less a machine. The dominant idea modifying the policy of the admiralty and of the service would then be that the sailor had disappeared and the engineer had taken his place. Under these conditions the engineer branch of the service would be superior to the executive; or, more properly, the engineer would be the executive. Just as we have advanced arguments in favor of the first scheme, we can now adduce arguments in favor of the second, which is the exact antithesis of the first. 'The modern man-of-war is a gigantic structure of iron and steel, which depends for her existence and her utility on the engineer. The modern gun is an extremely beautiful and complex machine, with next to nothing in common with the smooth bore of Nelson's time. The same truth holds good of the torpedo. Sails have entirely disappeared. The mast is a signal tower, or a place of observa- tion. The "nimble topmen" have gone below as stokers and greasers. The great guns are loaded and fired by machinery. From first to last the engineer is everywhere and everything in the man-of-war. There is still room for the fighting bluejacket or the marine. There is none for the sailor, who has become an anachronism. But, it may be urged, we must still have seamanship. What does the word mean? In Nelson's time it meant a great deal. It involved a great deal. The art of sailing a ship through the tempest and calm represented a very high standard of ac- quired experience, natural good sense, and special knowledge. There is nothing at all like this needed in the present day. An engineer might learn to carry out all the evolutions, of a fleet just as well as an admiral or a captain, and when it comes to fighting, we doubt if any admiral or captain could excel the engineer in knowledge of what a ship could or could not do. It will, no doubt, come with a certain jar to the naval officer to be told that the engineers could do all that he does; that an engineer might be a post-captain, or an admiral in command of a fleet. Yet we question that the naval officer could advance any stronger argu- ment to prove that these things are impossible, and very able engineers in all but the name have already been captains in the British navy. A glance at recent history will do much to prove that the true char- acter of a modern fighting ship is beginning to be realized among all the principal nations. We have only to compare the position of the naval engineer of today with his position forty years ago, to see that, although progress towards a complete appreciation of the situation has been slow, it has been none the less sure. Notwithstanding all the drawbacks of the position, the naval engineer is more in evidence than he has been yet, even in this country. In the United States we have an intensely mechani- cal people, building up a navy in the light of the experience of the rest of the world, and their congress has taken the first steps to make the engineer the dominant factor. The engineer is the equal of the deck officer in the United States navy. The next step will be to throw the past overboard altogether, and make the engineer the superior of the deck officer. It is beyond all question that even at this moment there is nothing in the rules of the United States service to prevent an engineer from being the captain of a ship. That nothing of the kind has as yet taken place, or, perhaps, will take place for some time yet, is simply the result of naval inertia, and the force of popular opinion not yet reconciled to the idea. We have recorded Admiral Melville's statement that so far the whole plan has been a failure. The engineer comes on deck; the executive will not go below. We said that the scheme is bound to fail, and we have given some reasons why. But the principal reason is that the change has not been sufficiently thorough. Let the engineer be above the executive or line. The disci- pline of the ship would then secure the presence of engineers below, just as it now secures the presence of officers on deck, as a mere matter of course. The whole "inwardness'" of the service would be changed, and that which is now distasteful would become honorable. To carry out the plan fully in this country, however, a radical change 'would probably have to be made in the training and education of our offi- cers. Years of study and training are now required to turn out what is deemed a satisfactory executive or line officer. Precisely the same state- ment holds good of the naval engineer. It seems to be impossible to com- bine the two educations as they now are. There is not time. The difficulty would have to be got over by dispensing altogether with much teaching that is of no practical value whatever at sea. This applies to both branches of the service. The new curriculum would have for its object the making of a man an efficient engineer, so far as his particular work in the navy was concerned, and an efficient executive officer also, so far as 'his duties were