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* tects and Marine Engineers, 12 THE MARINE REVIEW fuel in the foregoing table, we have a result which is as follows: Coal, Oil, tons. tons. ALES oy bbod (oj cl ree gee. ERPS EY 129,000 16,900 NS) CAT RO o.c 5 ae ess 120,000 . 38,100 Potale sachin oases 249,000 45,000 Consumed as per table..... 242,200 41,600 IVA T ONES oss hes paves vies ois 6,800 . 3,400 It should be stated that the two new oil carriers KANAWHA and MAvMEE, now ready for service, are included in the list of colliers. These two help to swell the figures for oil by 18,244 tons. The margin remaining as above is un- comfortably small and we are at once confronted with the problem of 240,- 000 tons of coal and 40,000 tons of oil required to get the ships back* to Bal- boa. The bunker coal for the colliers can be gotten from Singapore or Aus- tralia, but only “Welsh” or ‘“Pocahon- tas” class of coal serves for naval use. The problem, as elementary as it may seem, is extremely complicated even in time of peace. What it would be in war is another matter, but it illustrates the profoundly gratifying fact that. we have wisely given our ships a large steaming radius, and, more wisely still, gone in for government-owned colliers and supply ships, while every other navy in the world has to rely on chartering. With adequate supplies of coal and oil at Honolulu, Midway and Guam, we may attain the desired mobil- ity of the fleet even in war, provided we adequately fortify Guam and Mid- way. The cost would not exceed that of one battleship. _ The Problem of Auxiliaries In time of war the high speeds re- quired in scouting and protecting would increase enormously the demand for fuel, and the 10 knots speed for the fleet shows how narrow ‘is the margin as it gives the very minimum, easily in- creased by leaps and bounds under stress of weather or war operations. It is estimated that probably 200,000 tons of coal a month would be required along this route in time of war. Two things stand out clearly in this prob- lem, viz., the necessity for adopting the system of towing and coaling at sea so ably and so often advocated in the meetings of the Society of Naval Archi- and the need of replacing our old colliers, sup- ply ships and cruisers with newer, larger and faster ones. These colliers, repair and supply ships, fitted with 5- inch and 6-inch guns and officered and manned by regular officers and men, should be able to give a good account of themselves in time of danger and would not need the sheltering and shep- herding that must be given to a hetero- geneous lot of chartered and irrespon- sible craft, none too reliable under the most favorable circumstances. This leads up to the question of either pur- chasing additional colliers and supply ships, or building them, as we cannot rely on chartering because we will need all the available merchant ships for other purposes, as our expanding for- eign trade, and the maintenance of what we have. A purchased ship will re- quire at least two months to overhaul and adapt her to government require- ments. During the “war with Spain’ we purchased colliers. having a gross tonnage of 42,500 tons at a cost of $76 per gross ton. Economy and_service- ability point to the entire desirability of building ships for the special service required. We have worked out and know every detail of what we want as colliers, oilers, refrigerator, repair, transport, water tank, ammunition, and hospital ships, torpedo-boat destroyers and submarine tenders, mine layers, mine sweepers, merchant scouts, aero- plane transports, tugs, coal lighters, and buoy tenders. In supplies are included reserve am- munition, medical stores, fresh and dry provisions, clothing, equipment,, fresh water, “canteen” stores, both. afloat in supply ships and at the naval bases. Fuel means the ability to deliver the blow without delay. Delay means the loss of the initiative. Operations can only be based on available means, and, in modern war, you cannot plan and then assemble stores to execute the plan. After war is declared it becomes a question of supplies and weapons at the front, or else falling back on the de- fensive and trying to gather from every source the supplies needed even for the defensive. With fortified island bases, each would become a stepping stone to the next, and a center from which to sally forth, attack and harass, and to which to return for supplies, rest and overhaul. Our real coast line would become, as it were, more remote from our enemy as these obstacles in his path hindered his free movements; and, on the other hand, these island bases. would have the effect of extending our coast line out into the ocean for our own forces. as valuable to the enemy as to us, un- less we fortify them adequately and de- fend them with submarines, torpedo boats and mine devices. All this sounds like the stock lan- guage of the rampant militarist looking for and bringing on trouble, but is sim-— insurance trouble ply the cold business of against and avoidance of through prevision and provision. There is, moreover, no reason in forbidding business in freight relations, or diplo- macy in making for markets and trade opportunities. Tutuila, Midway and the Aleutian islands come into the question As sources of supply they are January, 1916 of island bases as auxiliary centers of supply and security, or as centers of scouting and offensive, not to mention commercial operations. Over and above all lies Guam in its position of unique, commanding and supreme importance, the “Key of the Pacific.” On what we do there depends our future on that ocean, and as a peaceful, law-abiding and properly respected member of the community of nations. If we rise to the occasion, no one can take the Phil- ippines if we should let go, or drive us out until we choose to go in our own time ‘and in our own way. Geographi- cal destiny is knocking loudly at our door. No one can trouble the fishing indus- tries and rich coal fields in our store- house of the future in Alaska, if there is a fortified base in the Aleutian archi- pelago. Tutuila, 5,700 miles from Pan- ama, 2,276 from Honolulu, 3,159 from Guam, and 4,500 from Manila, is only 1,565 miles from Auckland and 2,377 from Sydney, with their supplies of fresh provisions and coal. The Panama canal has made its beautiful landlocked harbor a priceless heritage in our mani- fest destiny in the Pacific. Midway, at present an indispensable cable relay sta- tion, 1,150 miles beyond Honolulu, near the route to Guam, has a harbor with a bar good for 17 feet draught now, and which the cost of one cruiser would convert into an auxiliary fortified and equipped island base. Many visits, in connection with constructive work and planning, have made its every feature familiar and of deep interest to me, and I look forward to the time when wise foresight will guard this. vulnerable out- post in the ocean on which our future lies. ; Preparations Not Costly All this talk of fortification and equipment means less than the cost of two battleships, and without which the battleships are restricted to operations from bases improvised after war is declared. The money spent annually in soda water, chewing gum and candy, if spent on reasonable military necessities, would put us in the hated class of the “prepared.” The cost for one day of the war now going on in the world would secure the Pacific coast from in- vasion for all time. Everyone knows this, but like the Jews of old we con- sider ourselves the chosen people, and the voices of those who could pilot the job are as those crying in the wilder- ness of local politics. The question of maintenance of the fleets is separate from that of organiza- tion, training and operation. But as to the supply of trained officers and men, as effecting the maintenance of the fleet, sO many more than the present num-