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Te APPEARED: “in -Mhe' case’ cot YayvE Marv, 274 Federal Reporter 195, that the charter party required the owner of the vessel involved to keep the same “in athoroughly efficient state in hull, machinery and equipment for and during the service,” and provided that, in the event of loss of time from breakdown or “any other cause preventing the full working of: the vessel, the payment of hire shall cease for the time thereby lost.’ After entering on the charter and . while lying in port awaiting cargo,the vessel was injured in collision and ren- dered unseaworthy as to one hold for loading or carrying cargo, and she was taken by the owner and repaired. The charterer continued to keep the vessel waiting for a considerable time after completion of the repairs, and the ques- tion arose as to whether the charterer was entitled to off-hire until the repairs were completed. In deciding the issue in the affirmative, the court said: “The ‘loss of time’ provided for in the char- _ter party means the time during which the vessel was not in. ‘full working’ or- der as the result of an injury, and for that time the charterer was released from the payment of hire, although he would have made no use of her if she had not been disabled. It can not be that he was bound to pay for a_ vessel he could not use, merely because he deemed it for his interest to keep her out of use. His right to off-hire did not depend upon loss of profits, but upon the fact that the vessel was not in a ‘thoroughly efficient’ condition. Besides, as already mentioned, on notice of the accident and claim of off-hire, the owner took such possession of the vessel as was needful for making repairs, and that possession necessarily deprived the char- terer of any use of her which otherwise he might have made. In that situation, and while it existed, the owner’s right to compensation was suspended by _ the terms of the contract.” ok * * A fishing schooner operated on a lay and whose master had no authority to bind her is subject to a lien for sup- plies of food delivered on board upon order of the master in a port where she was not known, where it did not ap- pear that it was customary to operate fishing boats on the lay on that part of the Atlantic coast, and the libelant re- lied on the apparent authority of the master.—ANcIE B. Watson, 274 Federal Reporter 218. * * * An amount agreed upon at a survey ($700) as the. cost of restoration of a damaged vessel will not be allowed where such vessel was old and was actually repaired later, in another way, for a Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law much less sum ($220), and then used for a long period of time. The court thus decided in the case of Downer, 274 Federal Reporter 220, holding that the survey was not necessarily conclusive. The commissioner found, said the court, “the survey was not shown to be incorrect in any particular, and that it does not appear that the repairs made the vessel precisely as strong, staunch, and serv- iceable as she was before the accident. This must be done.” The case was con- trolled by the principles stated in the case of J. T. Eaton, 24 Federal Re- porter 95. ae. yore If without fault on the part of the tow a misfortune occurs under circum- stances in which, if proper care is ex- ercised in performing a similar service, such misfortune does not ordinarily oc- cur, it suffices to impose upon the tug the burden of proving that due care was exercised.—Kiernan v. Lake Champlain Transportation Co., 273 Federal Reporter 499. ee Oe Provision of a charter which exempts delays from strikes connected with the working, delivery, or shipment of the cargo does not exempt the charterer from delays caused by strikes in the mills manufacturing the lumber for the cargo. “Construction in accordance with the general rule.” it. was held in the casé of *W. Ro Grace & Co. y. Hansen, 273 Federal Reporter 486, “would be that, when the charterer makes a con- tract for the use of a ship, the presump- tion is that he has a cargo in existence in relation to which the contract is made. It is not apart of the contract. that the provision shall pertain to procure- ment of the cargo.” * * * The purpose of the act of congress of June 29, 1888, Chapter 496, Section 1, prohibiting the dumping of refuse, ashes, mud, dregings, sludge, acid or any other matter of any kind in the harbor of New York or its adjacent or tributary waters said the court in the case of Warner- Quinlan Co. v.. United States, 273 Federal Reporter 503, is to prevent dis- charge or depositing matter into the har- bor which obstruct or injure it. De- posits which do not obstruct or in- juriously affect the harbor are not pro- hibited by the act. Obstruction is the principal injury congress had in mind, but it is not the only one; for “acid” would not obstruct, but would corrode and be detrimental to boats, wharves, etc., and would thus be injurious to the har- bor as such, as owners and captains of boats would not care to enter harbors whose waters contained acids which were injurious to boats. It was ‘held in that 281 case that fuel matter, sludge, black oil, and oil and tar, discharged into the harbor from an asphalt plant, came within the terms of the statute, and con- viction therefor was upheld. * * * A stevedore, not being a member of the crew, and being employed by the hour, can not recover for personal in- juries suffered in unloading a cargo on the basis of a seaman’s rights or con- tracts, but he must recover on principles of negligence. He was not a_ fellow servant of the captain and can recover for injuries caused by such captain’s negligence—Howett, 273 Federal Re- porter 513. * * * “It is good law,” said the court in the case of NewsurcH, 273 Federal Reporter 436, “that when the burdened. vessel decides to ‘keep: out of the way’ by crossing the bows of the privileged ves- sel, though she gets an assent to such proposal, she assumes the risks involved in choosing that method. The duty of the privileged vessel in such cases is to co-operate, and she need not keep her course. * *** But such an agreement, initiated by the privileged and as- sented to by the burdened vessel, might be regarded as creating other duties. It could be considered as a proposal that the duties of the vessels should be reversed, and that the burdened (now the privileged) vessel hold her course. and | speed, so that the privileged (now the burdened) vessel might be able to fore- cast her positions at future moments, precisely as the rule requires when no agreements has been made.” Speaking further, the court said that although the proposal emanates from the _ privi- leged vessel, and should be taken as meaning that she will undertake actively to keep out of the way, it need not absolve the burdened vessel from her similar and original duty also to keep out of the way, nor will it impose on her a rigid duty to hold her course and speed. . “Tt 4s true,’ it was observed, “that that ‘duty is imposed by the rules generally as a correlative to the duty to keep out of the way, but only in cases where no agreement has’ been reached. Some convention is essential when neither knows the other’s purposes, but when both have agreed upon a maneuver by an exchange of signals, their accord should be left for execution by movements adapted to the circumstances. For example, if the angle of crossing is wide, it will usually be best for the originally burdened vessel to hold her course and speed; but, if it be narrow, it is safest for both to starboard and pass at a greater distance.”