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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers RBITRATION clause in a charter party requiring arbitration of any dispute “arising during perform- ance” was intended to require arbi- tration of all disputes arising, although performance on both sides had ter- minated, it was held in the case of Re Utility Oil Corp., 69 F. (2d) 524. In construing an arbitration clause, the whole clause should be considered and not parts of it. ore # im VESSEL owner is not bound to equip her with every known safety device nor to adopt all the lat- est improvements under peril of his ship being held unseaworthy. Latest improvements or not—the question is one of reasonable fitness for the un- dertaking.—Cano Hatreras, 5 Fed. Supp. 725. Bo Ed * ECITAL in bill of lading that bales of dry salted goat skins are “shipped in good order and condition” was held, in the case of Cohen vy. Hol- land—America Line, 6 Fed. Supp. 247, to refer only to external condition, which was clearly satisfied, even though the burlap was spotted and the hoops rusted. The steamship line car- rying the bales of skins would not be liable for damage due to sweating. zo TUG towing a chartered barge A is primarily liable for its negli- gence, causing damage to the barge, and the charterer is only secondarily liable-—Century Indemnity Co. v. New York Tank Barge Co., 6 Fed. Supp. 280. ek ROVISIONS of steamship passage ticket requiring notice of claim to be given within 45 days after death and that suit be commenced within one year after lodging of claim are binding, said the court in the case of Lee v. Swedish American Line, 6 Fed. Supp. 342, even though the deceased was a three-year old infant traveling on her mother’s ticket, and suit not com- menced until after expiration of the one year period was barred, through notice of claim was given within 45 days after death; both requirements of the passage ticket should have been met in order to maintain an action. * * * CARRIER surrendering goods to the consignee and waiving its promise of the consignee to pay the 20 Specially Compiled for Marine Review By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law freight, may recover the freight from the consignee; a consignee who re- ceives goods under a bill of lading which incorporates the charter provi- sions is personally responsible for the freight, and it is no defense that the goods were damaged through the car- rier’s fault, although any such damage may be offered against the claim for freight by recoupment or cross-libel. A carrier who has given a clean bill of lading, stating that cargo has been re- ceived in good order when it was at the time manifestly damaged, is estopped to deny the truth of the as: sertion against a purchaser of the bill of lading who has been misled by the representation and has altered his position on the faith of the representa- tion.—Munson Steamship Line y. Rosenthal, 6 Fed. Supp. 374. * *% LAUSE of contract for discharge of cargo, providing for increase of rates if wage scale was increased, did not apply, it was held in the case of ALBISOLA, 6 Fed. Supp. 392, to contin- gency of cargo being damaged, though longshoremen under contract with Stevedoring company received higher wages because of handling the cargo under distress conditions, where the wage scale was not ¢hanged. The lo- cal custom of a port regarding in- creased compensation for unloading damaged cargo did not apply where a nonresident party to the contract did not know of it, and the contract fixed the rate for discharging cargo without limiting it to sound cargo; knowledge of a custom cannot be presumed ex- cept in case of custom prevailing gen- erally in the trade or business in which both parties are engaged. * % * ASED on privity of contract, a shipper has a right of action against a carrier for loss of merchan- dise, though the title thereto passed before liability arose—Samuel Sanday & Co. v. United States, 6 Fed. Supp. DOT: * Dd HE judgment of those on the spot at the time of a collision is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of those who seek to criticize after the event. On the basis of this declara- tion, it was held by the court in the case of ALGONQUIN, 6 Fed. Supp. 644, MARINE REvViEw—August, 1934 that the evidence in proceedings to limit liability negatived negligence or errors of judgment in handling a steamship disabled by collision, and in declining a tug’s assistance and offer of an acetylene torch to sever the anchor chain. e £ HRASEH, “dangers of navigation,” within an exception to a contract to carry and deliver cargo in good or- der, is equivalent to “perils of the sea.’ A peril of the sea is that danger that comes when wind and wave in their fury work their will with ship and cargo after the owner has used all reasonable effort to make the ship sea- worthy and well qualified to withstand those hazards and perils that the own- er knows or has reason to believe must be encountered. The phrase does not mean danger or hazard, but comprises such accidents as arise from the ele- ments and which could not be pre- vented by any care and skill of the master and _ crew. Seaworthiness means such fitness as to structure, lad- ing, captain, crew, etc., as will enable a ship to encounter the winds and bat- tering waves of the seas that must be encountered during the season and in the places where the ship must tray- el so that its cargo will be carried safely and delivered in good condi- tion.—Norris Grain Co. v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 70 Fed. (2), 32. * Ed HERE the channel of the river where a collision occurred took a curving course, and the vessels were meeting and not crossing courses, the fact that one vessel was on the star- board bow of the other vessel did not make the starboard hand rule applic- able.—Cariso, 6 Fed. Supp. 748. RA se se “di 7 S, UNDER a New York statute, a A vessel may elect to engage a pilot or to have the ship piloted by its master or own officers and pay pilot- age, a pilot engaged to pilot ship was an “employe” within the Jones act, as regards liability for the pilot’s death; however, seamen who rowed a yawl from the pilot boat to the steamship to take the pilot from the steamship were not employes within the Jones act as regards liability for their deaths.—Peterson v. United New York Sandy Hook Pilots’ Assn., 6 Fed. Supp. 649.