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the facilities offering in the open freight market. And to obtain that object they have built and run, at the cost of the state, ships to com- pete in international trade with ships under other flags.”’ Cites Shipbuilding Expenditures It is evident that the British na- tional committee is unanimous in thinking that this is not sporting. Then to make its case particularly strong, the general scope and char- acter of the methods employed by various countries to “‘create tonnage”’ since the war are summarized, in the main, from the report on Shipping and Shipbuilding Subsidies prepared by Jesse E. Saugstad of the bureau of = be Liy 4 ae See CEVA T VE TOE TE ETT el j 4 stra 1; ROMER rn, AIT BI S. S. Santa Rosa—11,200 gross tons—Speed, 18% knots—Completed, Oct. 24, 1932— Sisterships, three—See MARINE Review for December, 1932 8. S. Talamanca—6963 gross tons—Speed, 17% knots—Completed, Dec. 12, 1931— Sisterships, five—See MARINE Review for January, 1932 foreign and domestic commerce of the United States department of commerce and issued in 1932. “The shipping policy of the United States since the war,” says the Brit- ish report, “is particularly strik- ing. In 1913 only 228,232 gross tons of merchant shipping were launched in the United States. In 1919, 3,579,826 tons were launched, a figure greater than the maximum pre-war world output for any single year, namely, 3,332,882 tons in 1913. Why Ships Were Built “The outlay of the United States government upon ship construction and operation through the United States shipping board from 1916 to June 30, 1931, reached the collosal figure of $3,694,855,792. Of this amount $79,648,869 have been re- turned to the United States treasury leaving a remainder of $3,615,206,- 923 as the net cost of the program of the United States government for the 16 year period, less the value of government property and other assets. This cost does not include expenditure by other government de- partments such as certain sums paid under postal contracts prior to the passing of the merchant marine act of 1928."’ No explanation is given—just the bare statements as quoted above with figures taken from an undeniably un- prejudiced source, the above men- tioned report by Mr. Saugstad of the United States department of com- merce, but in this same report much is said about the reasons for this tre- mendous shipbuilding in the United States in 1919, and the expenditure of such a huge sum of money. It was done, of course, because of the urgent need of ships during the war. As everyone knows it was done to win the war. The responsible lead- ers of Great Britain during the war not only encouraged this stupendous shipbuilding program but insisted that the very life of the allies depend- ed upon the speed with which the United States could turn out ships. No one could foresee that the war was to end when it did. Looking back now, it is all very well to say that shipbuilding should have stopped with the war, but at that time the momentum of the tremendous ma- chine built up for turning out ships on such a grand scale was too great and the prevailing psychology the world over did not contribute to wis- dom and foresight. It has been pointed out early in this article that a most thorough liquidation of the huge government fleet of merchant vessels has now MARINE REVIEW——July, 1933 been made. What would the Brit- ish have had us do? Take this great fleet out and sink it! Unless it could have been so disposed of, the ships were there to continue somewhere in some hands as an addition to world tonnage. It is nothing less than un- reasonable to keep harping back to this war initiated merchant tonnage. Even the British now, on occasion, are not above sneering at its unfitness for trade. We have stated the facts in the case. This war built tonnage is now from 12 to 15 years in age and if what is left of it is a threat to the efficient ships of Great Brit- ain or any other country, all we can say is that they have little of the stamina of their seafaring ancestors. The British committee’s report continues in referring to mail con- tracts as follows: ‘On June 30, 1931, forty-one ten- year mail contracts had been let to private companies under the mer- chant marine act of 1928. Compen- sation is not based upon the volume of mail carried but upon the size and speed of the vessels used and the length of the route served. These contracts provide for the permanency of the services undertaken, the con- struction of new vessels and the im- provement of present equipment. It is estimated that the total amount guaranteed for the ten-year mail con- tracts is $282,426,400. Since then, three other mail contracts have been let.”’ A Policy of Encouragement This is a correct statement. It represents the definite policy of the United States to encourage the estab- lishment and the efficient operation of first class vessels in certain trade routes so that we may no longer be entirely dependent on foreign car- riers in the development of our world commerce. It is, in fact, granting aid in the maintenance of sea com- munications on particular routes, the promotion of particular trades in which the United States has special interests and the provision of par- ticular types of vessels which would be of value in time of war. Accord- ing to its own statement as quoted 11