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10 THE MARINE RECORD. Engine Cylinders FOR SALE. _F. W. WHEELER & COMPANY, BUILDERS OF ALL KINDS OF Pair of 18x34x34 stroke steeple com- pound engine cylinders, complete with Iron, Steel, ana steam reverse link and sword arm, 6 throttle valve, exhaust shift valve, etc. * Wooden Ships Built for compounding an engine, but never used on account of change of own- ership, lack of funds, etc. For full par- ticulars address E, care of the MARINE RECORD. FOR LAKE OR OCEAN SERVICE. West Bay City, Mich. aoa F. W. WHEELER, Pres. E. T. CARRINGTON, V. P. C. W. STIVER, Sec’y and Treas. PRON TI al *, X Iron Works. MARINE ENGINES. DETROFY, NOCHE WM. WILFORD’S*>— MATCHLESS WATER-PROOF CANVAS The best in the market for hatch Qd covets, is stronger, lighter, and more ‘gp.durable than any water-proof goods / yet ptoduced. It is made of a twist- ed thread of pure flax, which renders it very strong. It will not crack like cotton goods, which is a great advan- tage Meee ee ee Ue EDWARD A. BUNKER, Room 617 27 and 29 William St., New York. PATENTED AND MANUFACTURED EXCLUSIVELY BY «PEERLESS RUBBER MFG. CO. 16 Warren Street. NEW YORK. A 16=24 Woodward Avenue, DETROIT, MICH. FAC-SIMILE OF A 6-INCH SECTION OF 193-195 Bank Street, CLEVELAND, O. gt ot FOR vt ut vt vt UNION Jt ut STAND HOLES w& wt AND vt ot MAN HOLES At 202=210 South Water Street, CHICAGO, ILL. ECLIPSE GASKET SHOWING NAME AND TRADE-MARK IMBEDDED, the British, and by means of the lake trade they secured an influence over the Indians of the northwest, which they were able to retain till the war of 1812. During that war the Americans were at first determined to shut the British out from the lakes. In this they were largely successful by force of arms, but in diplomacy it was considered expedient to insist upon securing con- trol of the lakes. Such a policy would probably have broken off negotiations at the time, for Great Britain would hardly have given up such a great advantage to commerce, especially when she feared the dangers of conquest of her upper provinces by the Americans. By these considerations the American commissioners at Ghent were led to stand for “terms of reciprocity honor- able to both countries.” When the British commissioners were proposing that Great Britain should have military occupation of the lakes, the Americans asked only a renewal of the former boundary through the middle of the lakes and “perfect reciprocity” in such matters as naval forces and fortifications. Lord Castlereagh from the first desired to prevent a contest for naval ascendency upon the lakes. In his letter to the British commissioners, August 14, 1814, he said that a boundary line equally dividing the lakes, with a right of each nation to arm, both upon the lakes and upon the shores, was calculated to create a rivalry for ascendency in peace as well as in war. This ap- peared to be one reason why he thought the British, as “the weaker power upon the North American continent,” should have military occupation of both shores of the lakes, in case the former territorial limits were left undis- turbed and the Americans were allowed free commercial navigation. He thought under these conditions arma- ments would not be needed: But Lord Castlereagh’s proposal to disarm was not based upon the principle of reciprocity. It may, however, have suggested to the minds of the American commissioners the idea of mutual disarmament. There is an intimation of the idea, at least, in their reply to the British commissioners (dated August 24, 1814), in which they are “at a loss to discover by what rule of perfect reciprocity the United States can be required to renounce their equal right of maintaining a naval force upon those lakes and of fortifying their own shores, while Great Britain reserves exclusively. the cor- responding rights to herself.” Though the United States had no guns upon the lakes before the war, she did not propose to give up her guns now and go back to her former condition in this respect. She desired to see England propose a more liberal and amicable policy toward America. The Government at Washington early in the war appre-] hended what would be the probable policy of the British. Monroe instructed the, commissioners April 15, 1813, under the proffered Russian mediation: “You will avoid also any stipulation which might restrain the United States from increasing their naval force to any extent they may think proper on the lakes held in common; or excluding the British traders from navigation of the lakes and rivers exclusively within our own jurisdiction.” At this time, it should be noted, past experience and con- ditions made it appear necessary for’ the United States to keep a superiority of naval forces on the lakes. Neut- ralization of these waters was probably not thought of at that time. Even as late at January 28, 1814, Monroe thought that participation in the dominion and naviga- tion of the lakes by Great Britain would be a source of danger of the renewal of the war. It appears that the first definite proposition of disarma- ment on the lakes was made by Mr. Gallatin. It was on September 6, 1814, when it seemed that negotiations could not proceed. Bayard manifested some symptoms of concession to the British proposals, and Mr. Gallatin proposed to offer, at least, to refer to the United States Government a “stipulation for disarming on both sides of the lakes.” Adams objected to this, as not being in accordance with positive instructions. Here the matter dropped. But it was probably further discussed by the American commissioners, as a subsequent note seems to indicate. Their firm, but friendly, reply of September 9 was a factor in drawing from‘the British commissioners a more favorable reply, in which they asserted that they had ‘never stated that the exclusive military possession of the lakes * * * was a sine qua non in the negotia- tion,” and that after the Indian question should be adjust- ed they could make a final proposition on the subject of Canadian boundaries “so entirely founded on prin- ciples of moderation and justice’ that they felt confident it could not be rejected. The nature of this proposition is not stated. It was never brought forward, nor was any explanation given of what was intended by the offer. But the American commissioners supposed they intended to propose the mutual reduction of armaments, and on September 26 pledged themselves to meet such proposi- tion with perfect reciprocity.”* Gallatin, however, wrote to Mr. Monroe on October 26: tober 26: “The right of preserving our naval forces on the lakes to any extent we please is a sine qua non by our instruc- tions. Supposing the British to propose a mutual restric- tion in that respect, either partial or total, should we still adhere to the sine qua non? Clay wrote a private note to Monroe on the same day, in which he says that the recent events at Vienna and in America had encouraged a hope for an early peace, but he does not allude to Gallatin’s note. It is probable that Gallatin wrote without consulting the other members of the commission. No reply to this note is found; in fact, if one was ever sent, it could not have reached him until after the Christmas eve when the terms of peace had been agreed upon. Gouverneur Morris, who had ben desirous of peace, and not desirous for Canada, during the negotiations also suggested the idea of disarmament. But the idea differed from that of Gallatin by being proposed as a matter of economy. On October 17, 1814, he wrote to Hon. William Welles: “It would be wise to stipulate that neither party should have ships of war on the lakes nor forts on their shores. Both are an idle and useless expense.” He added: “Tf they had there forty ships of the line and a dozen Gibraltars, we could with great ease take Canada.’ The work of reducing the expense of naval forces on the lakes began very soon after the peace. Mr. Jackson, of Virginia, on February 17, 1815, offered a resolution that the naval committee be instructed to inquire and report to what extent the United States navy on the lakes could be reduced consistent with public interest. It was felt that while the United States forces ought to some extent be regulated by that of Great Britain, all useless expenditure should be retrenched. It was not the policy of the United States Government to fight to prevent a possible injury at a distant day. The Government ex- pected peace and began to prepare for it. By act of Feb- ruary 27, 1815, the President was authorized “to cause all armed vessels of the United States on the lakes to be sold or laid up, except such as he may deem necessary *Mr. Clay, on October 9, however, was for rejecting any proposition to disarm upon the lakes of a proposed article by the British (ultimatum on Indian pacification) was admitted; because he considered that the two articles together would deliver the whole western country up to the mercy of the Indians.