The following text may have been generated by Optical Character Recognition, with varying degrees of accuracy. Reader beware!

1903.] ENGLISH SHIPPING LETTER. Some Tabular Statements Showing Great Progress: Made by British Mer= cantile Marine--Sir. Wm. White's Defense of Shipbuilding Policy--Other Matters. [From Special London Correspondent. ] London, Feb. 2.--In the discussion attending the question of ship subsidies for your foreign trade vessels you have undoubt- edly had all manner of statistics--argument on both sides of the subsidy proposition--dealing with the growth of British shipping and the decline of our own shipping in the foreign trade. Without thought of what may be done by your legislators, but purely as matter of information, there is presented herewith some very interesting, tabular statements showing the bearings of the shipping trade of the leading mercantile countries during the last forty years or so. It is an extraordinary fact, well known, of course, to most of your readers, that of the tonnage employed in the trade between the United Kingdom and the United States of America in 1860, the American portion was largely in excess of the British. In 1870 the American mer- cantile marine trade showed an enormous contraction and down to 1890 this contraction was progressive. In 1900 American ton- nage was again somewhat on the up grade. The following tabu- ular statements have not before been presented in their present form: FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM--NET REGISTERED TONNAGE, ENTRANCES AND CLEARANCES OF VESSELS WITH CARGO. British Foreign Per cent vessels. vessels. British, 1900... 0... - 52,332,155 27,525,989 65.5 $500, 2. . 46,406,250 16,429,825 73.9 L800... 4% .» 35,885,868 13,793,082 72.2 Poe re et . 422,243,030 9,381,641 70.3 7800 .. .. oP E2;110,454 8,718,464 58.2 BeG0 i OC ee ee 66.9 a a 69.6 TRADE BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES IN SAIL AND STEAM VESSELS, CARGOES AND BALLAST.--TABLE SHOWING NET REGISTERED TONS EMPLOYED, VESSELS OF BRITISH, AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES. British American Vessels of other vessels. vessels, countries. fee Pe, 040,14 549,025 1,471,524 1608 6. ee. BIg S72 259,905 849,883 TOGO a iS IS 708 653,858 1,816,075 70 a 20755300 832,268 299,585 EB00 5 so 02853022 2,339,101 178,134 TRADE BETWEEN UNITED KING- 'TRADE BETWEEN UNITED KING- DOM AND BRITISH POSSES- DOM AND _ BRITISH NORTH SIONS, CARGO AND BALLAST, AMERICA, CARGO AND BALLAST, NET REGISTERED TONS OF NET REGISTERED TONS OF VESSELS. VESSELS. British. Foreign. : British. Foreign. 1000... 10,220,021. 1,225,000 . 1900'. ..-.. 2,011,807 643,320 1900 << 0,137,840 1,320,723. 1600... . 1,794,755 816,926 1880... $264,505 1,107,842 18802. 2... 2,412,450 070,547 1870 .. .. 5,495,050 548,978 1870.. .. .. 1,799,514 261,773 1300 .. 2. 64,333,808 733,308. . 1860°..:..... 1,505,403. 251.455 FOREIGN TRADE OF CHIEF MARITIME COUNTRIES, IN AND OUT, CARGO AND BALLAST. British percentage Total Trade. *Year 1889. tIincludes government stores but not troops. Country. 1890. 1900. Volume, 1890. Volume, 1900. Russia... : 658.2 37.3 12,072,988 16,879,384 Wey ee dG 10.0 5354,130 6,159,015 mweden 220 1. 2265 9.9 10,766,711 17,123,126 Denmark .. .. .. No separate British 8,032,080 11,753,507 Corm@any =... 666 1. 25.4 26.9 21,100.980 29,207,857 POllend, 2 2 AOR at 6,844,034 18,890,462 Peom -- ) os. 3S 44.6 11,589,148 16,977,046 Pie 2k. 440. -400..- 28,067,848 38,286,445 Portes). 5 568 10,504,723 19,960,318 Spain .. .. .. .. No separate British: 23,010,808 28,477,509 ey 4.4 10-7. 14,246,724 39,510,252 United States .. 1528 4.4 30,704,653 47,151,255 OM er ag 50.1 5,739,715 5,991,270 Argentina .. van G8" 203 11,847,424 13,364,884 Japan .. .. .... No separate British 3,166,404* 7,840,415 Canada roe PE 516 61.0 10,328,285 $4,175,121 Newfoundland .. .. .. 93.0 78.7 634,147 1,447,481 Cape of Good Hope .. 87.9 89.8 2,957:377 9,504,922 Pal Og a 00.2 992,452 2,822,719 ew Zealand (© 2... 87.4 91.8 1,312,474 1,679,907 Australian Com'nw'th. 87.6 85.2 14,248,806 23,704,204 It has often been said, in regard to the sudden decline in the American Atlantic tonnage 'between 1860 and 1870, that it was entirely due to the war of the union. As a matter of fact, whilst the war had a most serious adverse influence upon American shipping, yet the real cause, as viewed from this side, was the revolution in ship building created by the British building of iron vessels and the gradual supercession of hard wood boats MARINE REVIEW AND MARINE RECORD. "19 by iron and subsequently by steel built vessels. It may be as- sumed, further, that at the special juncture of affairs in 1870 the American nation had much more urgent problems to face than that of Atlantic transit. Land transit was of much more vital importance, and accordingly we observe an immense fund of energy expended upon the building of American railroads and the development of internal communications generally during the period under review. 