Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law Specially Compiled for Marine Review OWER’S liability policy covering liability for collision occurring to any vessel ‘‘while in tow” of the tug covered the assured’s liability for loss of cargo of a barge towed by the in- sured tug, though the contract be- tween assured and the owner of the lost cargo was one of carriage. A warranty in the policy that assured would assume no liability not im- posed by law was not violated by is- suing a bill of lading whereby the assured assumed liability for its own negligence, where the policy also pro- vided that the assured would not be prejudiced by the negligence in the bills of lading. In view of a provision of the policy that insurance should be void to the extent other insurance was available, but that solvency of other underwriters was guaranteed, loss, to extent covered by other in- surance, could be prorated. The car- rier was entitled to interest under the tower’s and ecarrier’s liability poli- cies only from the time of payment made in satisfying the decree for car- go loss, not from the date of the de- cree.—Marine Transit Corp. v North- western Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 67 F. (2d) 544. % % * FERRYBOAT colliding with an A anchored steamship was _ pre- sumably at fault. Where the ferry- boat heard the bells of the steamship, anchored in a fog, she was bound to proceed at such a rate of speed as would enable her to stop within the distance she could see ahead.—Provi- dence, 67 F. (2d) 865. % * % EPARATION of barge and dredge S engaged in a single venture was immaterial in determining whether both should be surrendered as con- dition to limitation of liability to a seaman employed on the dredge for injuries sustained on the barge used as a tender to supply oil to the dredge, it was held in the case of Standard Dredging Co. v. Kristiansen, 67 F. (2d) 549, Said the court: “Perhaps separation might serve as a practical rule of thumb; we are quite aware of the restriction upon the right to limit which must follow upon making functional unity the test. But there is really nothing in reason to be said for such a doctrine; it exposes the remedy of the injured party to the merest sport of chance, It would 42 for example be a strange whimsy to say that the dredge must here have been surrendered had the barge hap- pened to be made fast alongside, but that she need not, because there was a thousand feet of water between them. Surely that cannot be a signi- ficant difference, when substantial in- terests are at stake. * * * When the unity of vessels is made to de- pend upon their devotion to a single venture, it would be egregious to in- troduce a purely fortuitous condition which can have no rational relation to the interests involved.”’ * * * SHIP is seaworthy, said the A court in the case of Apa M., 67 F. (2d) 331, if she conforms to the re- quirements of her class and service, even though her owner fails to keep her up to a higher standard which he had gratuitously assumed. Own- ers are not obliged to construct ships of the highest safety; seaworthiness is a resultant of the added safety from the supposed device and its cost; ordinarily it depends upon the stand- ard generally accepted in the trade for which the ship is used, though certainly in the end the court sets the standard. Failure to make water tight the bulkheads of a wooden ship used in Great Lakes shipping was held to be immaterial as respects liability for cargo damage, the law merely requiring cargo partitions. % Eo * SHIP carpenter, while engaged in repairing a scow on a dry dock upon navigable waters, had the status of a seaman, it was held in the case of Rogosich v. Union Dry Dock & Repair Co., 67 F. (2d) 377. Inthe absence of a statute, said the court, he could recover compensatory dam- ages for injuries received only upon proof of unseaworthiness of the ves- sel, Although the term ‘‘unsea- worthiness” might possibly be ex- tended to cover a case where the own- ers selected and employed an incap- able crew as fellow servants of the carpenter, the evidence failed to show unseaworthiness in that respect. * * % not guilty of negligence in fur- nishing stevedore cable too dry for use on drum hidden from winchman, though dryness made kinks more likely to form than if core of the cable ee here held as matter of law MARINE REvIEw—April, 1934 had been as well saturated with grease as when new. Even when new such a cable would kink in use, and the danger from kinks lay, not in their formation, but in the use of the cable after they had formed and with- out removing them. The ship had a right to assume that a stevedore boss would exercise the care of a prudent man in working a winch with a drum out of the winchman’s sight, and was not liable for death of such boss caused by the formation of kinks in the cable-—De Luca v. Shepard Steamship Co., 67 F. (2d) 437. * * * HERE, when a tug left port, there were no indications of dangerous weather known to her, failure to call the weather bureau for unpublished news was not negligence rendering the tug liable for damages sustained by a barge in tow in a gale. This is true, it was declared in the case of “IMOAN; (67. BF... (2d). 6038 though had the master called the bureau, he would have got advices which would have kept a careful navigator in port. Failure of the tug to put into refuge ports was not bad seamanship rendering her liable for damage sustained by the barge dur- ing the gale, where to do so would have put her port quarter four points to the wind, the weather conditions apparently confirming favorable radio weather forecast, and port farther on offering a safer entry. A master may be held for lack of seamanship only where his conduct is outside the range of possible discretion; error to become fault must be gross and flagrant. * ES * N CASE of collision between a mov- ing vessel and one at anchor in a proper place showing requisite lights, the burden of proof to show absence of negligence is upon the moving vessel. —MaARIAN, 66 F. (2d) 354. * e # Ds of an overtaking vessel to anticipate a possible change of course of the overtaken vessel does not require the overtaking vessel to anticipate a right angle change of course of the vessel overtaken which is believed to be, and in fact is, headed for the same narrow channel as the overtaking vessel.—Larsen v. Portland California Steamship Co., 66 F. (2d) 326.