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188 entered Santiago, there were many transports just outside the harbor load- ed with supplies for the troops who were back of Santiago and in that sec- tion. of Cuba. The War Department had planned to have these transports en- ter the harbor of Santiago and from there make a distribution of the sup- plies. One Saturday evening, I received a summons from the Secretary of War, and when we met, he made this state- ment: 'Mr. Baker, can you help us out? We have outside of Santiago a large number of transports loaded with supplies and provisions for our troops, and the only possible means we have of landing these cargoes is by taking the flour, provisions and the other things ashore in small boats, and then having them carried on the backs of the men to the soldiers and the refugees who have joined them. While Cervera's fleet is in Santiago harbor, it is impossible for us to supply one-tenth of our men. "What are we to do?' In reply to the question as to what had been done, the Secretary stated that some tug boats and barges had been sent out for the purpose of landing supplies on the south coast of Cuba and that they had been wrecked on Hamilton Bay. He 'pictured the conditions as most serious and declared that some- thing must be done immediately. I re- mained in the War Department all night and nearly all day Sunday arranging to secure tug boats. I cabled our London office that I would seize a British ship I found nearly loaded with large tim- ber in Savannah, and I told our London representatives to see the owners and let them know that they would be re- imbursed on a liberal scale for the seizure of the ship and cargo. While - these arrangements were going on amidst the great strain and excitement, word came that on Sunday, Cervera had come out and had been attacked and that the harbor was free for our transports to enter. I always shall believe there is something in what we old seafaring men believe in, that "There is a little cherub who sits aloft and watches over the life of poor Jack." Surely in this crisis for- tune came to us most unexpectedly and in bountiful measure. But the incident was another illustration showing out un- preparedness at that time. The Spanish Torpedo Boat Ornuz. Still another incident may be told. The United States government had arranged for auxiliary cruisers for the Navy De- partment and had chartered the boats of the American Line. I happened to be in London at the time of the sailing of one of these ships--the St. Paul, I think --from Southampton. The immediate return of the St. Paul had been cabled _ for. At the moment lying in the dock THE Marine REVIEW at Cork Harbor was the torpedo boat Ornuz, belonging to the Spanish govern- ment. With hurry orders the American Line ship was rushing with all possible speed to complete arrangements to leave Southampton that Sunday morning. She had arrived there only the day before. I know of my own personal knowledge that it was the plan for the Ornuz to leave the dry dock at Cork Harbor and intercept this ship. Our naval attache in London at that time knew of the circumstances. In some mysterious way on Sunday afternoon the stays support- ing the Ornuz in the dry dock at Cork slipped and the torpedo boat went over on her side with such serious results that it was impossible for her to leave. I have every reason to believe that the so-called accident was not an accident. Surely in our war with Spain we realized what a frightful mistake it was not to have as auxiliary to our navy a ~ merchant marine which could be called upon to relieve the government's neces- sities. Nothing was ever more manifest. The whole country rang with the cry. Our public men were seized with panic at the folly of our policy. And yet because our victory was easy and because the strain was for a few months only and because we move so quickly and are so apt to forget, we stand today as unwise children who have learned a great lesson without profiting by it. Is it desirable and is it neces- sary to have a merchant marine as an auxiliary to our navy? Ladies and gen- tlemen, I do not need to put such a question to this audience of men who know. By great good fortune we have not had a contest with a first class naval power. We have gone into the politics of the world with superb confidence in ourselves, and with the childish belief that our responsibility does not take with it the imperative need of being prepared with means to back our words. The other day enlightened statesmanship sent the great American fleet around the world. It was a big idea splendidly carried out, and that matchless proces- sion made a great impression wherever it was seen. But how it humbles our pride and makes solemn our thoughts when we know that this fleet could not have made the journey unless it had used the ships of other nations as col- liers. You know, and I know, that if tomorrow trouble should come, our navy, excellent as it is, would be comparatively helpless because it would not have the necessary boats back of it to provide its coal and its ammunition and to take care of its cripples. It is all very well to say that it would be easy for us to secure such ships as we might want, but, ladies and gentlemen, let me tell you from my own experience that it would not be easy. Twelve years ago had we May, 1919 not been in direct touch with the for. eign office at London, and had Spain entered any formal protest to the trans. fer of the ships, it would have been jim. possible for us to have gotten these boats for use in the Spanish-American war. I say this of my own personal knowledge and experience at that time In fact, it was with a great deal of hesitation and only through the influence of personal friends in London that the foreign office at that time did not ob- ject to the transfer; that, too, in spite of the fact that they had received no formal protest from Spain. The Navy Needs the Merchant Marine, Where would the United States be if it were drawn into such a conflict as England had with South Africa? Why, all the steamships on the Atlantic coast would be nothing compared with the enormous service which England estab-' lished "for South: Africa. This also | know from actual experience, because we chartered many ships to them at that time. Under similar conditions the United States would be entirely help- less. Now, no one is more of a peace man than I am, and no one would re- gret more than I to see our country drawn into a contest with a great mari- time nation, and my purpose here tonight is to emphasize my belief that there is no better way of 'preventing that sort of thing than to be prepared for it. Our great writers have covered the ques- tion fully, and I should like to quote from the most eminent of them ll, Capt. A. D. Mahan: "Can this navy be had without restor- ing the merchant shipping? It is doubt- ful. History has proved that such a purely military sea power can be built up by a despot, as was done by Louis XIV; but though so fair seeming, ex- perience showed that his navy was like a growth which, having no root, soon withers away. But in a representative government any military expenditure must have a strongly represented interest behind it, convinced of its necessity. How such a merchant shipping should be built up, whether by subsidies or free trade, by constant administration of ton- ics or by free movement in the open aif, is not a military, but an economical question. I would also like to quote President Hadley, of Yale College: "Of England's mail contract system it may be fairly said: (1) That its aims are political and not commercial. It 1 a necessity for England to have constant communication with her colonies and she has spent large sums for this object. It is almost equally important for her t0 have an efficient naval reserve and trans- port service, and she has made her mail contracts one among several means 10