The following text may have been generated by Optical Character Recognition, with varying degrees of accuracy. Reader beware!

gee Rapa is merely extended freight, and the purpose of lay days is to fix a period during which the charterer may detain the vessel, and beyond which he must pay for delay as such extended freight in the form of demurrage or damages in that nature. * * * The delay in loading the vessel within the lay days was not a breach of the charter en- titling the owner of the vessel to dis- continue further performance under the charter party, but an event within the legal contemplation, though it may not have been in the expressed contemplation of the parties, for ad- ditional compensation as _ extended freight. And demurrage is payable, though there is no fault on the part of the charterer.”—New York & Cuba Mail Steamship Co. v. Lamborn, 8 F. (2d) 382. * * T WAS held in the case of RIVER Qupen, 8 F. (2d) 426, that a maritime lien stands on a_ higher foundation and _ broader principles than a mechanic’s or materialman’s lien on a house, and is a debt against the vessel itself, vesting in the cred- itor, a special property in her, which subsists from the moment that the debt arises, and follows it even into the hands of innocent purchasers. It was also held that a maritime lien on a vessel, for repairs made after taxes became due, but without notice of the government’s claim therefor, was superior to the government’s lien after levy, notwithstanding the tax lien related back to the time when the taxes became due. * * E AULT or negligence may not: be charged to a tug where it had sufficient power to command and navi- gate a tow when it started out, and especially where it encounters un- usual conditions of wind and tide.—. Mary T. TRACY, 8 F. (2d) 591. ae NG company was not chargeable with a ship’s fault in leaving a hatch open, or liable for failure to warn an employe of dan- gers, where the employe who fell therein was equally familiar with the conditions. It is not negligence to leave a cargo hatch open, if the ship is awaiting cargo, though it is negli- gence to leave a coal hatch open.— Hardie v. New York Harbor Dry Dock Corp., 9 F. (2d) 545. * * STEAMER in a fog must control speed, so that she can avoid colli- sion with another; herself observ- ing proper precautions. * * * It is well established that the tow, if inert and helpless, is not responsible for 82 Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law the faults of the tug. * * * It is not a fault to be without steam while in tow.”—Naamlooze Venootschap Maats- chappy Stoomschip BARENDRECHT V. Noran Towing & Transportation Co., 9 F. (2d) 714. oe Me whose barge was sunk after collision with the wreck of a merchant vessel owned and used by the United States, which wreck was not marked with buoy, beacon, or, light, as required by statute, may recover from the United States; un- lawfully leaving an unmarked wreck in a navigable channel being a mari- time tort.—Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 47 Supreme Court Reporter 289. A by a vessel, said ‘Athe Supreme Court in the case of WILLDOMINO, 47 Supreme Court Re- porter 261, is a voluntary departure, without necessity or any reasonable cause, from the regular and usual course of the ship. It was further said that a vessel leaving for a des- tined port with a grossly inadequate supply of coal, with the intention to proceed to another port under the pretense of emergency, made an in- excusable deviation, making it liable as an insurer for any damage suffered by cargo, since, it having the privilege of going to such port, it was her duty to take ordinary course. ay sk By * Wy Eee fishing schooner would have reduced mackerel catch to possession, if purse line of seine had not parted, the seller of the line, it was held in Linen Thread Co. v. Shaw, 9 F, (2d) 17, was liable for the loss as damages for breach of an implied warranty. * * ke ALUS bringing a barge which she had ‘in tow into collision with a barge lying alongside a pier, damaging her about three feet above the water line, was held in the case of Mars, 9 F. (2d) 188, not to be liable for damages due to sinking and expense of raising as the result of continued loading after the collision, causing the barge to settle until the opening in her side was below the water level. The court stated the rule as to divid- ing damages in these words: ‘Where two joint wrongdoers contribute simul- taneously to an injury, then they share the damages; but where one of the wrongdoers completes his wrong, and the subsequent damages are due to an independent act of negligence, which supervenes in time, and which has as its basis a condi- tion which has resulted from this act MARINE REVIEW—April, 1927 ST —— —— of negligence, in that case they do not share; but in that case we say that the consequences of the first act of negligence did not include the con- sequences of the second.” * * * VESSEL at fault for a collision cannot be held liable for increas- ing damages by the subsequent negli- gence of the vessel injured.”—EDWARD A. Unric, 9 F. (2d) 185. HERE the primary cause of a collision between a _ steamship and a pilot boat was the fault of the latter, to sustain the apportionment of the steamship’s damages between it and the pilot boat, the pre- sumption of the law is against the pilot boat, and against apportionment, unless that vessel can, by clear and convincing proof, establish contribu- tory fault on the part of the steamer. —LA FLANDRE, 9 F.. (2d)..3381. ARITIME lien on a vessel cannot be created by contract of her master, made while she is in custody of officers, who had seized her for violation of the immigration and cus- tom laws; nor can such lien be created by contract of the master with an at- torney to defend him and the crew on the charge of violating immigration and customs laws.—JEANETTE, 9. F. (2d) 408. * * * SHIP which received a specific lot of cement from a particular con- signor, regardless of marks and brands, had the duty to so segregate the shipments from other merchandise of like kind that it could and would be discharged separately, and not con- fused with the other merchandise; the consignee of cement of a particu- lar brand has the right to assume that it, and no other, will be delivered, it was decided in CARDIGANSHIRE, 9 F. (2d) 416. The court also held that “arrival of ship,” within the meaning of bills of lading requiring claims to be filed within a specific time after “date of the arrival of the ship at destination,” must be construed, where misdelivery is charged, as meaning date when the cargo is discharged or offered for delivery. 1 * * TIME charter, by which _ the owners of a vessel remained liable for wages and provisions, and the charterer agreed to provide bunker coal and passenger expenses, the cap- tain being under orders of the char- terer, was held in the case of PENZA, 9 F. (2d) 529, not to be a demise, and hence the captain was the owners’ master, and not the charterer’s.