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Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law Late Decisions in Maritime Law | ISCUSSING the question of gen- eral average, the court in the case of Aktieselskabet Fido v. Lloyd Braziliero, 283 Federal Reporter 62, said: “All losses in -a maritime adventure falling outside the contractual obligations of the parties, and which arise from a voluntary sacrifice of a part of the cargo, made to save the whole adventure from _ perishing, or which arise out of extraordinary ex-. penses or expenditures of money in- curred for the joint benefit of both ship and cargo, constitute a claim to general average contribution. The doctrine is founded on the principle that what is sacrificed for the benefit of all should be made good by the contribution of all. It is one of the oldest and best estab- lished principles of the maritime law. * * * The circumstances which the testimony discloses in the cases now before the court show: (1) A peril common to all the interests. (2) A peril which was imminent. (3) A_vol- untary, deliberate, and intentional act of sacrifice or expenditure, made to preserve all interests involved. (4) That the act of sacrifice or expenditure -was necessary. (5) That the act was attended with success and the peril avoided. And where such circumstances concur the case is plainly one of general average.” x * x A foreign vessel, lying outside the 3-mile limit, which delivered a_ part of her cargo of liquors, which were contraband, in the nighttime, to a motor- boat, in which it was taken ashore with the assistance of her small boat, and part of her crew, was subject to for- feiture under United States revised stat- utes, section 2874. The fact that the vessel was seized outside the 3-mile limit, it was held in the case of Grace and Rusy, 283 Federal Reporter 475, did not deprive a court of the United States of jurisdiction of the offense under a libel filed after she had been brought into port. Foreign vessels, it was said, hover- ing always more than three miles from shore for the purpose of smuggling, which have been in contact with the shore by their own boats and crews, and have thereby assisted in smuggling, are subject to seizure. “The high seas are the territory of no nation; no na- tion can extend its laws over them; they are free to the vessels of all coun- tries. But this has been thought not to mean that a nation is powerless against vessels offending against its laws which remain just outside the 3- mile limit. * * * The line between ter- ritorial waters and the high seas is not like the boundary between us and a foreign power. There must be * * * a certain width of debatable waters ad- jacent to our coasts. How far our authority shall be extended into them for the seizure of foreign vessels which have broken our laws is a matter for the political departments of the govern- ment rather than for the courts to de- termine. It is a question between govern- ments; reciprocal rights and other mat- ters may be involved.” * * * The owner of a vessel may, under proper circumstances, limit its liability for the consequences of the breach of an implied, although not of an express, warranty of seaworthiness.—Robert A. Monroe Co. v. Chesapeake Lighterage & Towing Co., Inc., 283 Federal Re- porter 526. Rock® “A bill of lading,” said the court in Aktieselskabet Bruunsgaard v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 283 Federal Re- porter 106, “is both a receipt and a contract. It is a receipt for the goods shipped on board a ship, signed by the person who contracts to carry them or his agent, and stating the terms on which the goods were delivered to and received by the ship. While a shipper has an absolute right to demand a bill of lading, both under the Harter act and by virtue of long-established usage, he must get it from a properly authorized person, and who that person is will depend upon the facts shown in each particular instance.” In this case, the charter party did not contain a provision requiring the master to sign bills of lading as demanded, without prejudice to the charter party, and the court held that a loading agent for the charterer had no authority to issue a bill of lad- ing or collect freight, and that the mas- ter was the only person who had au- thority to do so. ee A steamship, proceeding in a fog in frequented waters at such speed that she could not stop after seeing a vessel ahead in time to avoid collision, and which also failed to stop on hearing the fog signal of another vessel forward of her beam, as required by article 16, international rules, was held, in the case of CampeNn, 283 Federal Reporter 326, in fault for the collision. The fact that the steamer was carrying passengers and it was important to get them into port does not exempt her from the rules for preventing collision in a fog, it was held. * * * “Towing on hawsers is a legal means of transportation; but it is the duty of commanders of tows to arrange and navigate them, not merely with regard to their own convenience and safety, but with reasonable care and regard for other vessels rightfully on the sea. This is required by international rules, arts. 27 and 29, * * * In view of the great dangers from long tows, this require- ment demands * * * that in narrow pas- 153 Sages or congested waters the length of tows be reduced as much as is practi- cally. possible.’—Campen, 283 Federal Reporter 326. ee aoe _ A general ship’s agent, said the court in the case of BucKHANNoN, 283 Fed- eral Reporter 352, is presumed to rely upon the credit of the owner, and not upon the credit of the ship. Such an agent is entitled to a lien for advances made of a character to create a maritime lien, where made under a_ contract clearly stating that the credit of the ship is relied on, and not the credit of the owner. ont ae Where seamen, who signed for a voy- age, were discharged without their con- sent or fault, having served only five days in preparing the ship for the con- templated voyage, section 4527 of the United States revised statutes, which en- titles seamen, when so discharged “be- fore the commencement of the voyage,” to an additional month’s wages, applies, though the voyage was abandoned, it was decided in Brown v. United States, 283 Federal Reporter 425; and a release signed before a shipping commissioner by the discharged seamen on settlement of their wages for the time served, re- quired by section 4552 of the revised statutes, does not operate aS a consent to their unlawful discharge. * * * Where no showing is made of any services rendered to a marshal by the master and crew after he had taken the vessel into custody under a court’s or- der, no recovery for wages subsequent to the attachment should be allowed. A master has no lien for wages.—IracEs, 283 Federal Reporter 445. * *. * A vessel under charter to a state, it was decided in the case of CHARLOTTE, 285 Federal Reporter 84, is not subject to suit for a maritime tort committed during the period of charter use, where the charter makes the state owner pro hac vice. A charterer of a vessel, it was said, does not become owner pro hac vice, unless the possession and con- . trol is surrendered by the owner during the period of use or letting specified in the charter party. * * & Subsection P, section 30, merchant ma- rine act, gives a lien for supplies fur- nished a vessel, where they are necessary to the vessel as a vessel, to permit her to make her voyage, such as repairs to her hull, rigging, etc. and supplies for the engine room, if a steamer, and food, etc., for her crew, and does not apply to goods and merchandise for cargo or trading purposes——MAJESTIC II, 285 Federal Reporter 91.