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1902.1 MARINE REVIEW. | . OUR NEW NAVY. Rear-Admiral George Wallace Melville contributes to the current issue of the Review of Reviews a very interesting article upon the subject "Our New Navy.' No authority stands higher than the engineer-in-chief of the United States navy and no man has had a longer or more honorable public career. Following are excerpts from the article: "In measuring the value of a navy, account should be taken of the direct and indirect 'benefits accruing from its existence. It is worth some- thing to a nation to possess a weapon that can be quickly used, either at home or abroad, for restraining disorder or for averting war. It makes for the nation's dignity and prestige to possess a service whose traditions and customs instill honor and self-respect in its members, and whose officers represent, in their conduct and work, the best thought and aspira- tions of the country at large. It is because the great value of a navy toa nation in warding off evil can never be determined that the full realization and significance for its existence will never be appreciated, except by some such isolated country as Great Britain. The British empire is the only power that fully realizes the fact that to preserve a nation's prestige and integrity there must be maintained a navy strong enough to protect its own coast and commerce, while also sufficiently large to attack at the same time any possible ally of her enemy. Every dominant world power for over 2,000 years has aimed to control the highways of the ocean. There is an inspiration and glory in possessing sea-power that makes any holder loth to lose control of the great lanes of commerce. Once let a nation reap the glory of a Trafalgar or Santiago, or secure the carrying trade of the world, and you raise a race who will eventually make the sea the home of its adoption. This country has had a taste several times of the sweets of a sea-power, and, on this account, the rehabilitation of the navy has appealed so strongly to public sentiment that the question is neither a political nor sectional one. Only, however, in the past century has any- thing like full recognition been given to the work of a navy in the great movements that have determined which nations shall mold human destiny. "It has been maintained by some experts that our sphere of influence should be confined to the protection of our own coast. Such a policy may be applicable for hermit nations; 'but manufacturing countries must. have ships to carry their wares to distant seas, and where the merchantman goes, the man-of-war must be kept in readiness to follow. © Self-preserva- tion compels industrial nations to trend toward becoming world powers. In the carrying of goods to the shores of colonial possessions, one may often pass the boundaries of possible foes, and, therefore, one's navy must be powerful enough to keep clear the lane between country and colony. As it takes five years to build a battleship, and as we have fewer of these fighting 'machines than almost any other great power, it will be some time before we shall have a navy adequate to our needs and necessities. A policy of construction and action should be outlined, and, therefore, the question of the navy's requirements should be met and not evaded by naval experts. : "The race for naval supremacy is well on, and it will be continued until some of the countries are pretty nigh bankrupt in the effort to become powerful on the sea. Either by trend of events or for self-preservation, some nations have been forced into this race against the protest of wise and experienced statesmen. There are two factors, however, which will narrow this contest for supremacy to three powers: "First--The expense of creating and maintaining a navy. The naval expenditures of several countries have increased threefold during the past fifteen years, and already the naval budget of one nation exceeds $100,000,- 000. With such expenditures a nation with the deepest pocketbook must have a great advantage. : "Second--The difficulty of securing men for the warships. The only man who can do good work afloat is one who has aptitude for the sea, and a nation which does not possess either a powerful maritime marine, or does not systematically develop a large and efficient training system, can never hope to become a sea power. : : "In measuring naval strength, that country will be the ultimate stronger naval power which can turn out a battleship most rapidly, and which has the most establishments capable of undertaking this work. Speed in construction is, therefore, a factor that must be taken into con- sideration. We have at least ten ship yards that are ready to take a con- tract for a battleship when they find it profitable to do so, and within two years it is likely that three more will be in condition to do the work. We have two plants that can make armor, and if our building program will be sufficiently large, a third firm is ready to go into business. Measured from the standpoint of speed construction, we are only surpassed in naval strength 'by England. The ship yard is an element of naval strength, and the fact is becoming more recognized each day. An armor plant is as valuable as a gun foundry, and a dock is necessary to the efficiency of a fleet. : "Our ships can only be considered the equals of those of other nations. In a few special respects they may be the superior; but it must be remem- bered that wherever these battleships are designed, the local vessel is made out to be the superior. Such would naturally be the case, as different ex- perts attach different values to the several factors that are considered in the 'design of a warship. In designing these fighting machines, there are many questions that affect their efficiency, such as ammunition and coal supply; character and distribution of both battery and armor;.mean draught, speed and total displacement. 'A change in any one of these factors may ne- cessitate changes in all others, and thus each nation would naturally develop a type of warship that would best meet its special requirements. Measured from the standpoint of each nation's resources and necessities, every naval power has probably settled upon a type that best answers its purposes. It is possible that, in seeking superiority in special respects, a naval architect may attach importance to factors which time may show to be valueless for even the particular purposes intened. a. "Considering the fact that the general plans of a warship are accessible to hundreds of observing and intelligent persons, no nation can keep from the knowledge of possible enemies any military invention that will nen: the efficiency of the fighting vessel. Probably the only secret that can be jealously guarded for a time is the composition and manufacture of ges powder and high explosives. As it may be regarded as a good rule to consider the last battleship whenever designed as the best, all ew Possess 'antiquated, as well as some excellent, vessels of the fig fing: machine 'type. ! The exact science 'of the Fretich; the' profound thought oe "the German; the inventive faculty of the American, and the experience an ' ern battleships. No one could be taken seriously who would maintain that any single navy possesses a fighting machine which is superior even in many respects to those built by other nations. We can well rest content in the knowledge that the character, if not the numbers of our ships, are the equal of the best possessed by the leading naval powers. 