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342 ine. The subsidy bill will certainly ‘penalize foreign shipping generally, and inevitably revolutionize the North American trade, which is now sup- ported by shipping under practicaliy every European flag. The cost of living is thus reduced, and the cost of putting American goods in foreign markets 1s kept down. It is under the favorable conditions which have hitherto existed that Ameri- can export trade has steadily grown ’ from year to year, while at the same time the American people have gaitcd the freest access to the markets of the world for ail they require. The man power of the United States has flowed into the most profitable channels. fn- tensive development internally has been rendered possible and under normal conditions employment has been found not only for the resident population, hut for the stream of tens of thousands of emigrants which have flowed through the ports from month to MARINE REVIEW month. If tie American mercantile 7 eS 4 1 re marine languished, and difficu'ty was found in obtaining seamen, the cause lay on the surface. The subsidy bill is a matter which touches the pockets of the :Americans, _ and it is, of course, for them to assess its influences on their fortunes. The measures should be tested by the effect which it will produce on the shipping services in the north Atlantic trade. If those services are rendered less efficient—that is, if fewer ships aie available for carrying American imports and exports—or if they are conducted less economically the commerce be- tween North America and Europe will suffer. The problem is one of immense importance to the American people, because they have a _ great surplus of goods which they want to place in the European markets, and if access to those markets is rendered more difficult the subsidy bill, -instead oft August, 1922 facilitating American trade, will serious- ly handicap it. The problem is also of importance to Europe, because Europe requires American goods, and will pay for them if the price, consisting of the cost of production and sea trans- port, is not too high. The position, it will be seen, is a complicated one. The army of unemployed in the United States is a very large one chiefly because the overseas demand for American goods has not kept pace with the supply. If the subsidy bill renders it still more difficult to sell American goods in Europe, as well as elséwhere, the return to normal conditions of employ- ment will, in the United States, be jeopardized, and it will be small con- solation if 5000 or 10,000 more men are employed at sea in American ships if these hundreds of thousands of men ashore are in consequence deprived of work owing to the falling off of the. American export trade. Japan Building Unrestricted Warships NRESTRICTED by. the. naval [ limitation treaty accepted at the Washington conference this year, Japan is proceeding with a naval construction program which calls for 140 units with an aggregate tonnage of more than 200,000. As _ against this and under the same _ privileges not restricted by the disarmament agreement, the United States is build- ing 52 units of 116,000 tons; England is constructing eight of more than 11,- 000 tons; France 33 of 68,000 tons and Italy 24 of 42,000 tons. These figures have been disclosed by the bureau of naval intelligence at Washington following a survey show- ing the construction programs of un- restricted types of war craft as of June 26 this year. Limitation of the auxiliaries of the type Japan is build- ing on such a broad scale probably cannot be fixed until the next naval conference which, it generally was accepted last winter, would be called in eight years, or about 1929. If the principle of ratios of “existing strength,” which prevailed at the last conference, is again adopted, the pres- ent outlook of that strength would give Japan an overwhelming percent- age in ratio to that of other nations. The United States is building 10 light cruisers, and on June 12 was re- taining 12 light cruisers which are not to be scrapped. Japan is building 15 light cruisers, in addition to the 18 which she is retaining as of June 1. On this showing Japan will have 33 to 22 for the United States—a ratio. of 63% toni2.in’,favor,:of. Japan. If light cruisers were built on the basis of the 5=3 ratio the United States would be entitled to 55 light cruisers for the 33 which Japan will have when her building and projected light cruisers are commissioned. Japan has building and projected for immediate laying down a total of 75 submarines, as against 36 building and about to be laid down for the United - States. In commission and_ built, Japan already has 23 first-line and 10 second-line submarines, which will give Japan a total of 108 submarines. The United States, on the other hand, on June 1, possessed 57 first-line and 28 second-line submarines arid 3 fleet sub- marines. When the 36 classified as building are completed and added to the present strength of 88, the Ameri- can submarine strength will be 124 submarines. On the basis of a 5-3 ratio, the United States would be en- titled to 180 submarines when Japan has her 108 in commission. On the basis of present submarine strength of the American and Japanese navies, the United States will have to build a great many more submarines than it has so far proposed. The exist- ing strength ratio is 8 to 3 and on that basis the United States would be en- titled to 288 submarines, when the best the American navy can now see is 124. In other words, the United States would have to build 164 additional submarines in order to maintain the “existing” ratio of 8 to 3, or if the bat- tleship ratio of 5 to 3 were applied as the determining factor for submarine strength, the United States would need to build 56 submarines in addition to the 88 built and 36 building. The naval report showing the aux- iliary building and projected programs of the five powers signing the limita- tions treaty gives the proposed work as follows: Great Britain First-line cruisers, none. Destroyer leaders, one of 1750 tons. First-line destroyers, three of 3725 tons. First-line submarines, four of 5800 tons. Fleet submarines, none. United States First-line light cruisers, 10 of 75,000 tons. Destroyer leaders, none. First-line destroyers, three of 3645 tons. First-line submarines, 36 of 31,561 tons. Fleet submarines, three of 6375 tons, Japan First-line light cruisers, 15 of 81,900 tons. Destroyer leaders, none. First-line destroyers, 50 of 58,500 tons. First-line submarines, 23 of 30,394 tons and 52 of tonnage unknown to American naval intel- ligence officers. Fleet submarines, none. : : France First-line light cruisers, three of 24,000 tons. Destroyer leaders, six of 14,400 tons. First-line destroyers, 12 of 16,800 tons. First-line submarines, 12 of 13,200 tons. Fleet submarines, none. : : taly First-line light cruisers, two of 16,000 tons. Destroyer leaders, six of 12,270 tons. First-line destroyers, 12 of 11,680 tons. First-line submarines, four of 2600 tons. Fleet submarines, none. These figures in comparison with other figures showing the ships re- tained on June 1, 1922, by each of the five powers, and excluding those to— be scrapped under the naval treaty, have convinced naval officers _ that Japan is gaining an advantage over the United States with respect to light cruisers and submarines.