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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law SINGLE small vessel, moored at the end of a pier, where she did not obstruct entrance to the ships, is not required to give sound signals during a fog. The duty of giving sound signals, it was said in the case of PATRICIA, 296 Federal Re- porter 527, has been applied only in cases where the vessels were tied side by side extending into and obstructing the navigation of a stream. * * * A submerged barge lying in a slip alongside a pier, and extending 30 to 35 feet beyond the end of the pier, was held, in the case of WILLIAM NELSON, 296 Federal Reporter 553, to be not marked in compliance with Act of March 38, 1899, section 15, where it was not marked at all by buoy or beacon in the daytime, and at night only by lights placed even with the end of the pier. * * * A steamship owned and operated by the Turkish government, and engaged in commercial trade under charter to an individual, was not immune from seizure on process, especially where diplomatic relations between the Unit- ed States and Turkey had been severed at the time of the seizure, and in the absence of any suggestion for immun- ity from the state department.—GUL DJEMAL, 296 Federal Reporter 567. * * * A steamer does not become an out- law because she dragged off the an- chorage grounds, nor does she _be- come an obstruction to navigation ipso facto because she anchored again out- side of anchorage grounds; she could have been compelled to move on to anchorage grounds by the federal au- thorities, if they thought it advisable, and would be liable for damage caused by her being an obstruction to navi- gation. KATHLEEN TRACY, 296 Fed- eral Reporter 711. * * * The owner of a tug has a mari- time lien under the general maritime law on a barge for towage service rendered under a contract between the master of the tug and the master of the barge, made in a foreign port.— Hupper v. Hyde, 296 Federal Reporter 862. * * * Provision of through bill of lading, issued by a railroad company for a shipment to a European port, that the pnroperty should be subject to all conditions expressed in the regular forms of bills of lading in use by the steamship company at the time of shipment, is valid, it was declared in the case of SUSQUEHANNA, 296 Fed- eral Reporter 461, and makes the conditions of the ocean bills of lading a part of the contract. Provisions in an ocean bill that the carrier shall not be liable for any claim unless writ- ten notice thereof is given before re- moval of the goods from the wharf, and that no suit therefor shall be maintainable unless instituted within three months after such notice, are reasonable and valid. Where neither the party furnishing, at charterer’s request, stevedoring services, nor the party furnishing la- bor and materials, knew any facts showing that the vessel was under charter, and the charter party re- quired charterer to pay for such serv- ices, but neither party made any in- quiry to ascertain the facts, neither party secures a lien on the vessels.— VILLE DE DJrIBouTi, 295 Federal Re- porter 869. * * * “The responsibility of a wharf own- er for the safe condition of the waters in the immediate neighborhood of his wharf is certainly no greater than is his responsibility for the condition of the wharf itself. The duty of a wharf owner as to his wharf is to exercise ordinary care and no more. The same rule has been applied to the ap- proaches to a wharf, pier or dock. * * * Tt is quite true that a wharf- inger may be responsible for the con- sequences of a defect in his wharf or other danger which imperils vessels, either there obtaining a berth or about so to do, and that such liability does not necessarily depend upon his ac- tual knowledge of the danger. But the measure of his responsibility is negligence, that is, lack of care under the circumstances; and it is on this principle that he is held liable for what he ought to have done, that is, in not knowing it must be found as a fact to result in negligence.’””—Berwind White Coal Mining Co. v. Bush Ter- minal Co., 296 Federal Reporter 475. * * * “Wharfage,” it was held in the case of Beard v. Marine Lighterage Corp., 296 Federal Reporter 146, not only in- cludes mooring of vessels for unload- ing and loading cargo, but also for the purposes of protection and safety, and a maritime lien attaches to the ship in a home port if she is not out of commission or withdrawn from navigation. The right to collect wharf- age, it was said, is a right which has been recognized in admiralty from the earliest times, and it has been re- peatedly held that the wharfinger has a maritime lien therefor, and no dis- tinction has been made whether the wharf be privately or publicly owned. A steamship company which as carrier performed its whole duty to the ship- 304 . Tonnage, per, under the bill of lading, by de- livering the goods on a pier or to a lighter, was under no obligation to furnish free wharfage to the consignee for lightering the goods from the pier or vessel. * * * It was held in the case of O. Y. A. -B., ve cFexas: Co, 298 Federal Reporter 893, that the burden is on the owner to prove the sea- worthiness of the vessel, and also that the damage to the cargo was occa- sioned by the perils of the sea for which the owner is not responsible; mere proof of damage by sea water is not sufficient. * * % A ship owner, it was declared in the case of United States v. Sugerland Industries, 296 Federal Reporter 918, cannot recover demurrage at the rate stipulated in the charter party for de- lay in discharging, because the con- signee did not receive and remove the cargo from the wharf as fast as the ship could, and was required to dis- charge it, where it might have dis- charged at the agreed rate, and stored the goods at expense of consignee at a substantial saving of expense. * * * A set-off is unknown to the mari- ‘time law, said the court in the case of Rodgers Sand Co., v. Monongahela & Ohio Dredging Co., 296 Federal Re- porter 919, except as a credit on the transaction which forms the object of the libel, and a claim arising out of another contract or transaction can- not be set up as a defense. * * * “While in mercantile contracts time is of the essence, the statement that the vessel would load ‘about June 2, and ‘about June 5’ is a mere represen- tation, and not a warranty, and while ‘about’ is a comprehensive term, and when used with regard to time may cover a considerable extent, and has no definite trade meaning, it does not signify that time is immaterial, but only that the precise date is not war- ranted.”—Williams Steamship Co. v. McLeod Lumber Co., 296 Federal Re- porter 927, * * * Sunken barges, which had not been used for a year or two, and were resting on the bottom of a river at the ordinary level of the water, and in need of extensive repairs to make them fit for use, were not “vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation,” within revised statutes of the United States, sections 4283 and 4289, so as to limit the owner’s liability to the value thereof when thev broke loose—Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 297 Federal Reporter 238. SON eee si aol lia Cs Toa ee a ae eT PTT ae