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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers — By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law Specially Compiled for Marine Review HEN live ashes are taken from yr a furnace to be dumped upon a wooden scow, the operation is so ob- viously fraught with danger as to de- mand the exercise of a high degree of care to provide for wetting them suffi- ciently to prevent a fire. When, as it appeared in-the case of Bartley Scow Corp..v. J. V. Petrie & Son, Inc., 37 F. (2d). 58, they are dumped so hot as to burn and damage the scow, those who do the dumping are presumptively neg- ligent. ek ke & N RE Lee Transit Corp., 37 F. (2d) 67, involved a petition for limitation of liability on account of the claim of a deckhand for personal injuries sus- tained while in discharge of his duties on petitioner’s tug. The court held that an employee is not necessarily at fault in exposing himself to risk, which a volunteer would not be justi- fied in assuming, saying, in part: ‘‘No doubt the standard always must be the proper balance between the risk to life or limb and that to the prop- erty, and this of course involves the imminence and gravity of the possible injury and of the possible damage. A servant may not greatly hazard his safety for a trifle; it does not follow that he may ,not incur a slighter chance to protéct property of value from present danger... The real ques- tion is whether his relation as em- ployee justifies more disregard of him- self than if he had no duty to per- form.” * * * HE price which a city paid for a vessel was competent evidence of her value in a ferryboat company’s limitation of liability proceeding, said the court in In re Union Ferry Co. of New York and Brooklyn, 37 F. (2d) 95, and the consideration expressed in the bill of sale presumptively stated, subject to refutation, the price paid. * Bg % O ALLOW a ferryboat to pass 100 feet away from tugs towing a par- tially submerged barge, where neither the tugs nor the barge carry any warn- ing signal, those in charge of the tugs well knowing that the ferryboat is bound for her nearby slip, is coming with a strong ebb tide, and that a dist- ance of almost 300 feet beyond the sterns of the tugs contains a danger, which may result not only in damage to property, but loss to life, and yet give no warning whatever of such pos- sible danger, by whistles, shouts, or gestures, relying solely on the hope that the master of the ferryboat can see the obstruction, or on the belief that he will not make a turn within that space, is in itself sufficient evi- 40 dence of negligence on the part of those in charge of such tow.—Ham- MOND, 37 F. (2d): 184. % * * HE . general rule lished, it was declared in the case of Frepenssro, 38 F. (2d) 501, that an underwriter who has paid a loss is entitled to recover what he has paid by a suit in the name of the as- sured against the carrier who caused the loss. * * * HE fact that a voyage was rough, and that there was a great deal of pounding in the forward part of the ship, did not, according to the case of CameErRontisA, 38 F. (2d) 522, relieve the shipowner from liability for dam- age to cargo coming in contact with sea water, under a provision of the bill of lading that neither the carrier nor the ship would be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters. * * * N OVERTAKING vessel has the duty to keep out of the way and to avoid the risk of collision. If in doubt as to whether the other ship is converging or parallel, she is bound to assume the first; ambiguities must be resolved in favor of safety. It must always be remembered that it is the risk of collision, not the colli- sion itself, that masters must avoid. * * * BRIDGE spanning a navigable river is an obstruction to navi- gation tolerated because of necessity and convenience to commerce upon land. Such a structure, it was held in the case of Karp, 38 F. (2d) 84, must be so maintained and operated that navigation may not be impeded more than is absolutely necessary; the right of navigation being para- mount. It is incumbent upon the owner that the bridge be so con- structed that it may be readily opened to admit the passage of craft, and maintained in suitable condition thereto. It is also his duty to place in charge those who are competent to operate the bridge, to watch for sig- nals, and to open the bridge for the passage of vessels, and for the per- formance of such delegated duty he is responsible. A vessel, having given proper signal to open the bridge and prudently proceeding under’ slow speed, has, in the absence of proper warning, the right to assume that the bridge will be timely opened for passage. She is not bound to heave to until the bridge has been swung, or raised and locked, and to critical- ly examine the situation before pro- ceeding, but may carefully proceed at MARINE REview—January, 1931 is well estab-.. slow speed upon the assumption that the bridge will open in response to the signal, and may so proceed until such time as it appears by proper warning, or in reasonable view of the situation, that the bridge will not be opened. * % * N THE case of Ativan H. BousHeEt, 38 F. (2d) 980, it appeared that a towing company contracted to tow a ship to a given destination, necegsi- tating the use of two of its tugs. The ship was taken over and placed in the control of the tugs, under the specific direction of the master of one of the tugs. mand of the ship and tugs, and was proceeding en route in charge of the flotilla directing same from the ship’s bridge, as is customary, and while so engaged, pursuant to the towage un- dertaking, a collision occurred, as a result of the fault in navigation of the tow thus in charge of the master of one of the tugs, so placed in com- mand by the towing company. Under such circumstances, said the court, both tugs are responsible and liable for damages arising from such colli- sion, where as in this case, both were participants in the venture and un- dertaking, and both were at fault in bringing about the collision. The master, so in control of the under- taking, was, in such circumstances, to all intents and purposes, the master of both vessels, and the two tugs con- stituted the unit to be surrendered to justify a limitation of liability. * * * FFIRMING the judgment in 33 F. (2d) 211, the court, inom case of United States v. Munson Steamship line, 37 F. (2d) 681, de clared that water transportation wun- connected with transportation by rail is not subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce act that cal- riers shall file, etc., schedules of rates, etc., water carriers being subject, not to the interstate commerce commis- sion, but to the United States ship — ping board, and are required to file schedules of maximum rates with that board, which is given super- visory power over their rates and practices. carrier receiving merchandise from 4 rail carrier and issuing a bill of lad ing to the shipper under a separate contract with him was not takins part in transportation with the rail carrier under “common arrangement’ with the rail carrier within the mean- ing of the Interstate Commerce act — so as to require filing schedules ° rates with the interstate commerce commission. That master took com- — It was held that a water —