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November, 1910 TAE MARINE REVIEW 437 HOW THE MEYER SYSTEM OF NAVY YARD ORGANIZATION WORKS Only a few examples are given of the in- efficiency of the present organization. The writer has made a personal investigation and has himself seen these and many others even worse. It is well known that the navy de- partment will punish any one who dares to speak the truth about the present organization. It has even gone so far as to punish promi- nent officials who, in the course of their duty, have given information to the naval commit- tee. If the writer should tell all he knows, those innocent of any wrong would be marked for puuishment. If congress will really in- vestigate, abundant evidence to establish the charge of naval inefficiency will be forthcoming. LMOST a year has elapsed since the organization devised for the navy depart- ment by Secretary Meyer and -his aides went into. effect. The time has now arrived when it is possible to judge clearly the merits and demerits of Mr. Meyer's system of organization, to note its effect upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the navy and its value in procuring economy in naval admin- istration. The author has recently had the opportunity of visiting several navy yards at some length, and of ex- amining carefully and thoroughly their condition and administration under the Meyer regime. This article pro- poses to relate frankly the results of this investigation, showing the actual workings of the Meyer system as it affects the navy yards. The author is an engineer by training and experience and is competent to criticize engineer- ing matters and affairs pertaining to works management. At the time the Meyer "re-organiza- tion" took effect, it was announced that the new scheme would promote harmony, simplicity, efficiency and the utmost economy. It was announced that the Newberry system of consoli- dation had failed in all these particu- lars. As a matter of fact, in the few yards where the Newberry system had full swing and during the very short time it was in operation, some start- ling results were obtained in the re- duction of the cost of doing work. How has the Meyer scheme fared in this respect? Meyer System Results in Friction. After a careful study of the situation the author has come to the conclusion that the Meyer system of naval or- ganization has resulted in friction, wastefulness, extravagance, useless du- Plication of machines, materials and organizations, conflict of authority and dangerous division of responsibility. The system is without a counterpart in any industrial organization; it is clumsy, crude, illogical and unbusi- nesslike. These contentions the author will prove in the course of this article. Friction between officers, between departments and 'between superiors and their subordinates has developed-- in some cases to an alarming degree-- - because the officers who actually know the least about yard administration and the extremely technical matters constantly arising for consideration and adjustment, are placed in authority over the officers who really know the most about. these matters. The su- preme authority is rested in line of- ficers whose experience has been al- most entirely at sea, and who know nothing of shops, engineering, organi- zation or works management, while the construction officers, whose train- ing specially fits them for yard man- agement, are placed in subordinate po- sitions. This is a reversal of the natu- tral order of 'things, and places the 'commandant in a false position. Fric- tion is only the natural result, and friction has developed, as might have been expected, to the great detriment of the efficiency of the service. It has been urged that the commandant of a navy yard occupies a position com- parable with that of president in a commercial organization and that tech- nical skill on his part is therefore un- necessary. This might be all right if it were true, but in actual practice the commandant under the Meyer scheme is the actual manager of the yard and all the technical details pass through his hands. With this in mind, the fol- ly of placing a line officer in this po- sition is self evident. The subordinant officers are allowed practically no free- dom of action, which only increases the friction all along the line; the ropes are drawn so tightly that no communications are permitted between heads of departments without going through the commandant's office. Fre- quently the written orders of a super- ior are revoked to his subordinate ver- bally, after the superior learns how little he himself knows about the mat- ter. Sample of Idiotic Orders. | Below are samples of the idiotic or- ders which emanate from the _ head- quarters of the department at Wash- ington. A navy yard was requested recently to furnish "a payroll of indi- rect charges." The entire cost system in vogue in the various yards was re- cently suddenly and radically changed by a letter from Washington. days later a new order was received, only to be immediately modified by telegraph. In five weeks five impor- tant modifications were made in the cost keeping system. Owing to the divided responsibility and lack of abil- ity in many directions, the writer found that in some yards under pres- ent circumstances, One division or de- partment would be up to date in its work and another all the way from one to three months behind. Waste, extravagance, useless dupli- cation, conflict of authority and divis- ion of responsibility are only a natural result of the system now in vogue. The Newberry system was unified, compact and concentrated; the actual workings of the Meyer system show 'it to be scattered, inharmonious and hardly worthy of the names of organi- zation. Instead of one organization with centralized, intelligent authority, each navy yard consists nominally of three great departments, a hull divis- ion, a machinery division and a de- partment of yards and docks. The line of demarcation between these de- partments can be only vaguely defined; the departments are at once independ- ent in authority and inter-dependent in their work. These are the two great, irremediable faults which are inherent in the system itself, and which can be eliminated only by eradicating the entire organization root and branch. The following incidents illustrate a few of the follies growing out of this system of having several independent departments working on the same job. Interminable Red Tape. The hull division needed the use of a locomotive crane alongside a ship at dock. Permission to use the crane had to be formally asked in writing of the bureau of yards and docks, and it developed that the crane was brok- en and in need of repairs. The bureau of yards and docks had made no ef- fort to have the crane repaired of its own initiative so that it might be ready. The civil engineer was called in to inspect the crane and report to the captain of the yard, head of the department of yards and docks, its con- dition. He reported certain minor re- pairs necessary requiring some ma- chine shop work. A formal order to. A few ,