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16 MARINE REVIEW. [April . 26, THE FUTURE OF SHIP BUILDING. BY CHARLES H. CRAMP. (FROM HARPERS’ WEEKLY, BY PERMISSION. COPYRIGHT, 1900). The marvellous progress in ship building made by Germany during. the past ten years gives us the key to the future of that industry in this country: Up to about twelve years ago, although there were two very considerable ship-owning companies in Germany, there was no _ ship building worth mentioning. All the sea-going ships of the Hamburg- American and ‘North German ‘Lloyd companies, and most of the German navy itself, such as it was, had been built in England. But about 1888 the policy of Germany was suddenly changed. The present German emperor promoted the new policy with all the vigor and ability so characteristic of him. He not only encouraged the German ship build- ing industry by his administration of the laws, but he, through his pri- vate resources, personally took stock in most of the enterprises that were started under the impetus of the new policy, and he also interested him- self in the same manner in the ships themselves. The result is that today, including ships under construction and nearly finished, the Hamburg and the North German Lloyd are the greatest two ship-owning and ship-operating concerns in the world. And concurrently with that all the German war vessels for the last fifteen years have been built and are required by law to be built in Ger- many, and, as far as possible, of domestic material. And an additional and equally important result is that, from practically nothing twelve or fifteen years ago, Germany ‘may now be considered as the second ship build- ing nation in the world, and rapidly en- croaching upon the hitherto undisputed supremacy of England. Had the policy of our government been as wise, as liberal, or as ‘comprehensive as_ 1s the policy of the Ger- man government, the growth of the ‘Ameri- can ship building in- dustry might have compared favorably during the past twen- ty years with that of the fatherland. It may be said that American ship building has grown rapidly since, say, 1881 or 1882. But consider what that growth might have been and might still be were our govern- ment to cease driving nails into the coffin of American ship building, and promote, aid and encourage the industry as other na- tions are doing. The subject of American ship building is, I 5 5 think, little understood by the general public, and much that is written about it is inadequate to explain the situation. In the first place, there seems to be a disposition to regard the supremacy of Great Britain in metal ship building as a cause, whereas it is an effect. Iit is the effect of two causes—(1) the destruction of the American merchant marine just at the beginning of the era of metal ships, and (2) the most persistent and universal aid and encouragement from the British government. It is not stating the case too strongly to say that the principal or largest ship yards in Great Britain have been built and equipped and their working organization trained at the public cost, or by public money. For convenience we may begin with the year 1860, from which to date the supremacy of metal ships. Since that time about or a little more than seven-tenths of the total steam tonnage, metal built has been the product of British ship yards. During the first ten or fifteen years of that period a very large proportion of the naval con- struction of Great Britain was given to private ship yards, and for that work prices were paid sufficiently large to not only give a handsome profit on the ships themselves, but to enable the builders to construct new dry docks and otherwise enlarge their plants and organizations.. The most notable example of this kind is Laird’s of Birkenhead, who were enabled, by the method described, to build five large dry docks. It is difficult to estimate or to even analyze in detail the benefits of this policy in all its bearings. The far-sightedness of the British government might well’ be cause for chagrin to the American people, who have seen the English nation build up an efficient reserve power that would enable it to quickly prepare for war, both in new construction and in the repairs and outfit of vessels that in time of peace would be what is called “lying in ordinary.” But it had an effect reaching far beyond that. The ships which these private ship yards built for the British navy went all over the world and advertised their builders in a manner that could not have been accomplished by any other method. The result was that, from 1860 to 1890, British ship yards supplied all the nations of the world with navies wholly or in part, except France and the United States. The general result has been to make metal ship ‘building the greatest of all British industries for a period of forty years; greater not only in point of com- mercial supremacy—or rather, it may almost be said, monopoly of ocean Battleship Kentucky in Dry Dock. carriage—but also in actual profit earned and money brought into the United Kingdom from all the rest of the world. There seems to be a tendency to forget these notorious facts. Now turn to American ship building and see the reverse side of the picture. Just at the time when the metal ship building supremacy began our supremacy in the era of the wooden ship ended. The war of the rebellion wiped out the commercial fleet that we had, which was com- posed almost entirely of wooden vessels, both sail and steam. Some of the ships were bought by our own government; others were destroyed by Confederate privateers; the remainder were transferred to foreign flags and put under foreign management in order to avoid capture. By the time the war ended the business of owning and operating ships in the United States had ceased to exist. No effort was made to resurrect it. There was no demand for new ships, because all the people who had previously owned and operated ships had gone out of the business, or their. companies were disorganized or broken up by the war, and the English and, to a less extent, other foreigners had secured under their neutral flags during the war such a perfect monopoly of sea-carrying trade that nobody was willing to undertake a contest with them under the conditions then prevailing. Then, as if to stamp out the last spark of life in American ship building, the gov- ernment adopted the policy of doing what naval work it had to do; in its own navy yards; therefore, so far as the seaboard was concerned, there was absolutely no demand for American-built ships except in the coasting trade, which, in ‘these years, - was done almost exclusive- ly in old wooden hulks that had survived the war. So we have be- fore us the two condi- tions — British ~° ship building promoted, aided and encouraged by the most lavish sys- tem of government patronage on a_ most colossal scale, and American ship ‘build- ing choked to death ‘by the reaction’ of ° the same causes that had promoted that of Great Britain. . Now what is the country losing by this backwardness of its ship building indus- tries? Before I go-into details let me_ state that no country can successfully own and operate ships that can- not build them. This proposition has been disputed, and it has been argued that it made no difference how or where ships were obtained, the possession of them would create and maintain a merchant marine, irrespective of home ship building. But it is hardly worth while to waste time in refuting this fallacy. Assuming it to be admitted that it is desirable to maintain home ship building in an effective and prosperous condition, I will pass on to explain the part which the American ship builder must play in any genu- ine and permanent revival of our merchant marine, The only sure guide to practical truth is the lessons of history, or, in one word, experience. We see that Great Britain, the greatest ship-owning nation in existence, is also the greatest ship building nation in existence. She has reached a point at which her yearly imports exceed her exports by the enormous sum. of $780,000,000. To meet this deficit Great Britain. must either earn an equal amount as the great common carrier of the rest of the world, or she must treat her accumulated cash capital itself as revenue and draw on her hoarded principal. Let us see how Great Britain makes up for her vast adverse balance of trade by her earnings as the common carrier of the world. Her 7,310,000 tons of steam merchant shipping earns an- nually $500,000,000 ; her sailing fleet $130,000,000, and the profits on bank- ing, commissions and insurance, all of which inevitably follow the flag, amount to $68,200,000—a grand total of $698,200,000. This alone nearly wipes out the adverse balance previously shown as between actual im- ports and exports. Of this colossal revenue, greater than that of any empire that ever existed, the United States contributes a little more than two-fifths directly; or, in other words, the producers and consumers of the United States pay to British ship owners not less than $280,000,000 a year as the common carriers of their commerce to and from all parts of the world. Without a merchant marine of their own the American people must continue to pay this tribute indefinitely. For this drain there is no rec- ompense. It is sheer loss. The foreign ship owner who carries our over- sea commerce makes us pay the freight both ways. For our exports we get the foreign market price less the freight. For our imports we pay the foreign market price plus the freight. The remedy is in the hands of congress. American-built ships of any grade or class must cost from 15 per cent. to 20 or 25 per cent. more than British-built vessels, ton for