18 MARINE REVIEW. POSITION OF THE NAVAL ENGINEER. FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF AMERICA HE IS DEMANDING EXEOUTIVE RANK AND EXECUTIVE TITLE IN THE BRITISH NAVY—NO PLACE ON THE MODERN MAN-OF-WAR, HE SAYS, FOR THE SAILOR AS HH HAS BEEN KNOWN IN THE PAST. Mr. D. B. Morison contributes to the Institution of Engineers and Ship Builders of Scotland an article upon the subject “Engineering Crisis in the Navy,” in which he devotes considerable attention to Rear Admiral Melville’s remarks upon the operation of the personnel bill in the United States navy. He says that the unjust and prejudiced policy of repression, which it has always been a tradition of the British admiralty to adopt to- wards the engineering branch of the service, is gradually sapping its effi- ciency by kiliing the enthusiasm and contentment of the personnel and by rendering it unpopular and unattractive in those circles in which the best class of engineer officer could and should be recruited. Continuing he says: “In these days, when engineering science is the very foundation of civilized existence, it is foolish and hopelessly futile to attempt to repress its professional representatives by any artifices of social or service con- vention. The evils attending the efforts of the admiralty in this direction are growing in an increasing ratio with every development of engineering that increases its influence upon sea power. The variety, complexity and magnitude of the machinery employed upon modern warships renders 11 essential that those responsible for its care and manipulation shall possess high professional attainments, whilst the successful organization and management of the large engine room staffs now required call for admin- istrative capacity of no mean order. It is surely unreasonable to expect that the well-bred, high-spirited and capable youths who are therefore alone fitted to become efficient engineer officers, will willingly enter a ser- vice where they will be subjected to continual annoyance and humiliation, and where their ultimate grave responsibilities will be unaccompanied by corresponding powers of control. There is a tendency on the part of some of the opponents of reform to make capital out of certain state- ments made by Rear Admiral Melville (in his able and remarkably frank report for 1900, as the chief of the bureau of steam engineering of the United States navy), with reference to the unsatisfactory working of the new personnel act, by which the former line and engineer corps of the United States navy were amalgamated. There is, however, no justifica~ tion for interpreting the words of Rear Admiral Melville as a condemna- tion of the enlightened and liberal policy of which the personnel bill was t*e practical expression. In order to prove this point I cannot do better than quote Rear Admiral Melville’s own words: “*T am fully aware of the futility and folly of decrying legislation simply because the desired results therefrom do not promptly materialize, but surely time enough has now elapsed since the enactment of the reorx- ganization scheme to make criticism of its effects upon the navy both proper and important. To any close observer it is convincingly evident that either the scheme was a mistake, or that the proper course has not been taken to carry out its intent. I am free to acknowledge that the events of the past year have brought only discouragement to those most deeply interested in a successful outcome of this new law, but I am equally candid in the belief that the cause of this discouragement lies not in the scheme itself, but in a lack of full appreciation on the part of the department (navy department) of the urgency of the need for haste, not only in providing the fullest opportunity for the acquirement of practical engineering knowledge on the part of the younger officers of the former line, but in enforcing their embracement of this opportunity in the most effective manner by departmental orders. It will not do to depend upon unaided individual enthusiasm, or details occasioned by the necessities ot particular ships; such a course merely temporizes with the present needs, fails in any rational degree to increase the force of navy engineers (even should it suffice to replace the annual loss), and is hopelessly ineffective to secure the most desirable results in the shape of a speedy acquirement Oia knowledge of engineering on the part of the new line as a whole. “Regarding the engineering departments of ships at sea in times of peace as well as of war, compare for a moment the advantage of a battle- ship depending for the full and proper operations of her motive power upon the knowledge of a single officer, the chief engineer, with that of another ship of the same class, whereon any one of the line officers could in an emergency take efficient charge of the machinery and several, indeed, assume and completely fill the position of an expert in that department. The ideal condition of the latter is what we are now striving for, since en- gineering knowledge has been recognized as of the most vital importance in the service, and it is to the realization of this I will hopefully look de- spite the many visible obstacles.’ “In reading Rear Admiral Melville’s valuable and lucid report,” Mr. Morrison continues, ‘‘one cannot help feeling that it would be to the ad- vantage of our public services, and therefore of the nation, if it were possi- ble for the heads of our naval departments to make public, in the same complete, frank and decisive manner, the results of each year’s working. and the bearing which the experience gained had upon the creation ot greater efficiency. One inestimable advantage attending such published reports lies in the fixing of the responsibility upon individuals rather than upon an unarraignable and intangible system. That the engineering diffi- culties in the navy, with which we are now face to face, are typical and not accidental; that they are simply an acute and critical stage ina process of evolution, and not merely the outcome of certain special features of our naval administration, is proved by the fact that the same difficulties are arising in all the progressive navies of the world, The United States navy was the first to reach an acute stage of the trouble which, in the judgment of the very progressive and decisive American people, demartded the immediate application of measures for its redress. We appear to be the next to experience the grave dangers attending the failure to har- monize personnel and material. The others will undoubtedly follow in due course, and in view of the vast amount of world wide attention which the whole subject is now attracting, progress is likely to be rapid, and we [January 24, must take care that we are not left behind in the race for the acquisition of the enormous advantages which, in warfare, will accrue to the navy possessing the most efficient organization. ; 1% “The first step towards reform is a frank and intelligent recognition of the obvious fact that