Maritime History of the Great Lakes

Marine Review (Cleveland, OH), October 1916, p. 349

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OOOH ti ilTn7™?|k| ] ttthtTtTtTTTTTTTKE SUNITA Ye@ y A Sune MAY Y AV a @ A Review of the Month on Coasts and bs Ua Pointers for the Men Who Get the Business HU5NUCTUUUTuUuNMMIIO©—iOOOO OCC CORN y SS SS SSS Soe war has reduced the carrying efficiency of the world’s mercantile marine 50 per cent, according to estimates recently made by English au- thorities. When one places this reduced capacity alongside the greatly increased volume of trade to be carried, a clear insight is obtained into the basic cause of present soaring freight rates. The problems which the British ship owner has had to face were described recently by the London Economist. It is stated that in this war British ship owners have had to contend with great difficulties, many of them unforeseen. For nearly 18 months merchant shipping has been considered a fair mark by Ger- man submarine commanders and the U boats make the protection of commerce in war time a more complicated business than it has ever been before. But the main difficulties of ship owners have arisen from scarcity of labor ashore and afloat, the restriction of building and the high price of materials, and above all, from the requisitioning of the govern- ment, which has taken over 50 per cent of British registered tonnage for the needs of the navy, the army and the allies. If, however, the ship owners’ difficulties have been serious, their opportunities have been infinitely greater. Owing to the volume of goods wanted by the fight- ing forces and to the amount of tonnage withdrawn from ordinary commerce, freights have risen to a level hitherto unimagined, and the price of old ton- nage is about three to four times what it was in days of peace. Exact quotations of all freight markets cannot be given, but the following figures indicate closely enough the course taken since the out- break of war: Home- U.S. Home- wards French Tyne wards Ka- Atlan- Tyne Rou- Plate. rachi. tic. Genoa. en. sd sd sd sd sd Sa ee8 150 12 6 30 sae oa 14 35 0 17 0 43 190 120 June, 715 500 45 0 86 26 6 16 0 Dec., 715 1050 166 66 6 22 0 July, °16 1600 800 130 700 27 6 It will be seen that while freights rose from the beginning of the war, the sharpest upward movement took place about the middle of 1915, and it was this sensational rise that forced the government to take action for the con- trol of the shipping industry. The rise came when it did because the center of activity on land shifted suddenly from western Europe to the Balkans, and the navy, in addition to its former duties, had to transport, safeguard and supply big allied armies in the eastern Mediter- ranean. To carry out this work they requisitioned right and left, and the more they requisitioned the more freights rose. Stearners Come High The rise in freights was accompanied naturally by a rise in the price of ton- nage, and extraordinary figures have re- cently been fetched by steamers, espe- cially smaller and older steamers, that the admiralty does not covet for its own use. For instance, a small steamer of 350 tons gross, built in 1904, and suit- able only for the coasting and continent- al trade, changed hands a short time back at $75,000, the price working out at over $200 a ton gross and $500 a ton net. In peace times, if she had sold for $60 a ton, she would have made a good enough bargain for her owners, so that the rise in her value is quite fantastic. In view of such facts and figures it is clear that the reduction in available tonnage must have been enormous, and, though no exact statistics can be ob- tained, we may arrive at an approximate estimate of what the reduction is. In July, 1914, the steamers—British, colonial and foreign—on Lloyds Register repre- sented a net tonnage of 24,809,234, of which 11,500,000 were British owned. To this sum of 24,800,000 must be added an amount for new tonnage, less tonnage broken up—say 800,000. Then we must deduct enemy shipping, less the boats commandeered and captured, steamers lost from war and marine risks, the al- lied and neutral steamers imprisoned in the Black Sea and the steamers requisi- tioned by the government—say 60 per 349 ‘committees to cent of British tonnage. The estimate would work out as follows: Net tonnage. Lloyds Register, July, 1914........ 24,809,000 *Estimated new tonnage.......... 800,000 4 Boy iH Ect pare sete Shura aves opm ec Sey 25,609,000 Deduct— Net tonnage. Widt OlOSSES: toe, See 1,520,000 *Marine losses ........ 550,000 Black! s@aweec eens 134,000 *Enemy steamers ...... 3,320,000 Estimated requisitioned. 6,927,000 ———— 12,451,000 Available: tonnage: sce oa 13,158,000 *Partly estimated. On this estimate the steamer tonnage suitable for ordinary commerce is rather less than 60 per cent of the tonnage available two years ago, and the reduc- tion in carrying power is really greater ‘than appears from the table, because the time spent in loading and unloading is far greater under war than under peace conditions. A steamer that can do a round voyage in one week is worth three that take three weeks, and, owing to the congestion of traffic and shortage of labor, it may be assumed that the carry- ing efficiency of the world’s mercantile marine at present is actually less than 50 per cent of the normal. It is clear that normal rates for ship- ping cannot prevail, and no heroic meas- ures for reducing them would be ef- fective. All sorts of schemes have been suggested, and a strong movement was on foot last year to make the govern- | ment commandeer all British tonnage and manage it as a government industry —a plan that experience with admiralty requisitions scarcely recommends. What the government has done is to restrict imports, to institute and extend a system of licenses, and by a number of expert control generally the movements of shipping. There is a foodstuffs committee, a coal export com- mittee, a charter licensing committee, and without permission from one or other of the various bodies a British ship owner cannot send his vessels to any part of the world. Official brokers are engaged to take a part in the freight markets, and, thanks to England’s control of coal- ing stations, and partly to her position in the insurance world, some supervision

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