'This is an old story but there is still another reason. Probably I am treading upon forbidden ground in referring to it. I venture to hint, however, that the decline of American shipping and the simultaneous growth of British ship- ping may largely be accounted for by the protective tariff of the United States. This may have been brought about in two ways-- (a) by the increase in the cost of iron and steel, so that until quite recently ships could not be built in American yards as cheaply as in British yards, and (b) that in consequence of the expansion of free trade methods in this country it has followed that Great Britain has slowly and surely becomle the sea car- rier of the world. Another consideration suggesting itself is that the United States protective tariff has given to American capitalists a great counter attraction by artificially increasing the profits of certain domestic industries. Assume, for example, that under free competition on the high seas, ship owners cannot reckon on more than 5 per cent. profit on their capital, but that the same amount of capital invested in a protected home indus- try will yield 10 or 20 per cent. Clearly, under such conditions, spare capital will flow into the protected industries, and shipping will be neglected. These are the facts which suggest themselves to me as a resident in this country, and it is just possible that I may be biased because I live where free trade is prevalent. I am, however, quite conversant with American life and American commerce, and I commend the facts here touched upon to the careful consideration of those Americans who are anxious fo develop the ship building industry. = It is true that Great Britain has now a great start, not only in tonnage but in ship building experience and organization. At bottom, however, the ruling factor in favor of Great Britain's mercantile supremacy is the inflow and outflow of commerce into British ports, directly the outcome of a free trade policy. WHITE'S DEFENSE OF SHIP BUILDING POLICY. Sir William H. White, K. C: B., the ex-director of naval construction in this country, who some time ago had to resign the post mainly on account of ill health, is issuing what is, in effect, an apology, in which he replies to the numerous critics who buzzed like gnats round him during his period of office. I do not propose to give the full details of Sir William White's defence of his ship building policy, but one or two points are of general interest. In the first place, it is clearly wrong to attri- bute policy in Great Britain to the chief naval constructor. On this point Sir William White says: "Were not great public interests involved, I should have kept silence, but it is desirable to have no misunderstanding on this important matter. My duty and responsibility have been ~ to design and direct the construction of strong, safe and sea- worthy vessels, having the offensive and defensivs powers speeds and coal supplies determined by sticcessive boards of adiniralty. That duty I claim to have fulfilled during the period. (1883- 1902) of strenuous effort and unprecedented ship building pro- grams while I held office as director of naval construction. The existing fleet of today represents the intentions of the admiralty in regard to its fighting efficiency as expressed at the date when the designs were prepared and approved." | A complaint made by Sir William is that comparisons have frequently been drawn between ships constructed by him and ships of the same class constructed in other countries at later periods. If ships are to be fairly conipared they must have been designed at the same time. Improvernents in machinery, guns, armor, and materials are rapid and continuous. Ships designed at a later date get the neicht of such improvements, and can be made more powerful or swifter cn given dimensions. Completed ships are degraded in value by lapse of time, and it is not uncommon to find ships described as comparatively ohsolete when they are in early periods of service. [hese considerations affect all fleets and give substantial advantage to the navies which have been most recently developed. It is this constant improve- ment in all the parts of a ship that mecessitates the constant reconsideration of ship building programs and of the types of ships, in order to keep abreast or ahead of possible rivals. The brunt of the attack on Sir Wiilian: White has been, in the main that ships built for the British government of large displacement have not given a corresponding efficiency. It is to this class of criticism that he devotes most attention. On this point he says: ; "Broadly stated, one great cause of the larger nominal dis- placements of British ships is to be found in the heavier loads they carry of armament, armor, coals, provisions, stcres and equipment. In their loads as designed is also included a 'board margin' for contingencies or additions which may be desired during construction. Every addition to the load carried at the required speed and draught of water is multiplied in additional displacement--it may be two, three, or more times, according to