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| : 4 JULY 5, Ig00. eee In 1863 the Brun boat, the Plongeur, was built at Roche- fort, France, and was one of the first to have mechanical motive power. She lacked diving rudders, attaining her depth solely by variations in weight. Asa result there was no control in the vertical plane. Later horizontal rudders were fitted, and the boat worked very well—with the usual result, Admiral Hichborn adds, that she was declared useless by a board, and made into a water tank. The importance of horizontal rudders was not grasped in spite of experience with the Plongeur. In fact, one of the curious circumstances connected with the development of submarine navigation is that in very few cases does any evi- dence appear of the study of the art. Almost all inventors began de novo, with the consequence that our late patent files show designs for obtaining results that had been reached a couple of centuries ago. During the last forty years at- tempts to solve the problem of submarine navigation have been almost constant and the progress has been generally forward, and these years may be considered the era of the power-driven boat. One of the last hand-worked submarine craft was the Intelligent Whale, which attracted much atten- tion because she was bought by our Government and became a United States vessel, although she possessed no feature superior to Fulton’s design a half century earlier, and in many principles of design was inferior. She was an example of the power of conservatism, which practically prevented her use for studying the laws of immersed bodies, and was responsible on the one occasion she was operated, for man- ning her with an incompetent crew and trying her under ridiculous conditions which worked up a fright about the danger connected with her. A press account appeared credit- ing her witha total of forty-nine victims. Asa matter of fact, no life has been lost in her or in any way connected with her from the time she was built in Galveston, just after the close of the Civil war to the present day. Since 1880 Europe has been experimenting with submarine boats, and in France, Spain and Italy the governments have encouraged the experiments. In France alone has there been government encouragement through a series of years; progress has been so great as to call forth official estimates and requests for the building of a submarine flotilla of 38 boats. The French type developed by the trials with an electric-storage motor boat, the Zede, is a good one, deficient in important details, but sufficently good for the economical and methodical French to be impressd with the great econ- omy that submarines will bring to their mobile coast de- fenses. While Mr. Whitney was Secretary of the Navy, proposals were made for submarine boats, with a view to furnishing some kind of protection against gun fire for torpedo boats. . Several designs were offered and two propositions to build were made by the Cramps, the designs being those of Holland and Nordenfeldt, the latter of whom had built five or more boats and had sold two to Greece and two to Turkey. The designs differed radically in the very important princi- ple of control in the vertical plane. For submergence Nordenfeldt used vertical acting propellers outside the hull in the plane of the midship’s section; consequently stored power was used to pull the boat vertically down against the resistance of her whole greatest longitudinal section and that of her reserve or normal buoyancy. The boat was to be as stiff as possible as regards any inclination of the keel in the vertical plane. The Holland design was diametrically opposite as regards submerged manoeuvering. As lively a movement as possi- ble in the vertical plane was given by the action of the stern rudder; submergence and rising was attained by pushing the boat by her whole motive power down or up an incline, the angle of which was to be determined by the angle of the horizontal rudder. The Nordenfeldt was a down-haul or sinking design; the Holland a steering under, or diving, device. A dogma was issued by Mr. Nordenfeldt to the effect that the keel must always be kept parallel to the sur- face of the water, and this dogma was accepted by many naval officers because it was given out authoritatively, although it was never supported by theory, reasoning, or facts. Both designs proposed steam as the motive power, to be used from a fired boiler while the boat was running on the surface, and from the same boiler with fires hauled as a steam store, or from a chemical heater, when running sub- merged, and both provided for retained buoyancy. On March 3, 1893, Congress authorized the building of a submarine boat, and after some competition of designs and other delays a contract fora Holland boat was signed two years later. Details of the design were, by the contract, THE MARINE RECORD. made subject to the Department’s approval, and Mr. Hol- land claimed that some of these details as required interfer- ed with the efficiency of the boat. This boat, the Plunger, is not finished, the construction having dragged for many reasons, She is now undergoing a change in her surface