concerned, that is to say, his training would be highly specialized. There would always be, as there are now, men who would pick out certain branches of duty and develop their powers of dealing with them. Thus, we might have the electrician, and the torpedo lieutenant, the navigating officer, and so on. Really nothing would be done to diminish naval ii si dtc efficiency, but rather to promote it, The species of training now given in the United States might be taken as a foundation or an example to guide us in formulating a new system. Our readers have now two definite schemes before them for the im- provement of engineering in the royal navy. Neither the one nor the other is advanced by us. They are only alternative schemes, which are to be taken for what they are worth. Either appears to be a solution, deserving careful discussion, of a great difficulty. It is certain that mat- ters cannot continue as they are now. The public are becoming restless and apprehensive. Dissatisfaction is being expressed in every direction with the admiralty, with our ships, with our machinery. Very strong action was taken in parliament last session. Our readers may rest certain that the agitation will be renewed next year. Unpleasant questions are being asked concerning the competence of those who are in charge of the machinery of our ships. It is urged that the engines, at all events, main and auxiliary, are built by the best engineers in the world, and yet that they are incessantly breaking down under very moderate tests, and it begins to be said that it is not the fault of the engines but of those in charge. Account will have to be taken of these things. The cases of the Europa, the Hermes and the Highflyer demand careful investigation. There were grumbles about the Powerful and the Terrible--some ships do very well, others very badly. Why? We are not sanguine enough to suppose that either of the schemes which have been sketched will receive attention at the admiralty. Yet we think it will be difficult for the government of this country to ignore altogether in debate the remarkable action taken by the United States. The change, whether it succeeds or not, at all events represents the heaviest blow ever struck at the dominance of the executive branch of the service, and we may yet live to see the United States navy com- manded by engineer officers. 'Straws thrown up show what way the wind blows." It is not for nothing that .Sir John Durston, in this country, has been given the relative rank of rear admiral, and George Melville in the United States, the rank of rear admiral. em The above is a photograph taken of the Maricopa as she passed through the Sault canal on Dec. 6 on her last trip of the season. She encountered a driving storm on Lake Superior, which literally encased her deck and sides in ice. Capt. Henry Zealand, who stood on the bridge for thirty-six hours continuously, brought her safely through it. COLUMBIA AS A TRIAL BOAT. Secretary J. V. S. Oddie of the New York Yacht club has an- nounced that the Columbia will be in commission and will be sailed against the new defender as a trial boat and for the honor of. defending the America's cup, if she should prove faster than the new yacht. The Columbia will be managed by former Commodore E, D. Morgan, and Capt. Charles Barr will be the skipper. The Columbia is hauled out at City Island. She will not be put in the water until a short time before she is wanted, as there is nothing to do to the yacht except fit her out for racing, and it will only take a few weeks to do that. She will be put in the best possible shape, and in the hands of ex-Commodore Morgan and Capt. Barr should be able to make the new boat hustle to beat her. Capt. Barr is thoroughly familiar with the yacht, and it was a wise plan to make him sailing master of her again. Many yachtsmen are of the opinion that the Columbia will be faster this year than when she defeated the Shamrock. Former Commodore Morgan is an experienced yachtsman. In the early 7s he owned the sloop Dudley and then had the Vindex built, which was the first iron sloop ever built in this country. The schooners 'Wanderer and Albatross were his next yachts. He owned and raced the Tomahawk and the 40-footer Moccasin, and then the big schooner Con- stellation was built to his order. The cat yawl Gannet was his boat. This yawl was the forerunner of the Gloriana, also built for Mr. Morgan and which made Herreshoff noted as a designer. The fin keel Drusilla, also a Herreshoff boat, was built for Mr. Morgan and at that time was the largest fin keel boat constructed. Mr. Morgan was one of the syndicate that built the Vigilant. Of late years he has raced the 30-footer Puck. Among other yachts owned by him were the sloop Mayflower, catboat Mucilage, sloop Comfort and Muriel, and the steamers Amy, Catarina, Javelin, Ituna, Daisy and May. He has probably done more to bring Nat Herreshoff to the front as a designer than any other yachtsman.