the great changes of the last fifty years, under which our warships have become floating machines, necessarily involve sweeping changes in the organization and training of the naval personnel. The required standard of increased efficiency may perhaps entail some additional expenditure, but there are so many possibilities of effecting economies by means of reforms in our whole system of naval admin:s- tration, that it would appear more than likely that vastly increased naval efficiency could be obtained at an annual expenditure not exceeding that which is at present incurred for the maintenance of a navy which is in a chronic state of unpreparedness for actual warfare. In our dockyards, the cost of production could be greatly reduced, and enormous sums of money saved annually, by the erection of modern tools and equipment, and the adoption of an organization and methods more nearly akin to those obtaining in the commercial engineering world, and which have been evolved under the law of the survival of the fittest. Some of the say- ings thus effected could be advantageously devoted to increasing the efficiency of the personnel, by offering the requisite inducements to the © best class of men of all ranks and ratings. To those who have the main- tenance of our maritime supremacy at heart, it is satisfactory to note that, during the past few months, evidence has been forthcoming that the necessities of the case are being felt in some influential quarters, and I do not think it is too much to hope that the pendulum is about to swing. In support of this belief, I would quote the utterances of two distinguished admirals, whose opinions cannot but carry great weight in naval and administrative circles. Rear Admiral FitzGerald, in the course of an able article, entitled ‘Training of Seamen in the Royal Navy,’ which he contributed to the National Review for June, 1900, makes the following significant statements: “ «The navy has made great strides in the direction of becoming a mechanical profession since Sir Geoffrey Hornby’s day. Almost every- thing is now done on board a man-of-war by machinery; manual labor is nothing; and the tendency is to increase the machinery, and to do nothing by hand which can be done by steam, electricity or hydraulics. Not only the motive power, but the fighting power of our ships is all machinery. In the old days ‘Jack’ could repair all ordinary damages himself, and by the exercise of his ‘profession’ he could keep the ship as a ‘going concern’ for many months, and sometimes for years, without falling back upon a dock yard. Now he has practically nothing to do with the up-keep of the ship, because it has nothing to do with what we are still asked to believe is ‘his profession,’ and the ship can only be kept as a going concern by the engineers, the E. R. A.’s, the stoker-mechanics, the armorers, the specially instructed electricians, and in short, by that large class in the complement of a warship which we may properly call artificers. These men and these men alone can maintain for one week, or for one day, the fighting efficiency of a modern battleship or cruiser, or even a torpedo boat destroyer, and the consequence is that ‘Jack’ finds his general utility impaired because he is not a mechanic; his education has been faulty, and he has not learnt ‘his profession, so Sir Gerald Noel and some of his friends propose to improve his education by sending him to battle with the elements in an obsolete type of ship. This I consider to be illogical, because I see that ‘Jack’s’ power to defeat the enemies of his country is entirely dependent upon his ability to manipulate skilfully various delicate machines (including the guns themselves), which require considerable mechanical knowledge and skill to work them to the best advantage. Already the engineers are calling out for executive rank and executive titles. This is quite natural, as they see that they do most of the work, and the maintenance of our modern ships in a state of fighting efficiency is the business of mechanics and not of sailors. I do not think the engineers will get their wish just at present, but this agitation is a sign of the times which must not be ignored; and it is not difficult to foresee that unless our executive—both officers and men—receive a.more mechani- cal training than they do at present, they will be gradually ousted by the engineers and artificers. The law of the survival of the fittest is a universal one, and the navy will be no exception to it. The ‘sailor,’ as we have hitherto known him, cannot survive long, as there is no place for him on board a modern man-of-war. Steam and machinery have battled with the elements, and defeated them far more signally than ever the Jack Tar did in his palmiest days, and the caricature of him which we have been vainly striving to keep up for the last twenty or thirty years must now pass away. I do not feel called upon to produce forthwith a cut-and-dried scheme for our future training service; but that a complete revolution in it, from the day the boys are first entered from the shore, is absolutely necessary I have no doubt, that is to say if we are to keep pace with the times, and not see ourselves surpassed by other and more intelligent nations while we are crying over spilt milk. That the new training must be largely of a mechanical nature seems to me to go without saying, and that the manipulation of masts and sails can have no logical place in it ought, I think, to be equally obvious to all unprejudiced minds.’ ‘Mr. Morrison concludes that such utterances from such quarters may be regarded as marking the birth of a new epoch in the history of the British navy. “It is to be sincerely hoped,” he says, “that the younger officers of the executive branch will not fail to follow in the footsteps of those senior officers of high rank who, in spite of all the deterring influ- ences of that conservatism and affection for the traditions of the past which are inseparable from age, have had the intelligence, courage and honesty to recognize the fact that the old days are no more, and that new condi- tions demand new methods. The time has, however, not yet arrived for any relaxation of effort on the part of those who have identified them- selves with the active advocacy of reforms; rather is it necessary that yet more determined and sustained efforts should be made to stimulate the interest of the nation in the question, and to educate public opinion as to the facts and necessities of the case. I, therefore, appeal to the mem- bers of this and kindred institutions, and to the engineers of this country as a body, to give their close attention to this vitally important subject, and to give expression to a collective and authoritative opinion, that can- not fail to impress the public mind, and materially assist towards the insti- tution of those far-reaching reforms, which are absolutely essential if, on the eve of war, and in answer to the anxious enquiry of the nation, the navy is to be in a position to cry ‘All’s well.’ ”