Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law HE master of a vessel cannot pour water into the hold of the vessel without coming under the duty to take reasonable measures to ascertain whether any of the cargo was damaged thereby. If it was, and due diligence would have disclosed this fact, this obligation to protect the sacrificed cargo’s right to contribution is clear, it was held in the case of Dibrell Bros. vy. Prince Line, Ltd., 58 F. (2d) 959. The court held further that clauses in bills of lading requiring notice of claims for damage before removal of goods from the ship do not extend to claims for general average contribu- tion and are inapplicable to the vessel’s or saved cargo’s share of general aver- age contribution. * * * N REDELIVERY of lighters in O damaged condition by the char. terer, there arises a presumption of negligence on the part of the charterer which he must explain away in order to defeat libelS by the owner.— Harry R., 58 F. (2d) 1000 * * * HARTERER may waive the terms of a charter or a breach thereof. In the case of Clarke Steamship Co. v. Munson Steamship Co., 59 F. (2d) 423, it was held that any breach of a charter party by failure to paint a vessel before de- livery to the charterer was waived by the parties’ agreement to have the painting and cleaning done af- terward by the crew and additional men hired by the owner; and, fur- ther, that the charterer was not bound to reject the vessel in order to claim damages, but might accept her and retain the right to recover damages. In the same case it was decided that the arrest of a vessel under private legal process was not within the “restraint of princes,’ etc., exception in the charter party. * * * UIT in admiralty must be brought by the real party in interest and not in the name of one for the bene- fit of another, to whom the right bas been transferred, and courts of admiralty do not look with favor upon assignments executed solely to confer jurisdiction. In view of the above it wag declared in the case of Wittig v. Canada Steamship lines, 59 F. (2d) 428, that a shipper receiv- ing insurance for cargo damage under an agreement reciting that 26 payment was a “‘loan,’”’ for which the claim was pledged, continued the real party in interest, as regards re- covery against the carrier; also, that an admiralty court could refuse jurisdiction of a libel for cargo dam- age, brought by a resident of the district, as assignee, where transac- tions involved took place in a for- eign jurisdiction, Shipper and car- rier were foreign corporations, and witnesses would be in a_ foreign country. Bo *% * N CONNERS MARINE Co. v. Mc- Clintic-Marshall Co., 59 F. (2d) 758, the court decided that the owner of a tug and barge was entitled to recover damages arising from the charterer’s improper hoisting of ma- terials on vessels from car floats, but that such owner was not entitled to recover damages resulting from its representative’s obedience to the charterer’s orders respecting the shifting of anchors. The owner, not the charterer, of the tug and barge was held responsible for navigation thereof, though the charter party pro- vided that the master should be un- der orders of the charterer. HEN a vessel has violated the W anit laws and thereby become subject to forfeiture, it can be seized anywhere, even upon the high seas; in such a case, it is the duty of the customs officers to seize and secure it as well without, as within, their respective districts—Mary, 59 I’. Cld) iu. * * * RIVILEGE of limiting liability is Pe rantea the owner of an offending vessel on condition that he surrender the value of his interest in the vessel and her freight then pending. In the case of a flotilla consisting of tug and tow, the vessel required to be sur- rendered, according the case of In re W. H. Hedger Co., 59 F. (2d) 982, will, in some circumstances, be only the tug, while in other circumstances it will be the whole flotilla. The petitioner in a limitation proceeding has the burden of proving compliance with the conditions which enabled him to limit liability. He must show the value of his interest in the vessel and her pending freight. When a tug owner proves that he collected a certain sum as freight and that he had no interest in the cargo-carrying barges, the sum collected necessarily MARINE REvVIEw—February, 1933 measures his interest in the freight earned by the tug, in absence of a showing that others are entitled to share in the freight he collected. Eo Po * N CONSIDERING the rights of des- titute seamen, the courts judicial- ly know that Alaska is not contigu- ous to the United States; that ge- ographically it is foreign; and that by act of Jan. 3, 1923, seamen in Alaskan waters are placed on the same basis as seamen of the poli-- tically foreign countries, and appro- priations made ‘‘for relief and pro- tection of American seamen in the territory of Alaska.’’ Where the cus- toms office in Alaska, by its deputy collector, took full charge of a ship- wrecked crew, and required the mas- ter of another ship belonging to the same owner to transport the seamen to the shipwrecked vessel’s debarking port, agreeing to pay for transpor- tation, the shipowner was not enti- tled to compensation out of the des- titute seamen’s fund, notwithstanding the certificate of the deputy collec- tor, the primary object of the ap- propriation being for the relief of destitute seamen, and not for the benefit of the steamship company.— Alaska Steamship Co. V.. United States, 60 BY (2d) 135, * Eo % ESSEL leaving a course which would have permitted a starboard to starboard passing with ample space between, and turning into the path of an on-coming vessel without get- ting an exchange of signals to indi- cate that the on-coming vessel knew the crossing was to be in front rath- er than astern of her, was negligent, as was also the on-coming vessel, proceeding at a rate of 8 or 9 knots without any lookout or any one in the pilot house except the captain, and which disregarded the _ signal. The captain was negligent in either not hearing the signal or in disre- garding it, and an adequate lookout might have prevented that. Fur- thermore, he was negligent in not initiating an exchange if he did not hear the signal, and in proceeding without a change of speed or course into a position of danger without knowing what the other vessel’s in- tention was. — Kooxapurra, 60 F. (2d) 174.