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a MARINE REVIEW AND MARINE RECORD. sideration that the contractors were constantly being assisted in complying with service practices and they had often admitted it to him. There are not enough naval constructors for the work, and the enormous demand for draughtsmen has resulted in poor plans from contractors that might be looked upon as an offset for delays. Mr. Spear also said that those who know Mr. Dickie best know that he delights in promoting discussion. "When building up the new navy," said Mr. F. L. Du Basque, "the initiative was taken by the constructive corps. The ship yards, after the first contracts were let, were pleased to take ad- vantage of the information which the navy could give them. It should not be forgotten that some of the big yards can trace their early progress to assistance which they received from the young constructors. It is quite surprising, however, that in the matter of standards referred to in this paper the navy has not made more progress. The opportunity for standardization of parts in the navy is great but does not: seem to be taken advantage of." "T sympathize with Mr. Dickie," said Mr. A. G. Rutherford, "but he does not seem to have made a clear case in his paper. Delays are due to two reasons not specially referred to in the paper. We all know of what we are encountering in the matter of delivery of material. It is first necessary to send men to the mills in order to get the stuff, and then what a time we have to get along as the structure progresses! That which is wanted never comes at the right time. ting men suited to the work as it goes along in its different stages. These are, of course, matters of supply and demand, but they are of first importance in considering a subject of this kind." Robert Curr, who was connected with one of the ship yards of San Francisco up to a short time ago, said that nothing from the east seemed to satisfy the Pacific coast. He gave expression in a very humorous strain to the opinion that the builders of the Pacific had their own methods and were very much inclined to oppose anything that might be suggested from other parts of the country. Lieut. Com'dr. White spoke of the advantage to young naval officers of the training which thev receive when on construction work and the discussion was then concluded by the remarks of Secretary Capps, referred to in a previous paragraph, and in. which he directed attention to Mr. Dickie's keen sense of humor and his delight in promoting discussion. LIEUT. COMD'R. A. B. NIBLACK. Lieut. Comd'r. A. B. Niblack entered the navy in 1876 from the first district of Indiana (Vin- cennes) and graduated from the United States naval academy in 1880; has served. on the Pacific _ North Atlantic, South Atlantic, European and Asiatic stations; was employed in surveying and exploring duty in Alaska in 1884-7 and again in 1893 onthe boundary survey. He is the author of "The Coast Indians of Alaska and Northern British Columbia." He was inspector of naval militia 1895-6; naval attache at Berlin, Rome and Vienna 1897-8; and on 'the outbreak of the war with Spain served in the North Cuban blockading squadron, participating in the capture of Nipe bay in July, 1808. He commanded the torpedo boat Winslow in August, 1808, and was transferred to the Asiatic station in November of the same year to join the United States flagship Olymp'a. He served two years through the Philippine campaign and five months in the North China ex- peditionary force in 1900. In December, 1900, he was appointed secretary of the naval commission to locate a site for a nava station in the Philippines and afterwards had charge of the survey of the place chosen at Olonpago, Subic bay, Luzon island He was appointed inspector of target practice in 1901 and is now on waiting orders for sea. His paper on the "T'actics of the Gun" is the outcome of his experiences as inspector of target. practice. At the first meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Mr. Niblack read a paper on "Coal Bunkers and Coaling Ship" which has largely influenced the question of bunker arrangements in recent ships. Mr. Niblack's other papers before the society have been "Tactical Considerations in War Ship Designs" in 1895, and "T'actical Considerations Involved in Torpedo Boat Design" in 1899. Mr. Niblack is best known in his profession for his interest in signaling and tactics. He was promoted to lieutenant-commander in June, 1902. Lieut, Comd'r. A. B. Niblack. THE TACTICS OF THE GUN. At the close of the discussion of Mr. Dickie's paper Lieut. Com'dr. Albert P. Niblack's paper upon "The Tactics of the Gun" was read by Lieut. Com'dr. W. P. White, in the absence of Mr. Niblack. He gave a most appreciative reading of it. 'The paper follows: ws Xe The battleship is the epitome of sea power. Reduced to its simplest terms it is a floating gun platform. As a unit of offense There is also the difficulty of get-.. [Nov. 27. it contains, on a given displacement, the maximum of concentra- ted destructive power, (a) for battle on the high seas for which it is primarily designed, and (b) for coast attack, which is its secondary and seldom used purpose: The difference between the tactical values of battleships and of cruisers, torpedo boats, sub- marines and rams, are those of degree rather than of kind, for each merely chooses some weapon or some quality of the battle- ship:and sacrifices everything else to it. The special tactics suited to each are dictated by the battleships. Cruisers, topedo boats and rams must have speed to avoid encountering them unwillingly or to deliver their blow in the shortest time so as to escape as Big. 4 Fig. 2. A A poe 9 ' 5 | 9 2 * 9 "oe # \ a *» os ww, 7 , Sy < ls ® much gun-fire as possible. Submarines must be invisible. Noth- ing is here said of monitors, for their function is purely harbor defense, and as gun-platforms in a seaway they are wretched owing to rapid oscillation. On the other hand in the design of the battleship we must secure immunity from the other classes of vessels, but this is-done as far as equipment, construction and ordnance are concerned by quick maneuvering qualities, powerful secondary batteries, search lights, nets and other auxiliary appli- ances, but, primarily, battleships are meant to fight battleships on the high seas, and it is in this view of gun against gun that we shall consider the question of tactics. 'It is the function of the ram and of the torpedo to penetrate the underwater body of a ship, and breaking down its watertight subdivisions, or striking it in a vital point such as the magazine or boiler, to destroy it. It is the function of the gun to put out of action the battery and personnel, but as long as a ship retains her motive power, steering gear and her personnel other than that at the battery, the gun is almost powerless to destroy. To be more explicit, it is only by luck or by indirection that a modern battleship can sink another by gun-fire alone. We need not in the future expect to set ships on fire by gun-fire, as at Santiago or Manila, and, indeed, we have a long way to go before we can ex- pect to achieve victories over our next adversary. This is a warning and not a prophecy. The individual gun is the unit of offense, in one sense, but the combined fire of as many guns as possible directed according to a definite scheme by means of well organized fire control alone means victory. he key to modern fleet actions is concentration of gun-fire. To achieve this we must instal our guns properly, and we must of all things train our personnel. Fleet formations should be based on gun-fire, and in battle we should limit tac- tical movements to those which least disturb it. The object of all tactical maneuvers or movements of a fleet previous to or in a fleet engagement should be: First, to get and keep the enemy within a close effective range, ar Second, to endeavor to get a superior position in order to mask some of his fire, or increase the effect of your own. : Third, to hold an advantage gained or losing it to maneuver for a fresh one. Fourth, to avoid waste of ammunition. Fifth, to get out of a position of disadvantage or one in which a move of the enemv may threaten to place you. ; Sixth, to concentrate gun-fire on certain ships of the enemy in order to reduce the tactical efficiency of all his ships by crip- pling one or more. Seventh, but of all things to deliver a rapid crushing fire at "the earliest possible moment, thereby injuring at once his initia- tive and increasing your own offensive power in a geometrical ratio as you destroy his,