16 DECISIONS WHICH AFFECT SHIPPING INTERESTS. There have been many cases in the admiralty courts growing out of col- lisions rules and speed of steamers in a fog. The following statements, taken from cases decided in the federal courts, will be of interest. No fixed and inflexible rule can be laid down as determining what is mod- erate speed for steamers in a fog. This must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case; but 16 or 17 miles an hour in a dense fog is excessive for a large steamer in the direct track of the coasting trade. _While no rule can, perhaps, be stated as to what is moderate speed for a steamer in a fog in any particular case, it may at' least be said that the speed ought not - to be so great. that she cannot perform the duty of keeping out of the way of a sailing vessel after the latter is dis- covered. A eemetin failing to reduce her speed, when going through a fog in one of the main lines of ocean travel to such _a rate as will admit of her being brought to a standstill within the distance at which, in the condition of the fog, she can discover another vessel, is guilty of a fault rendering her responsible for a col- lision which might have been avoided had her speed been less. Moderate speed in the meaning of the sailing rules is a speed which will enable the steamer, under ordinary circum- stances, when approaching another ship, so as to involve risk of collision, . ef- fectually to slacken her speed, or, if nec- essary, stop and reverse. Ii, after a foe horn is heard on a steamer, there is not time for her to slow and deliberate sufficiently to learn the po- sition and course of the sailing vessel, and take proper measures to avoid her, that fact itself shows that the steamer . is moving at too great a speed. The moderate speed required-of steam- ers in a fog by rule 21 is something mate- rially less than ordinary full speed. It has reference to all the circumstances affecting her ability to keep out of the way, including her own power in back- ing, and requires a reduction of speed ac- cording to the density of the fog. When- ever the fog is sufficient to increase ma- terially the dangers of navigation, a given speed may be moderate for a-swift ves- sel, which would be excessive for a slow moving one having less power to stop and back. quickly. - Full speed by a steamer in a fog re- quires, to excuse it, the existence of a. present danger, and a necessity of going full speed to avoid it. A belief on the part of the master that a danger may, in a certain event, arise in the future, to "TAE. MARINE. REVIEW avoid which he gives the full speed or- der, is not a sufficient excuse under ar- ticle' 23. A lake steamer, proceeding in the usual course of vessels during a dense fog, should stop occasionally to listen for sounds of approaching vessels, or, at all events, to run only at such speed as will enable her to stop as soon as the close proximity of another vessel is known. SALVAGE SERVICE.--The United States. District Court for the Southern District of New York holds that the raising of a scow under a contract, sunk in its home port, and where the work involved no element of danger and nothing out of. the usual, is not a salvage service, which creates a lien on the vessel. PROVISION FOR PROMPT LOADING.--Under a charter party for a vessel to carry a cargo of coal, which provided that she should "have turn in loading" and "be loaded promptly," she is entitled to be loaded promptly in view of the facilities of the port and the climatic conditions which existed at the time, and to have such facilities used 'to their normal ca- pacity, not only in her own loading, but also in the loading of other vessels after her arrival while she was waiting her turn. LOSS OF JEWELRY BY PASSENGER.--Section 4281 U. S. Revised - Statutes provides that if any shipper of jewelry, etc., con- tained in any parcel or package or trunk shall take the same as freight or bag- gage, on any vessel without giving writ- ten notice of its character and value, and having the same entered on the bill of 'lading, the ship owner shall not be liable as carrier. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holds that the section is intended to ap- ply where such goods, are received from a shipper by a carrier for transportation in the usual course of business, and does not relieve a ship owner from liability for jewelry worn and carried on board by a woman passenger with the intention of placing it in the custody of the purser, as 'permitted by the rules of the ship, but which was stolen by an employe of the ship before she had the opportunity to do so. The case also holds that a ship owner is liable to a passenger for the value of jewelry stolen during the voy- age by a steward employed to perform duties which the carrier owed to the pas- senger under the contract of carriage ; also that conditions printed inconspicu- ously upon a steamship ticket, providing that the ship owner shall not be liable for any loss of the passenger's baggage through theft, or any act, neglect, or de- fault of the ship owners, servants or oth- ers, which are not oe to the passenger nor called to his attention, are invalid and 'constitute no defense to an action by the passenger to recover for the loss 'hold a minority of the shares, of jewelry stolen by one of the ship's employes. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PART OWNERS OF VESSELS.--Where a vessel is held by two conflicting interests, each equal in amount, and both equally desirous of em- ploying it, an obvious difficulty arises. The principle 'that as between co-owners those desiring to employ the vessel shall prevail over those opposed to its em- ployment, whether their interests be equal or unequal, and the principle that where both desire to employ, the interests -being unequal the majority shall control, are both inapplicable. Actual partition of the common property is rendered im- practicable by its nature, and the most obvious remedy is its sale and distribu- tion of the proceeds. The tendency of the American cases is to confine the power of sale to cases where the warring interests are equal, both desirous of employing the vessel. With but few qualifications the rights and liabilities of part owners of vessels are the same as those incident to a ten- ancy in common of other chattels. One part owner is not liable to-a co-owner for failure to employ the vessel, nor for profits which might have been earned had it been employed. Where a veséel is lost in the sual trade and without any negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of the owner in charge, the loss falls on all the-owners, and the owner in charge is not liable to the others for their respective shares. Where, however, _ the loss of the vessel is traceable to the fault of a co-owner, each part owner has a right of action in tort against him to the value of such owner's share. Part owners of a vessel cannot, by ex- cluding their co-owners from the pos- session of the vessel, although the latter deprive them of their proportion of the vessel's earnings. The excluded part owners may, and, where they do not dissent from the voyage are presumed to stand upon their legal rights, and claim the benefit of the voyages made. 'Since, however, a right to share in the earnings carries with it the obligation to contribute to the losses, a part owner may undoubtedly dissent from a proposed adventure, and by mak- ing his dissent effective may absolve him- self from all connection with it. 'In such a case the adventure is at the risk of and for the benefit of the other co- ownets, What, then, is necessary to make his dissent Ractive? Where the dissent- ing part owner, by application to a court of admiralty, requires of his co-owners a stipulation for the safe return of the ves- sel, not only does he deprive himself of any participation in the earnings and repel any idea to contribute to the losses of the voyage, but if the vessel itself be lost, he is entitled to reimbursement for his share.