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Late Decisions in Maritime Law Legal Tips for Shipowners and Officers ter No. 55, reported in 7 Fed. Supp. 470, was filed to recover damages resulting from the parting of a sling which was engaged in re- moving a condenser from the engine room of a steamship to the deck of a derrick lighter. The condenser, in falling, struck the side of the steam- ship, damaging that vessel, and then fell on a new condenser as well as the deck of the lighter. The con- denser being lifted weighed approxi- mately 15% tons and had to be lifted through a hatch 45 feet above the surface of the water. The sling, 34 feet long, was of 1%-inch steel wire, and it was contended that it was not strong enough for the work in hand. The court held against this conten- tion, it being shown that the con- denser did not, at any time, strike anything while being raised out of the steamship, and did not strike anything after being raised out and before it fell, but that the accident was caused by the sudden stopping of the descent of the condenser, which caused it to jerk and doubled the strain on the sling, which made the strain much greater than the safety point. The breaking strain of a 1%-inch sling is rated at 56 tons. The safety factor of 5 is commonly used, said the court, this showing the safe working load for the sling to be ¥1. 1/5 tons; * * Eo Te libel in the case of McAllis- WO vessels approaching each other from opposite directions on North river, practically end on, must, under inland rules, make port to port pas- sage, and it is the duty of the vessel giving a whistle signal of desire to pass starboard to starboard to pass port to port until the signal is an- swered by the other vessel. In the ease of Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 7 Fed. Supp. 473, it was de- clared that the vessel giving the whistle signal should consider wheth- er she has the ability to do her part in carrying out the maneuver, and where her clumsiness is known to her officers but not known to the other vessel, the latter cannot be held in fault in assenting to the signal and attempting to carry out the proposal. On the assent to the whistle signal, it was the duty of both vessels to co- operate in carrying out the proposed 24 By Harry Bowne Skillman Attorney at Law passage; nevertheless, the signalling vessel was bound to keep out of the way of the other vessel. * Bo * HERE a barge, which was moved in a Slip to afford an out- let for drift which had accumulated behind her, was moored with hemp lines and broke away when the gorge which had lodged against the up- stream end of the barge broke and struck her, causing her to drift into other moored vessels, the owner was negligent in not preventing the ac- cumulation of drift and not antici- pating the breaking of the gorge, and was liable for the damages resulting from the collision with other vessels, there being no proof that the break- ing away of the barge was the result of inevitable accident or was an un- controllable event.—Vang v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 7 Fed. Supp. 475. * % * UOTING from the decision in the case of PAJALA, 7 Fed. Supp. 618: ‘‘He who is the owner for the time being may impose a lien on the vessel. He who is merely operating under a contract which in plain terms imposes on him the duty of furnishing fuel for the ship, does not stand in the place of the owner, even temporarily, and the supplier is required * * * to exercise reason- able diligence to inform himself of the difference.’’ Specifically, it was held in this case that where fuel oil furnished to a vessel was not supplied upon the order of the master or any- one acting for him or for the owner, but under a general supply contract with the charterer, and the time charter, upon inspection which could have been made upon request, would have shown that the obligation to procure oil was on the charterer, not on the owner, the supplier was not entitled to a lien. By * * HERE a vessel failed to dis- charge cargo at its destination, and, in shipping it back from another port, it was lost, the cargo owner was entitled to recover from the ship- owner for the loss notwithstanding a provision in the bill of lading that the shipowner should not be liable for MARINE REVIEW—December, 1934 Specially Compiled for Marine Review claims unless written notice thereof should be given to the shipowner be- fore removal of goods and that, if goods should not be found during the usual stay of the vessel at the port of destination or transshipment, they should be sent back at the ship- owner’s expense but at risk of goods. —General Electric Co. v. Argonaut Steamship line, 7 Fed. Supp. 710. * % * HERE a notice posted on the cabin of a vessel stated that under the terms of the charter party neither the charterer nor the master had the right to incur a lien upon the vessel, and a copy of the charter party was carried on the vessel for exhibi- tion of any person having business with it, a person furnishing materials used on the vessel without inquiring as to the authority of the person or- dering materials had no lien upon the vessel for the materials furn- ished. A maritime lien, being secret and unrecorded, cannot be conferred on the theory of unjust enrichment or subrogation, and the right of such lien cannot be extended by judicial constructive analogy or reference.— ALJOHN, 7 Fed. Supp. 788. + # Oe F THE navigator of a vessel has | any doubt as to the course of an- other vessel, there must be an ex- change of signals before proceeding ahead on a new course. Where a ves- sel is approaching another vessel which has disregarded her signals or whose position or movements are un- certain, she is bound to stop until her course be ascertained for a certainty. —Rapium, 7 Fed. Supp. 804. PGarar eener BSENCE of the captain from a schooner cannot prevent limita- tion of liability on the part of the schooner, notwithstanding the fact that had he been on board it is not likely that the accident would have occurred. Even though the absence of the master, pilot, or some other competent person constituted negli- gence on the part of the schooner, the absence of the master and pilot cannot be charged to the privity and knowledge of the owner.—T. K. Bentley, 7 Fed. Supp. 565.