been shown definitely that any nor- mal person is capable of learning the broad technical and operational prin- ciples of radio. By law, masters of merchant ves- sels are responsible for all radio transmissions which are sent from their ships, just as they are solely responsible at all times for the safety of their commands, It seems obvious- ly desirable, therefore, that all mer- chant marine officers should become familiar with the general technical and operational features of radio communication in order to exercise intelligent supervision and obtain for their ships and other ships the maxi- mum benefit of radio. As pointed out before, they should know their radio directions-finder intimately, its limi- tations and peculiarities; the general construction of fathometer equipment with its efficient operation; utiliza- tion of proper time signals; reception of weather broadcasts or teletype maps for forecasting and consequent safety of navigation; use of their own radio facilities for the safety of all shipping; general world communica- tion facilities and a broad knowledge of world communication problems, Loss of the Vestris During distress communications, strict supervision must be exercised over all mobile radio communica- tions lest the rescue operations be hindered rather than aided. AS an example the well-known VESTRIS dis- aster may be used. After that ves- sel transmitted her first distress sig- nal, the distress channel was so con- gested with unnecessary radio trans- missions from irresponsile radio op- erators who felt they must transmit something or anything, that succeed- ing distress calls and rescue com- munications were seriously interfered with and delayed. Conditions at that time can only be described as chaotic. Finally, the battleship WyoMING stepped in, silencing superfluous transmissions, assuming control of the radio situation, and permitting the necessary communications to proceed. Had the officers on many of the interfering ships exercised the proper supervision and prevented the transmission of unimportant mes- sages, it is probable that much val- uable time would have been saved. A good knowledge of national and international radio regulations is necessary in such cases. Masters as well as the radio operators, have a responsibility, and both must play a part in such a situation. Case of the Tahiti The case of the S. S. TAHITI, lost in the Pacific, furnished food for thought in connection with the knowledge merchant marine officers should possess of radio. The TAHITI was about midway between Samoa and New Zealand when she was dis- abled and in a precarious situation. Few radio stations exist in that part 20 of the world and vessels are few and far between. However, by good for- tune only, her distress signal was re- ceived by a New Zealand station on the usual distress frequency of 500 kilocyecles (600 meters) since it hap- pened to be transmitted two hours before sunrise. Had the message been sent during daylight the chance of its reception would have been slight, since it is a well-known fact that frequencies of the order of 500 kilocyecles have a much greater effec- tive range during darkness, After receipt of the distress mes- sage by the New Zealand station, it was relayed to a Samoan shore sta- tion, which in turn transmitted it to the S. S. VentuRA, the latter arriv- ing on the scene just in time to take the passengers off the sinking vessel. The VreNTURA had never heard the distress signals of the TAHITI. If masters of ships were familiar with their communication problems, and realized the possibilities of the latest radio developments, ships on isolated voyages, such as that of the TaHIt1, would be equipped with suit- able high frequency apparatus cap- able of communicating over great distances. Such use would also de- mand the assignment of certain high frequency channels for calling and distress work exclusively. Further- more, if merchant marine officers were always aware of the technical limitations of their equipment and the general radio organization in various regions, they would insist on being regularly informed by their ra- dio operators of the position of the nearest vessels which may be util- ized in case of emergency. Effective use should be made of the means at hand. It must be noted that radio operat- ors on board ship are not expert radio engineers. Neither do many of them realize the complexity of the world’s communication set-up, its dis- putes or problems, As radio operat- ors, they perform their work satis- factorily, but they cannot be consid- ered as communication officers, since the latter must have a good general background of technical develop- ments, worldwide operational co-or- dination, and the knowledge required of a merchant marine officer in order to be in a position to advise the mas- ter correctly and intelligently. No responsible master would desire any other kind of advice. Rescue of the Florida Intelligent use of radio direction- finders is best exemplified by the res- cue of the crew of the S. S. FLORIDA by the S. S. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT in 1929. The position reported by the Frorimpa’s radio was some 150 miles in error, and it was only by constant and careful use of the radio direction-finder, coupled with a de- pendence in its performance, which enabled the PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to MARINE REVIEW—September, 1934 reach her side, It was inconceivable that the reported position could be 150 miles in error, but the faith of the master of the PRESIDENT Roose- VELT meant the difference between success and failure. His knowledge and association with the device en- abled him to use sound judgment in a trying situation. Constant use of the radio direction-finder by the mas- ter and his officers on previous voy- ages gave to them the assurance of the results obtained. International Code of Signals A valuable adjunct for communi- cation between ships at sea and ships and communication stations on shore is available in the international code of signals, For many years an international code has been in existence, but it was not until the current (1931) edition was made effective on Jan. 1, 1934, that there became available a mod- ern code suited for use in connection with radio as well as visual communi- eation facilities. The current edition of the international code of signals is published in two volumes: Vol. 1 for visual and sound signalling; vol. II for use with radio. Familiarity with the contents of the international code and a working knowledge of the manner of its use should be of great value to masters and communication personnel of ships which travel the high seas. One of the principal advantages of the code is that it affords a means where- by ships of different nationalities may communicate with each other effectually without the necessity for the personnel of either being famil- iar with any language but their own, Thus, for example, in time of dis- tress, the vessel desiring assistance and vessels in position to render aid may carry on intelligible communi- cation with one another by means of the code even though differences in language might make plain language communication between them diffi- cult or impossible. While merchant ships of the prin- cipal maritime nations are in general not required by law or regulation to carry the international code of sig- nals, a large percentage of ocean-go- ing ships are so equipped. The fre- quent use of the code will have the result of familiarizing personnel with its possibilities, thus creating confi- dence in its use, and will also bring to light any deficiencies and result in its improvement, The American edition of the inter- national code of signals is published by the hydrographic office of the navy department, Its subject matter, however, is under cognizance of the office of the chief of naval operations. That office receives such comments as are submitted with the idea of im- provement of the code, and transmits them to an international standing (Continued on Page 36)