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Merchant Ships (Continued from Page 15) In preventing the utter disappear- ance of the private shipbuilding in- dustry of this country the merchant marine renders the navy and the na- tion an inestimable service. American shipbuilders have repeatedly declared that the higher cost of ships in the United States, as compared with that abroad, is due to the higher wage scales here. At all events, they se- cure little or no foreign business. Naval construction is sporadic, usual- ly insufficient in volume to keep them busy, and always uncertain due to political exigencies. They must therefore depend for a livelihood al- most entirely upon the construction of such American-flag tonnage as has to be built in American yards to com- ply with the law. For the private shipbuilding in- dustry of this country to disappear would be a serious breach in our whole scheme of national defense. In any grave emergency involving our maximum naval effort, all our navy yards—-the only public plants cap- able of building seagoing ships— would probably be fully engaged up- on the repair and overhaul of naval vessels and auxiliaries. Practically all additions to the fleet, as well as the replacement of all shipping losses, would fall to the private shipyards. If these were inadequate disaster would certainly impend. Keeping Shipyards Busy In the ordinary course of events, normal replacement of obsolete mer- chant marine tonnage should suffice to keep a fairly robust shipbuilding industry going in the United States entirely aside from naval contracts. There were, on a recent date, even in the current depressed state of shipping, 1197 vessels, aggregating 6,753,944 gross tons in operation under the United States flag. Of these, 429 vessels, aggregating 2,712,- 182 gross tons, were in foreign trade, where vessels built abroad may fly the United States flag; but the rest, 768 ships, aggregating 4,041,762 gross tons, were in the restricted trade where only American built ships can operate. Assuming an average life of 20 years for these ships annual replace- ments for the 4,000,000 gross tons in coastwise trade alone would give American shipyards 200,000 gross tons a year to build. At an average price of $200 per gross ton this would mean $40,000,000 worth of business annually. Half the normal repiace- ments for the ‘‘treaty’’ navy——the other half being built at the navy yards, in accordance with the recent order of the congress—-would send the private builders $35,000,000 more business a year. These two items combined would suffice to keep eight or ten capable shipyards constantly employed. Until the frantic scenes 40) of 1917-1919 shall have disappeared from our memories, the existence of such an active shipbuilding industry will be recognized as a truly valu- able national asset. As a Source of Personnel Besides its ability to furnish ves- sels to supplement the navy, and its value in helping to sustain the ship- building industry, the merchant ma- rine affords the navy a ready source from which to obtain personnel al- ready experienced at sea. During the World war 21,000 line officers (less than one-third of whom held perma- nent commissions) and upwards of 500,000 men were on active duty in the navy at one time, whereas there are now but 6132 officers available for deck, engine room, and aeronauti- cal duties, and only about 80,000 men. The difference between these figures indicates how great an expan- sion of naval personnel might lave to take place on the outbreak of war. Congress in 1927 recognized the potential value of merchant marine personnel in this connection by pass- ing an act which established a naval reserve of three classes, one being designated ‘‘the merchant marine naval reserve,” to be ‘‘composed of male citizens of the United States and of its insular possessions who follow or have followed the sea as a profes- sion and who are employed, or who have been employed within three years, on public vessels of the United States or such other seagoing vessels documented under the laws of the United States as may be approved by the secretary of the navy.’’ Nearly 4000 officers are enrolled under this law——a very considerable asset-—de- spite the fact that the congress has never appropriated any money to pro- vide for giving them actual experi- ence, with pay, in naval vessels. Carrying on Trade One other function of the merchant marine deserves to be mentioned as an indirect but none-the-less valuable aid to national defense. That is, the function of carrying on our foreign trade during hostilities. When arms clash, seaborne traffic is the first to feel the feverish breath of war. Radios crackle. Ships scurry for port. Blockades are declared. The com- merce of the whole world is suddenly twisted. Shipments pile up on wharves. Insurance rates shoot up- wards, It is then that our own merchant marine becomes of the most intense value to us. Whether we are neutral or belligerent, our foreign, coastal, and intercoastal seaborne business must go on, else our whole business structure totters. Materials essential to our industry and our defense must be fetched from abroad. Credits for essential purchases abroad, either for defense or for home consumption, or for the purpose of exerting economic pressure on our adversaries must be established by the delivery abroad of MARINE REVIEW—October, 1934 our own products. Nothing but our own merchant marine can be relied upon to do these things in our inter- est under such circumstance. Even the navy is powerless to do them. Viewing the picture as a whole, it is not difficult to discern how vital to the country’s welfare both the navy and the merchant marine are. What may be required of them soon- er or later, no one can truly foretell. But whatever befalls, each must be adequate, or both will fail. Adequacy—What it Means What constitutes adequacy for each of them? The congress and the chief executive, in the exercise of their constitutional functions, have already answered that question, In the Vin- son-Trammell act they have estab- lished the composition of the United States navy with respect to the cate- gories of vessels limited by treaties, “at the limits prescribed by the treaties,’ and aircraft in number com- mensurate therewith—that is, a navy second to none. In the merchant ma- rine acts of 1920 and 1928 they have twice declared it to be the policy of the United States ‘“‘to do whatever may be necessary to develop and maintain a merchant marine suffi- cient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval auxiliary in time of war.” If our navy and our merchant marine are both up to those standards there is no question of their adequacy. Are they adequate now? The navy, even when all the ships now under construction are completed, will still lack 78 ships allowed by the treaties, to say nothing of several hundred air- eraft, or of some 2000 officers and 20,000 men ‘“‘commensurate with a treaty navy.’’ Our merchant marine, in competition with the rest of the world, has never been able to secure for itself the business of carrying more than 34 per cent of our foreign trade. Shall they be adequate? That is for the people of the United States to say, by their support, their patrenage, and through their representatives in the congress, and in the White House. But of this much we may rest as- sured. If the navy and the merchant marine are both adequate, this coun- try will be forever free to fulfill its destiny uncoerced. If either is not adequate, we may be compelled to lay our course according to another’s bid- ding. Proper Pier Construction (Continued from Page 31) To improve the conditions for fight- ing fires under piers, architects should consider accessibility. Reinforced concrete baffle walls should be suspended across the width of the pier at 100 foot intervals so as to reduce the fire area. These walls should extend from low water to the underside of the pier.