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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law ECTION 879 of Greater New York S charter, prohibiting vessels from lying at the end of any pier on the North or East river, except at their own risk of injury caused by any vessel enter- ine or leaving an adjoining slip, does not prevent recovery in such case, where the vessel so lying was not chargeable with fault contributing to the collision; and a barge, lying at the end of a pier when she was struck by another barge in tow of a tug entering the ad- joining slip, was entitled to recover from the tug for the collision, where she did not extend beyond the side of the pier, nor obstruct the entrance to the slip by vessels properly navigated—J. W. Kirrrett, 290 Federal Reporter 404. ce” * A drydock company, having possession of a tug on which it had-made repairs, by electing to proceed in admiralty to enforce its maritime lien, waives any right to priority it may have under its common-law possessory lien, and its pfi- ority rights must be determined by what- ever rule the court may apply as_be- tween maritime lienors.—INTERSTATE No. 2, 290 Federal Reporter 1015. eo ok Although a transfer tug was within her right when a river was clear to put her head against a rack or float and oper- ate her engine at full speed, she was bound to exercise care and not interfere unnecessarily with navigation and no such right exists when a tug with a tow is passing, because it endangers the safetv of a passing vessel—CaROLINE M. Wane, 290 Federal Reporter 607. * * * The fact that a barge, which was seaworthy when delivered, sank while in possession of the charterer, and could not be returned by it in good condition, subject to ordinary wear and tear, estab- lishes a prima facie case of fault, and places on the charterer the duty of re- butting the prima facie case—that is, to explain the situation, it was decided in the case of C. F. Harms Co. v. Turner Construction Co., 290 Federal Reporter 612: but the charterer was not required to show, it was said, how the accident happened, as the only way of meeting the prima facie case against it. * * * It appeared, in the case of JUNGSHOVED, 290 Federal Reporter 733, that a certain boat was tendered as suitable to carry the load for which her size fitted her, and under less than that load, in smooth water and calm weather, she sank; in the picturesque phrase of the water- front, “she just faded away” without ex- planation, then or since. This, said the court, raises a presumption of wunsea- worthiness. It was further said that the hiring of a lighter for storage of cargo in a harbor, pending its landing, catries the implied warranty of sea- worthiness for the purposes of the hir- ing. ae ee A stevedore’s services are maritime in nature, and a court of admiralty has jur- isdiction of a suit by stevedore against his employer for injuries received while working on board a _ vessel.—CANADIAN FarMErR, 290 Federal Reporter 601. * * * Where the marshal, in conducting the sale of a vessel, thought only one bid had been made, and knocked the vessel down to that bidder, whereas another bidder amount and claimed the right to the vessel, it was proper for him to put the vessel up for resale again immediately, and to accept higher bids therefor, which conformed to the practice of the state and resulted in the sale of the vessel for more than the former bid.— West Irmo, 290 Federal Reporter 796. Ke The master of a vessel has authority to disrate a seaman for incompetency or other adequate cause, held the court in the case of Butler v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 290 Federal Reporter 806. “It is contended,” it was said, “that dis- rating is an advocation of the contract of employment, and this is no doubt true. If the disrating occurs at sea the seaman disrated may claim his dis- charge as soon as the vessel reaches port, and if the disrating occurs in pert he may claim his discharge forth- with, and is not bound to accept the new position. In other words, it is: optional with the seaman whether he will accept the new position, or insist upon his dis- charge, but when that election is once made it is binding upon him.” es ge It is the general understanding in this country that damages for detention are not recoverable in collision cases with- out proof of actual pecuniary loss oc- casioned thereby—NANTASKET, 290 Fed- eral Reporter 813. * * * A tug, which with a number of others had been lying for several days in port on account of weather conditions, was negligent in leaving on a 12-hour run with a tow of four barges in the face of a falling barometer and other indi- cations of storm, which kept the other tugs with one exception in port, and fur- ther negligent in not returning or seek- ing refuge when a short distance out the weather became more threatening, which negligence rendered her liable for injuries to the barges, which were with- out motive power, by stranding and col- lision when they went adrift from part- 444 had made a bid of the same- ing of their lines——BEnyAMIN H. Wuor- FrorD, 290 Federal Reporter 816. 2K * * There are three rules in admiralty, it was said in the case of INTERSTATE No. 1. 290 Federal Reporter 926, respecting priority of liens of the same class: (1) In the case of vessels engaged in com- merce on the ocean, the voyage rule is applied, and liens for necessaries fur- nished on the last voyage rank similar liens for prior voyages, although in Massachusetts and Connecticut the calen- dar year has been adopted in the case ot coastwise vessels; (2) in the case of vessels engaged in commerce on_ the Great Lakes and canals the season rule applies. Priorities of the last season rank similar liens for a prior season, which is practically equivalent to clas- sifying them by the year; (3) in the case of harbor vessels on the Atlantic coast claims less than 40 days old rank older ones. In the western district of the state of Washington, a period of 9) days, instead of 40, is allowed in the ase of Puget sound tugs and vessels making daily or weekly trips. * * * The master of a _ vessel, being. the agent of the owners’ agents, in respect to the possession and general management of the vessel, his knowledge that she was on hire was imputable to them.— Suzuki v. National Surety Co., 290 Fed- eral Reporter 942. * * * Where the master of a tug having in teow a barge selected as the berth of such barge a position adjoining three other boats, and made the barge fast to the outside boat, it was his duty to see that the lines between the inside boats were sufficient and proper to hold her in the berth he selected, and, if in doubt, tc have made her fast by proper lines to the bulkhead, where the situation was such that, though the tide was flood and the weather clear, and not windy, the master of the tug must have known that with the change of tide the barge would be exposed to its full force, it afpearing that but three feet of her beam was within the lines of the piers. i EtHeL, 290 Federal Reporter 458. * Ok) OF A charterer, although not an insurer of the chartered scow under its charter, was liable for its own megligence or that of any person to whom it entrusted the boat, and where the,scow was in- jured by being placed in an _ unsafe berth for unloading by the consignee, the consignee and his agent were second- arily liable and the charterer primarily liable, for such injury—Donovan vy. Frederick Starr Contracting Co., 290 Federal Reporter 501.