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EQUIREMENT of a charter party that the charterer should pay out- ward pilotage “at loading ports” was not limited to pilotage, when the ves- sel was outward bound from the last port of loading, but included all pilot- age outgoing after any part of the eargo had been laden; a further pro- vision giving the charterer the right to load at two ports, by paying all extra port charges at the second port, covered all customary charges at such port, made in connection with. the entry of the ship, securing and load- ing cargo, and departure of the ship from the _ port.—Trafikaktiebolaget Grangesberg Okelosund v. Wilkens, 4 F. (2d) 577. * * *k T WAS decided in the case of Has- torf Contracting Co. v. Ocean Trans- portation Corp, 4 F. (2d) 583, that stevedores undertaking to stow cargo were primarily liable for crushing the barge’s deck by negligently concentrat- ing the cargo in two spots, though they were not bound under contract to lade the barge; that, though the bargee is the owner’s' agent to say when the barge is fully laden, he is not responsible for failing to protest against the stevedores’ method of stowing rails or telling the stevedores how to do so; that the bargee is re- sponsible for warping the barge to a safe berth, avoiding known dangers, ‘pumping, covering the hatches, stop- ping the load at the barge’s capacity, and other matters which he must do alone, but he is not responsible for matters which the stevedores may be assumed to know. * Ld * HERE the failure of those in charge of a pumping crib in Lake Michigan to ring the fog bell, as required by law, was sufficient to account for a collision with the crib by a steamship in a fog, the vessel could not be charged with contribu- tory fault except on clear evidence. There is no rule, it was said in the case of Goodrich Transit Co. v. City of Chicago, 4 F. (2d) 636, which re- uires a steamship, on approaching hicago on Lake Michigan in a fog, to stop until she ascertains the posi- tion of a pumping crib maintained by the city, which is required by law to keep its fog bell ringing as notice to shipping. * % * HE fact that a contract for sal- vage services was made with the insurer of the vessel, payment to be made only on their success, did not deprive the salvor of his right to a lien on the vessel to the amount of the contract price; services rendered By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law in pumping out a schooner, pulling her off a bank where she had _ been stranded during a storm, and safely anchoring her, constituted “salvage services.”—-LEONIE O. LovuISsE, 4 F. (2d) 699. * * * VESSEL licensed in the coast- wise trade in taking contraband cargo from foreign ships at sea, with which she was proceeding toward the coast, was held, in the case of RosauiE M., 4 F. (2d) 815, to be em- ployed in a trade other than that for which she was licensed, and to be sub- ject to forfeiture. It was also held that officers of a revenue cutter have authority to seize and search a vessel within the waters of the United States, where there is probable cause to suspect her of smuggling or at- tempting to smuggle goods into the United States, and such seizure and search may be made outside of such waters, subject only to diplomatic con- siderations. * * * ‘EAWORTHINESS depends’ upon the kind of cargo carried, said the court in the case of OAKLEY C. CuR- TIs, 4 F. (2d) 979, and it was held that damage to linseed caused by leaks about the pumphouse on the ’tween decks, and a hole in the galley floor, were chargeable to the ship, such leaks and hole constituting an unsea- worthy condition. * * * MA) HERE a bill of lading gave a vessel discretion to deviate from the usual course, and where it was necessary for the vessel to deviate from her course to replenish supplies and to repair sails, there was no devi- ation affecting relations or obligations of the vessel, since “deviation” to have such effect must be a voluntary de- parture without necessity or reason- able cause; and where a vessel was seaworthy in every particular at the outset of the voyage and damage to coffee by sea water was due to so severe a storm that it might be prop- erly regarded as a peril of the sea, the ship was not liable-—ROSALIE Huu, 4 F. (2d) 985. * * * OTH tugs were held at fault in the case of Edward J. Barton Lighterage Co. v. Davis, 4 F. (2d) 999, for a collision occurring in the darkness of early morning, as both left their respective slips, separated by an intervening pier, one for not maintaining a lookout, and the other for failure to observe the movement of the tug first leaving its slip, fail- ure to blow the proper whistle, and 66 Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review lack of vigilance, both vessels ‘pro- ceeding at five miles an hour, when signals of a nearby vessel should have apprised a careful navigator of the proximity of trouble. * * * RDINARILY an owner is not free 7 from personal fault who sends a vessel to sea in a leaky condition, but an owner of a new wooden ship was without personal fault, it was decided in the case of In Re McDonald Trans- portation Co., 4 F. (2d) 1010, where there was no evidence of a leak be- fore commencement of the voyage, and during the voyage there was no op- portunity for repairs, the leak being easily controlled by pumps and in no way endangering the ship, though, due to improper dunnaging, the cargo was damaged -by water. * Ly 3 HE rule of limited liability of owners of vessels,’ stated the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bot- tling Co., 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 879, “is an ancient one.” It was then said, “It has been administered in the courts of admiralty in Europe from time immemorial, and by statute applied in England for nearly two centuries. Our statutes establishing the rule were enacted to promote the build- ing of ships, to encourage the business of navigation, and in that respect to put this country on the same foot- ing with other countries. The rule should be applied having regard to the purposes it is intended to sub- serve and the reasons on which it rests.” The court held that a car- rier’s wharfboat, attached to shore by cables and used as office, ware- house, and wharf, having water and electric light connections and _ tele phone system, was not a “vessel” as defined by federal statutes so as to come within the rule of limited liability for damages to merchandise situated thereon when it sank. * * * WHERE a vessel backing out of a slip under her own power col- lided with a vessel on the other side of the slip, tugs engaged to move, her, but which at the time of the collision were waiting at the mouth of the slip, and had not undertaken the work of moving the vessel, were not liable, it was held in the case of HELEN, 5 Fed. (2d) 54. It was also decided that the collision im- pressed upon the wrongdoing vessel a maritime lien, which goes with the vessel into whosesoever hands it may come.