motive power from steam togas. Meantime the Holland Co. built a boat of their own design, the Holland, and she, last November, was reported by the Board ordered to ob- serve her functioning, as fulfilling the requirements that had been suggested by the Department. Two distinct types of practical submarine boats have now been produced, Admiral Hichborn believes; the submarine torpedo boats like the Holland and the French boats, and the bottom workers like the ‘‘Travaileeur Sous Marin,” in France and the ‘‘Lake’’ boat Argonaut in the United States. The latter boats are intended for work along the bottom, and the ‘‘Lake’’ boat gives good promise of efficiency. She is propelled along the bottom on wheels. At present she is not a true submarine, in that she retains communication with the air by means of a tube. The securing of our coasts so that our fleet may be free to do its legitimate offensive work is a most important duty. The question arises whether submarines can do it. It is not believed that any battleship, by her gun-fire or otherwise, can prevent the approach of a submarine of the efficiency of the Holland. A sharp lookout by day would reveal the ap- proach of asubmarine. By night she might be picked up by searchlight as she rose to correct her course, but the chance for this wou!d be small. When revealed she could be avoided by retreat, owing to her lack of speed. Once within good torpedo range her chance of putting a ship out of the fight by delivery 6f a torpedo would be excellent; her chance of being hit by a lucky shot from the enemy be- fore her torpedo was sent would be small. The submarine could therefore presumably force a ship away from the point of attack to a distance limited only by the fact that the boat must never move so far from the point to be defended as to allow the ship time to double back after she had been chased off. With a group of submarines some could be held inshore to prevent such doubling. Assuming twenty miles as the distance limit for effective work of submarines, -asmall fraction of the theoretical radius of their action, a fleet of submarines in the defense would force a blockading fleet to that distance. If the blockading line of ships were forced from the five mile limit at which shore works might be expected to hold it, off to twenty miles, it is clear that the area to be guarded by the blockaders would increase sixteen fold and at least as many ships would be required to hold the line. Considering all conditions and even materi- ally cutting down the efficiency shown on trial, Admiral Hichborn sees no reason why submarines cannot secure our coasts more perfectly than they can be secured in any other way at present practicable. The provision of a number of submarines would give a high degree of coast security, since their presence would result either in the absence of hostile ships or in giving a chance to oppose our small boat with its small crew to a large ship with a large crew, with the chances of war in favor of the boat. In closing, Admiral Hichborn says: ‘‘As a designer of ships, the economy in leading other nations in the adoption of submarines appeals to me strongly. For experience shows that as soon as any particular kind of fighting craft appears in numbers sufficiently large to make the effect of that kind felt, it forces great modifications upon existing types. Whether devices be invented whereby battleships can meet submarines, or whether they will continue to be vulnerable to offshore attacks as now, certain it is that the general appearance of submarines will force important modifications in design; and cestain it is that the first country to accept the modifications will enjoy great comparative advantage in saving in her naval budget.’ ———————$_ queen ee __—_—_—_—_—_——_ THE Hancock Inspirator Co. has issued a new catalogue of 40 pages, 6x9 inches, devoted to the well-known Hancock inspirators, of which they are the sole manufacturers, for stationary, marine and portable boilers. All the various types of Hancock inspirators are illustrated and described in detail, and much additional data of value is furnished in directions for connecting and operating, and price lists, which latter it has been found necessary to revise owing to the introduction of new goods. The book also shows the Hancock ejector, ‘‘Loftus’’ automatic in- jector, Hancock hydro-carbon burner, Hancock purge apparatus, Hancock shaking grate, valves and general jet apparatns which the company makes. Copies of the cato- logue may be had upon application at the general office of the Hancock Inspirator Co., 85-87-89 Liberty Street, New York. SHIPPING AND MARINE JUDICIAL DECISIONS. .(COLLABORATED SPECIALLY FOR THE MARINE RECORD). Witness.—Where an employe of the owners of.a steam- ship was expected to testify for them, but was discharged before the trial for bad conduct and gave testimony on the ° trial adverse to the owners, but his testimony, on collater- als facts tending to discredit the owners, was shown to be false, he was discredited, and his testimony of no value. The Strathdon, tor Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 600. Damage by Fire—Burden of Proof,—Where the theory of the complainant in an action against the owner of a steam- ship for damages resulting from fire to goods shipped on such vessel is that the fire originated from an overheated flue, from which the cargo was ignited, the burden is on the complainant to establish that the flue was overheated, and that the fire originated therefrom. The Strathdon, 1or Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 600. Effects of Release.