5 A navy is a costly institution. Large appropriations aré essential for its maintenance. From the fact that the warship contains machines crowded together, and designed to an extreme degree of lightness, depre- ciation of a battleship is very rapid. The design, also, soon' becomes ob- solete; so, altogether, it requires a heavy outlay to secure or maintain naval supremacy. The actual cost of our completed fighting vessels, and the total estimated cost of those building, will probably reach $275,000,000. This represents but a half of the actual expenditure incurred in creating a navy. In addition to the fighting ship, there are required for naval pur- poses numerous auxiliaries, such as dock yards, educational institutions for the training of men and officers, docks, and coaling stations. In the common sense of the Briton have been exercised in designing these mod- 'shape of auxiliary vessels we must have many gunboats and tugs. The collier, repair, hospital, supply, and training-ship each has a sphere of use- fulness. It is the indirect outlay that swells the expenditures in the navy, as well as in the army. As an example of how excessive are the indirect expenses in time of war, it has been estimated.that each soldier in the Philippines costs the army $1,500 per annum, although the pay, ration and clothing of the enlisted man will not average one-third of that amount. It costs us at least 30 per cent. more than it does any European power to build a warship. It costs us 30 per cent. more to keep our service in ope- ration, since the expense of living is greater here than elsewhere. The minimum expense in keeping one battleship in commission cannot be less than $1,000 per day. ee __ 1 have often been asked by strong friends of the navy, if the ships are still in a state of development, and-if any marked changes in design can be anticipated. The fact that the battleship must keep near a repair base shows that she is still far from being a perfect design of fighting machine. These floating fortresses are insatiable in their demands for maintenance, and it may be for the good of the peace of the world that constant repairs are required upon them. For the reason that these ships are not self- sustaining, there need be but little fear that our coast can either be block- aded or attacked. Even to blockade the French ports, a board of British admirals reported that England would have to use three battleships for every two possessed by France. No power would think of attacking our coasts without bringing into action a naval force of, at least, twice the strength of any squadron that we could assemble. It is beneath the pro- tective deck--in the engine and boiler rooms--where the warship, working from a distant base, is at an insurmountable disadvantage. The weakness of a modern navy in this respect is known to all naval engineers, and no one has yet dared to tell in its fullness the truth as to the weakness and un- reliability of this link. In the blockade of Santiago our fleet practically operated from Guantanamo and were thus able to procure coal, oil, and 'machine supplies from the auxiliaries that steamed to that harbor without any hindrance from the Spanish navy. The repair ship Vulcan also -ren- - dered effective service, and numerous supply ships brought fresh meat and vegetables to men and officers. ae "The warship is really a less formidable fighting machine than many suppose. The steaming radius of all vessels has been overestimated. Our service has probably as good ships as other nations, and yet we have not one battleship that could steam from San Francisco to Manila and return without taking on board a deck load of coal. There will always be some lame duck in every fleet which the commander-in chief will not dare to . dispense with, and this ship will retard the movement of the entire squad- ron. After steaming to San Juan, Porto Rico, from Key West, the com- mander-in-chief was compelled to return to the first-named port to refill bunkers. It will also be remembered that the flying squadron which left Key West for Santiago, to blockade that port, had hardly been off the entrance of the harbor before there was apprehension that there 'was a small coal supply. The fact that warships can do so little when operating distant from a base should be very comforting, so far as the protection of our coast is concerned. In the consideration of the Philippine question we shall have to labor under the disadvantage of working far from a base. The limitations in the power of the battleship that make for our ad- vantage in the protection of our own coast, will result to our disadvantage in the defence of colonial possessions. And this is a matter that should command the thoughtful consideration of naval students. In maintaining possession of that group of islands, we shall be placed exactly in the pre- dicament that Spain was in defending Cuba. No good coal has yet' been found on those islands, and any naval power which could operate from either China or Japan would possess a great strategic advantage over us in a contest for the control of the waters of the Philippine group. Good coal is found in certain provinces of 'both China and Japan, and if we have to carry fuel to the Philippines we will find the task a herculean one. nee "It is to the future, however, where all eyes are turned. All nations today are more concerned as to what will be than what has been concern- ing naval development. It is along engineering lines where special pro- gression must take place in the future. It is exceedingly probable that in two particular directions there will be engineering advance and improve- ment. For over 2,000 years there has been an effort to make a practical rotary engine. The advance secured in this direction in England by the Hon. Charles A. Parsons, F. R. S., during the past twenty years has been greater than that attained since the days when the priests of Isis used a simple form of the machine to awe their devotees. 'The advantages for naval purposes of a successful form of steam turbine need not to be enumerated. With the advent of the marine rotary engine will come in- creased reliance and security of motive machinery. The machine, how- ever, will not only have to be efficient, but possess endurance. Theré are many eminent engineers at work upon this problem. Even though its successful installation for commercial and naval purposes may only be secured by development, still the world can afford to pay a large sum to make the steam turbine a practical success. The two fastest torpedo boats in the world were fitted with steam turbines, and the British admiralty will install such form of motive power in one of the torpedo boats which will be laid down this year. While this great change in the form of the pro- pelling engine is anxiously looked for, the naval engineer is;:also looking for a method of generating steam more rapidly and efficiently, and it,is in the direction of burning liquid fuel for naval and maritime purposes that an increase in speed and steaming radius is expected.