The following text may have been generated by Optical Character Recognition, with varying degrees of accuracy. Reader beware!

Empress of Ireland-Storstad Case Inquiry as to Why the Empress of Ireland Sank so Quickly FTER determining the respon- A sibility for the Empress of Ire- land-Storstad disaster the Mer- sey court of inquiry added: "But a question of much greater pub- lic interest and importance remains to be considered, viz.: why the ship sank so quickly and what steps, if any, can be taken to prevent the terrible conse- quences which so often follow from such disasters." : In considering this phase of the acci- 'dent the court said: | Watertight Doors Definite evidence was given to show that the vertical sliding watertight door providing communication between en- gine room and after boiler room at the stokehole level was effectively closed after the collision took place; but no in- formation was available as to whether the reserve bunker doors higher up on the same bulkhead, or that on the for- ward bulkhead of the fore boiler room, between the lower and main decks, con- necting the reserve bunker with the steerage passenger or cargo space, were open or shut, although it is presumed they were _ shut. An unsuccessful attempt was made to close the vertical sliding door between the two boiler rooms at the stokehole level, but no evidence was available with reference to the two doors on the same bulkhead between the lower and main decks. Immediately above the main deck, as set out in the detailed statement of the vessel's construction, at least one hori- zontal sliding watertight door was fitted in each of the bulkheads numbered 3 to 9, and no _ evidence was forthcom- ing to show that any of these doors were closed at the moment of the col- lision. It was stated that some of the doors on the port side were closed after the collision, as the gear for actuating these were adjacent to the steward's quarters and readily accessible; but at- tempts made to close the starboard door of the third class dining saloon, and the door on the same side of the ship at the fore end of the second class accom- modation, were ineffectual. The door last-named was vitally im- portant, since it was in a bulkhead which completed, above the main deck, the watertight bulkhead at the after end of the boiler compartments. It may be mentioned that the operation of clos- ing the doors on the port side would After the be facilitated by any list to starboard, the arrangement being such that the weight of the door under the circum- stances mentioned tended to close it; but the contrary was true of those on the starboard side. One witness men- tioned that he either heard or saw some gear for closing watertight doors work- ing, and from his position at the time, it is possible that the door at the after end of the second class lavatory accom- modation on the starboard side was closed. Practically all the doors between main and upper decks must necessarily have been open under ordinary circumstances for convenience of communication be- tween cabins and dining saloons, etc., and therefore in view of the fact that the only two known attempts to close doors on the starboard side were un- successful, it seems practically certain that other attempts on that side, if made, had a similar result, and that nearly all the watertight doors on the starboard side between main and upper decks remained open after the collision. Port Holes or Sidelights It was stated in evidence that all the lower ports would be closed at the time of the collision, while others higher up would be open. Other evidence showed that some ports in cabins be- tween the main and upper decks were closed some hours before the collision, and that others in the alleyways be- tween the same decks were open at that? time. < [tis certain that "some ports at this level were open after the collision, for one passenger, in the third class accommodation forward, deposed to be awakened by water falling on his bed from the open porthole, and others testified to seeing water pour through port holes in alleyways and elsewhere near the after end of the ship. Evidence was also forthcoming to show that water entered through open ports inside between the upper and shelter decks. Nature and Extent of the Damage Re- sulting from the Collision, and Position at Which Empress of Ireland was Struck So far as the Empress of Ireland is concerned, no direct evidence as to the extent of the damage was available Impact since no survivor from the Empress of Ireland nor anyone from the Storstad has testified to having seen the torn side of this vessel. Divers report that the sunken liner is lying on her starboard side at a considerable inclination from the horizontal, and with her starboard .bilge buried in mud. No examination of the damage has been possible up to the present time, and the engineer in charge of the diving operations con- siders such examination a very hazar- dous and perhaps impossible undertak- ing. Information on this point can therefore only be gathered from an examination of the damaged bow of the Storstad. This vessel was more ex- tensively damaged on the starboard than on the port bow, as first contact with the Empress of Ireland was made on that bow; but on the port side also the in- juries were severe. The shelter deck of the Storstad ap- parently entered just below the shelter deck of the Empress of Ireland, the stem head of the former above the shelter dack being broken off. The vertical depth of the hole made in the side of the Empress of Ireland must have been approximately 46 feet, about 25 feet of this being below water at the time of the collision. It is not possible to determine the lateral dimensions of the aperture, as there may have. been some longitudinal ripping action, which would produce a wider hole than one caused by a single direct blow. But, excluding such action and estimating the size of the hole from the position of the limiting marks of injury on Stors- tad, the conclusion has been reached that the area below water of the hole made in the side of the Empress of Ireland was, immediately after the col- lision, no less than 350 square feet. The position at which the Storstad came into contact with the Empress of Ireland can be determined with some precijion. In the first place a 'cabin number plate (No. 328) from the last named vessel, was found after the col- lision on the shelter deck of the Storstad, near the stem. The cabin bearing this number was an outer one situated between the upper -and_ shelter decks of the Empress of Ireland slightly abaft amidships, the door being 7 feet in from the side. Further, the engineer on watch in the forward boiler room stated that 20 seconds after the colli- sion " water rushed through the star- board No. 2. bunker," entering the ah aN kN ae a ie a al ea Be a