—A receipt in full for all claims under a charter executed by a master at the port of discharge on payment to him of only the freight due does not release the charterers from a claim for deniurrage which was also made at the time by the master, and rejected, where thc master was compelled to give such receipt in order to collect the freight and did so under protest. Durchman vs. Dunnetal., ror Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 606. Damages for Loss of Vessel—Stipulated Value.—It is com- petent for the parties to a charter to fix the value of the ves- sel therein as a basis of damages in the event of her loss, and such valuation is conclusive upon them in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, especially where the vessel was one built as a pleasure yacht, and having no determinable market value. Moore vs. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, ror Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 591. Shipping—Demurrage—Construction of Charter.—A pro- vision, in a charter for carrying a cargo of lumber, that the cargo should be furnished ‘‘as fast as vessel can receive and properly stow same in suitable hours and weather,” has ref- erence to the hours and weather suitable for loading and stowage, and does not exclude time lost by reason of the lumber becoming wet in distant yards, and unfit for loading before it is forwarded to the ship. Durchman ys. Dunn et al., 1o1 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 606. Shipping—Contribution in General Average—Ljiability of Carrier—Excluding Loss to Ship.—Although the owners of a vessel are exempt under the statutes from liability for damage to the cargo resulting from a fire due to the negli- gence of one of the crew, without their own neglect, they cannot maintain an affirmative action against the owner of the cargo, for contribution in general average to the ship loss; but, when an action for general average is brought by the cargo owner, the damage to the ship. must be taken into consideration, as otherwise the cargo owner could recover by selecting his proceedings for losses for which the ship owner was not responsible. The Strathdon, ror Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 600. Construction of Charter—Ljiability of Charterer for loss of vessel.—A charterer, who bound himself by the contract, to return the vessel at the expiration of the term of hiring in as good condition as at the beginning, ‘‘fair wear and tear, rea- sonable use only excepted,’’ and who also explicitly under- took to be responsible for any loss or damage to any part of the vessel, her equipment and furniture, and to secure the owner ina specified sum against all losses and damages which might occur to her, is not relieved from the obligation to pay the owner her value as fixed in the contract on a fail- ure to return her, by the fact that she was lost without fault on his part, since such contingency might reasonably have been anticipated, and his liability in that event provided against had such been the intention of the parties. Moore ’ vs. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n, tor Fed. Rep. (U. S) 591. Sufficiency of Facts.—The donkey boiler of a “steamship was directly under a deck where a portion of the cargo was stored. The top of the boiler was Io or 12 feet above the fire, and a flue inits furnace extended from its top to the main boiler funnel, its nearest point to the roof being 19 inches therefrom. The entire shell of the boiler contained water, and there were four transverse water tubes in the in- terior.Expert witnesses testifled that it would be almost im- possible for the heat in the boiler to make the flue red-hot ; and that such a fire would cause the steam to explode the boiler, if the safety yalve did not lift, and warn the men. The use of the boiler did not require a heat sufficient to overheat the flues, and to maintain such a heat was contrary to instruction, and the testimony of witnesses who saw the flue before and after the fire indicated that it had not been red-hot. A former employe of the steamship, who had been discharged for bad conduct, and who was shown to have sworn falsely as to other matters tending to discredit the owners, testified that the flue was red-hot. The cargo was on planks on an iron deck over the boiler room. Between the flue and the deck were three baffle plates, leaving three 3-inch air spaces and and one 1034-inch air space between the flue and the roof. Experts testified that the deck could not have become hot enough to set fire to the cargo. Held not sufficient to warrant a finding that the cargo caught fire as a result of the fire becoming overheated. The Strathdon, ror Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 600.