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F you have a little spare time, look through almost any news- paper file covering the early part of the war and reread the German propaganda stories in which the ter- rible efficiency of the kaiser’s sub- marines was extolled to the skies and held up before a cringing world as the threat supreme. These stories made a specialty of the statement that the chief terror of the submarine lay in the fact that it was a weapon unseen and invisible, against which no_ suc- cessful defense could be organized. “Just contrast this unscrupulous Ger- man lie against the troop transporta-. tion records of Canada and the United States. Over 2,000,000 American troops were taken across the seas with losses less than occur in ordinary railway _traffic in this country. In a large measure, this was due to the fact that a successful defense against the submarine was developed in spite of the wild ravings of Von Tirpitz and his jolly crew of buccaneers. Fore- most in the program of defense against the submarines was the con- voy system of handling ships in fleets under protected conditions. System Kept Secret On account of the strict secrecy observed during the war, only the most meagre facts regarding the con- voy system were allowed to be pub- lished, and it is only now. possible for the first time to present cer- tain facts regarding this exceedingly interesting and tremendously import- ant maritime development. The convoy system was the result of the experience of the British in transporting troops across the English channel. The British found that by using nets and a screen of destroyers and patrol boats it was_ possible to fence off a portion of the waters of the English channel from the sub- marines, with the result that this limited area of the high seas was practically as safe for ordinary naviga- tion as in times of peace. In an in- tensely practical way this meant that the freedom of the seas was secured within the protected area. In bring- ing about this condition, the destroy- ers and patrol boats were by far the most important factors. It was the organization of their efforts, coupled with the invention of the depth bomb, A Story Based on Personal OL cewetons at Sea During the War Covering Details Not Heretofore Published that brought such huge success to the channel operations. The application of the convoy system to the transportation of troops across the high seas was the invention of Admiral Jellico of the British navy, according to a statement made by our own Admiral Sims in London on Nov. 12, the day after the armistice was signed. The funda- mental idea, it is understood, was sug- gested to Admiral Jellico by the The Liner She’s a Lady A ge liner she’s a lady, ’an she never looks nor ’eeds— The Man-o’-War’s ’er “usband, ’an ’e gives ’er all she needs; But, oh, the little cargo-boats, that sail the wet seas roun’, Theyre just the same as you an me a-plyin’ up an’ down! The liner she’s a lady by the paint upon “er face, Aw if she meets an accident they call it sore disgrace: The Man-o’-War’s ’er ’usband, and ’e’s always ‘andy by, But, oh, the little cargo-boats! they've got to load or die. The liner she’s a lady, and if a war . should come, The Man-o’-War’s ’er ’usband, and ’e’'d bid ’er stay at home; But, oh, the little cargo-boats that fill with every tide! E’d ’ave to up an’ fight for them, for they are Englana’s pride. —Kipling. operations on the British channel. Learning the success of this work he conceived the idea of using destroyer screens to form moving parallelograms of free water in any part of the ocean. By keeping the fleet of convoyed merchant vessels within the boundaries of these artificially created parallelo- grams as they moved across the sea, protected by the destroyers, their safety ‘was assured to all practical pur- poses. As long as the destroyer screen was effective, the parallelograms marked out by the convoys were to all intents and purposes as harmless as a harbor enclosed by a strong net, or boom. Thus by making small mov- 132 By H. Cole Estep ing sections of the ocean safe, the freedom of the seas and of naviga- tion was assured against vigorous at- tacks of the disciples of “Der Tag.” Zigzagging Meant Safety The destroyer screens were effective because, owing to the great speed and mobility. of these little boats, they were able to make it hot for any sub- marine which made its’ presence known. For this purpose the de- stroyers used gunfire, torpedoes and depth charges. The latter were by far the most effective. In actual practice, the protected parallelogram enclosing a convoy of 15 vessels is about two miles wide and five miles long. To an ordinary observer, even with four destroyers on a side and one at each end, there appear to be plenty of wide gaps in the protecting screen, sufficient, it would seem, to torpedo half the convoy. “In actual practice, however, it was impossible for the submarine to obtain any such results. In the first place, every vessel in the convoy pursued its individual zigzag course, which meant that the relative positions of the vessels in the fleet were slightly but constantly changing. The zigzagging is accom- plished by changing the course abouta point to starboard or port, as the case may be, every five minutes or so. Slight though this zigzagging was, it was confusing to the submarine com- mander. Therefore, if he did get a shot at any of the ships in a convoy there was a fair chance it would be. a miss, and the submarines soon found out that although they were by no means sure of getting the merchant ship, the protecting destroyers who rushed up to the scene with their depth bombs were almost certain to get the submarine. Attacking strong convoys, therefore, was almost the same as courting certain death. As a result submarining became a much less attractive occupation to ambitious young Germans with murderous pro- clivities than it was during the early stages of the war when the merchant ships were nothing more than helpless sheep led to slaughter. The convoy screen was effective because the sub- marine which showed itself anywhere in the vicinity was very likely never to report in Wilhelmshaven again.