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December, 1910 rangement of turret have been, I may say, very good, indicating that the many problems of the constructor and ord- nance engineer involved by the new de- parture were successfully solved. Favors the Michigan Arrangement. The author believes in the four-turret disposition of the Michigan, as against five or six turrets, as found on later ships. This opinion is shared by many of the most capable and experienced of- ficers in the United States service; but it is not possible to install the number of heavy guns demanded by the majority of our officers in four-gun positions unless we use three-gun turrets. the author. isnot: in favor -of. the triple-gun turret, although he does not take strong ground against it. He says, in effect, that only war experience could finally settle the question of its desir- ability. On this point, I would like to mildly disagree with the author, and record my opinion that war experience may be most deceiving. have a war lasting several years, with a battle every month, the experience gained would, of course, be conclusive as regards practically all professional questions. But when there single battle or two, at most, the ele- ments of chance may very well entirely obscure the result as. regards technical matters. We naturally draw as many conclusions as possible from the prac- tical experience of war; but, I repeat, that results of a single battle may well lead us to fallacious conclusions. The Passing of the Ram. At the battle of Lissa, in 1870, the victors used ramming tactics most suc- cessfully, and, for years, every navy in the world attached great importance to the ram. When we undertook the reconstruction of the navy, about 1881, a number of rams were recommended by the first advisory board, and finally we built one upon the ideas of a most distinguished officer, completing it more than twenty years after the battle of Lissa. By that time, however, the develop- ment of the gun and torpedo had prac- tically wiped out the chances of suc- cessful ramming, and the experience of the battle of Lissa is not now regarded as warranting any importance being at- tached to the ram as a naval weapon. It is very doubtful if it really war- ranted the importance attached to the ram during the few years immediately subsequent to the battle. There is a good old English proverb, which, it seems to me, should always be borne in mind when we undertake to learn the "lessons" from a naval battle, namely "One swallow does not make a summer," If we could: Sc Diba "TAE. Marine REviEw In his advocacy of good secondary armaments, the author takes strong ground on one side of a much debated question, and produces strong arguments for his contention. Disposition of Secondary Armament. There is no question that, today the disposition and protection of the second- ary armament of a large battleship is about the most puzzling problem to be dealt with of the whole design, and happy the designer who has no_ sec- ondary armament to contend with. In the Michigan and South Carolina, we had practically no secondary armament, because on the limits of displacement it was not possible to provide it, but we soon reverted to it. Most nations have never given it up. England alone has practically left off a secondary armament from a number of ships. It is true that we call our secondary armament "anti-torpedo-boat guns," or some such name, but the fact remains that it is a powerful battery-- the 5-in. guns we now fit being about as powerful as the 6-in. guns of a few years ago. If we may judge the future by the past, the secondary armament will re- fuse to stay abandoned in any navy. The English Dreadnought of nearly thirty years ago--the largest, fastest, most powerful vessel of her time, out- classing all others, had practically no secondary battery. About that time, the torpedo boat menace grew, and the sec- ondary battery began. It was given a big impetus about 1884 by the destruc- tion French quick-firing guns wrought in an affair with the Chinese, and the sec- ondary battery grew and grew until a few years ago, it grew up to the pri- mary battery. Immediately, however, the development of! a new secondary battery began. There is little doubt that, whether logical or not, the second- © ary battery will persists, in spite of the difficulties connected with it, and the author's belief in 6-in. guns seems fully warranted by the almost universal prac- tice of the present day. Indeed it seems very probable that even England will soon fall into line. History Repeating Itself. : ees The statement on page 10, that "in many cases history has been repeating itself" appeals particularly to me. No one can study naval developments for even a few years back without finding many cases where naval opinion has swung around in a circle, and the author, with his experience of forty- three years, is doubtless able to recall a number of cases where the complete circle has been traversed more than once. While many naval officers are 'conservative sea - going officer. 477 conservative, there is no question that naval opinion, as a whole, if reflected, as presumably it is, in designs of naval vessels--has during the last fifty years been in a constant process of change and re-crystallization in marked contrast to the conditions during the early part of. the last century, and for at least two centuries before. It may be interesting to recall that this period of shifting opinion is prac- tically coincident with the development of the naval architect and marine en- gineer as more paramount factors in the design of naval vessels, and it might be maintained that the technical man is responsible for the incessant change in naval opinion, and not the traditionally (Ap- plause. ) Admiral Capps' Discussion. ApmirAL WASHINGTON L. Capps :--It is to be regretted, I think, that officers of the ordnance and gunnery branch of the service are not here to participate in the discussion, as it deals with matters that particularly affect that branch of the service. It is also to be regretted that those of us who perhaps could speak with some authority on the mat- ters treated are limited in the expres- sion of our views by regulation. Some years ago, knowledge concerning naval development was much more freely dis- seminated. That period of ready access has been followed by one of compar- atively profound secrecy. I say compar- atively, because no matter how seriously you may attempt to keep things secret, those interested usually find out every- thing concerning them, and oftentimes you succeed in concealing a thing from your own people, who would doubtless profit by the knowledge, and those you desire particularly to conceal it from, have more or less complete informa- tion. Sir William has very modestly stated that "no claim is made that new state- ments of the case have been embodied in the foregoing summary of points in favor of or adverse to the adoption of battleship armaments comprising a large number of heavy guns in each vessel. All that has been attempted is to bring such points into view, fairly and brief- ly! Warship Design Subject to Varying Opinions. I think, Sir William is to be con- gratulated on the very fair and impar- tial exposition of the case, and although he arrives at certain definite conclusions, and gives the reasons for those conclu- sions, I think his paper is one that can be read with the greatest pleasure, and with very little, if any, adverse critic- ism.