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June, 1909 against John Duggan, engineer of the steamer James H. Hoyt. Therefore, the charge of negligence is not sus- tained, and the accused discharged. (Signed) JAMES STONE, United States Supervising United States Supervising Inspector. Acting for Local Inspectors of Steam Vessels. EXPLOSION ON THE FOCA. ASOLINE much to com- mend it as a propulsive agent, but its searching qualities and its volatility cause its use to has be fraught with .some risks _ unless handled with a_ great amount of caution. The hazard would be ma- terially reduced if the danger lay only in the presence of gasoline, per se, which would give visual indication of impending danger, but, on the con- trary, the most perilous part of this fuel is its invisible, heavy fumes which have a way of settling into pocketed spaces and forming with the air a violent explosive mixture. On April 26, an explosion of gaso- line fumes aboard the Italian sub- mersible Foca, resulted in the imme- diate killing of eight of the crew and the fatal injuring of a number of others. On May 12 an explosion of gasoline fumes occurred aboard the U. S. Submarine Cuttlefish. ately there was no loss of life, and the extent of the damage and the cir- cumstances of the accident are un- dergoing official investigation. Both mishaps, however, show that the use of heavy oils instead of gasoline would unquestionably give an added measure of security especially aboard subma- rine vessels where the ventilation is necessarily largely induced by me- chanical means, and where the pres- ence of electric motors and switch- boards which are liable to spark, double the chances of danger. Some Pregnant Suggestions. The circumstances attending the disaster aboard the Foca are pregnant with suggestiveness and point to the part which atmospheric conditions may play in increasing the hazards associated with the use of gasoline aboard submarine vessels. At the time of the explosion, the Foca was lying within the military harbor of Naples, and her crew were engaged in com- pleting the replenishment of her fuel supply--in fact, her gasoline tanks had actually been filled. The day was hot and humid and there was not a breath of air stirring. In this absolute calm, the petrol fumes hung about the boat and found their way into the superstructures--the manholes in Fortun- © TAE MARINE REVIEW which had been opened to facilitate making connections with the leads to the fuel tanks. In this manner, the heavy gasoline gas flowed into the superstructure space and remained there by reasom of its weight and the fact that no effort was made to permit them again to flow outboard. All that was necessary to create a disas- ter was an igniting spark, and this ap- pearéd in due season. It makes no difference whether this spark came from the smokestack of a near-by vessel or whether from the pipe or cigarette of a heedless smoker--the result is¢the only thing of present moment. Freeing Ports Should be Open. It is the usual custom aboard sub- marine boats to close all hatches lead- ing into the vessel when gasoline is being taken on board inorder that the fumes may not follow their natural flow downward and find their way in- to' the body of the boat. It would seem that this precaution was, in fact, taken in the case of the Foca, but the commanding officer failed to recognize that the superstructure space, in it- self, formed a dangerous counterpart of his main hull so long as it 'became a pocket for the reception and the re- tention of the explosive gas. In the Foca and the later submersibles of the Laurenti type, the superstructure is designed to be self-bailing when running in a seaway or when the ves- sel rises from a submergence--the water flowing outboard by gravity through freeing ports at the lower sides: of. 'the. superstructure, Had these freeing ports been open--as they should have been--at the time the boat. was taking petrol aboard--the fumes flowing into the superstructure through the deck openings would have passed outboard by reason of their own weight and gravity through the lower freeing ports, and there would have been no dangerous accumulation of gas within that space. The me- chanical or structural safeguards were present, but the officer of the Royal Marine in charge failed to take ad- vantage of them. Just why they should have been closed at all is not plain, unless the boat during her sea run met with exceptionally heavy weather, and it was deemed expedient to close' these freeing ports in order to add that much more to the vessel's re- serve of buoyancy. This explanation, however, does not seem to have 'point, because the Foca made an exception- aally rapid run from Spezia to Naples --covering the intervening distance of 400 miles in the remarkably quick time of 35 hours of continuous steaming. 163 During the nighttime, the Foca ran under her middle screw making about 10 knots an hour, and during daylight she used all three screws and attained an hourly speed of quite 14 knots. She could not have done this had she en- countered heavy weather. Building in the United States. Apart from this accident with its significant lesson, the Foca is of in- terest' to. us becalsé a vessel of this type but of larger dimensions is un- der construction at the ship yard of William Cramp & Sons for the United -- States navy. It should be a source of satisfaction, therefore, to us to know that there is nothing defective in the design of this particular type of sub- mersible, and that the exercise of rea- sonable foresight and the proper avail- ment of the features provided will prevent a similar recurrence here. Since the Foca has been raised, it has been found that the direct violence of the explosion was- localized in shattering 'the boat's light superstruc- ture--the main hull lying below and built to withstand the pressures due to submergence being intact and un- affected by the explosion. Apart from this, the gasoline tanks were found filled with fuel and likewise undis- turbed by the explosion. Had the gas- oline fumes accumulated within the main body of the boat and there been ignited, the result would have been far more disastrous -to the lboat, it- self, and the mishap shows how thor- oughly the Foca was protected against this danger. The official board of in- quiry found the engines and internal mechanisms unimpared save for the damage naturally to 'be expected through the inflow of salt water, and in this direction the most of the dam- age was done to the storage batteries. Had a breeze been blowing at the time it is quite likely the fumes would have been rapidly dissipated to lee- ward, and we can now appreciate that atmospheric conditions involving high temperature, humidity, and a calm provide potential dangers in them- selves when gasoline is being carried into a vessel--especially if that , ves- sel is low lying and deep draughted as are boats for submarine service. The accident teaches us one more impor- tant lesson which will not be Jost upon our experts. C. M. Heald, general manager of the Mutu- al Transit Co. of Buffalo has given an order to the Great Lakes Engineering Works for a package freighter to be a duplicate of the North Lake and North Sea and to come out in 1910. The steamer William E. Corey of the Pitts- bore Steamy Co.'s fleet, discharged 9,300 tons of ore at Ashtabula Saturday, May 16, in 4 hours and 34 minutes.